I spend quite a bit of time in rural Idaho. It isn’t Afghanistan, but it ain’t Brooklyn either. There is a new wind farm project being built on the outskirts of town. As I understand it there are 63 windmills being built to convert wind power into electric power. An unknown number of local farmers have leased the land to the developer.
Photo Source: caffeinejournal.blogspot.com
The ‘locals’, at least those who haven’t made any money by leasing their land, are not happy. They are generally not in favor of new things or new ways and there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding the ultimate effects of the wind farm. For one thing there will be windmills and not a few of the sky, for another there is a great deal of angst about the potential effect on crops and animals.
The developer built a network of wide dirt roads on private property – part of the land leases. The local newspaper ran some stories explaining that this was all on private land and that the county had not closed any roads.
Yesterday I’m picking up my lawn mower and there’s a couple ahead of me talking to the proprietor of the mower repair shop. All parties agree that the county has been reached by the developers to close roads and that something evil must be taking place because they can’t seem to figure out a way to ‘get up there and see what’s going on’.
I’m willing to bet that this is a scenario NATO forces are seeing in Afghanistan every day. It’s hard to convey information that people don’t want to hear.
Making matters worse is that the most credible spokespeople for the project, the farmers/ranchers that have leased their land, are hesitant to come forward and admit that they are actually making money from the project, perhaps for fear of being looked upon as traitors.
Bottom line: Credible rural messaging requires respected local spokes people.
Odd to read that point is again being neglected. A JIC was the major driver back in the standup of the CSEPP. Can you say beltway bandit rewrite??? More for your perusal:
ReplyDeleteMar 7, 2011 ... CSEPP Blue Book (PDF 2MB, TXT 502KB) - Provides in-depth information on CSEPP exercise policies and guidance (currently being revised ...
http://emc.ornl.gov/CSEPPweb/PDF/CSEPP%20Exercise%20Policy%20and%20Guidance%209-7-04.pdf
"Bottom line: Credible rural messaging requires respected local spokes people."
ReplyDeleteAbsolutely right. Having deployed to Afghanistan last year though, I can tell you that it's near impossible for us to recruit respected local spokespeople because we can't protect them. Village elders may side with CF and make efforts to cooperate with CF in a private setting, but hardly any will do so publicly, and with good reason- they'd be putting themselves and their families in danger. The reality is that the TB consistently and successfully target key leaders cooperating with CF across the country. I can't remember a month where there weren't multiple assassinations of provincial governors, district governors, district sub-governors, and/or other prominent government officials. Keep in mind that all of these folks have security details. It is no surprise that the far more vulnerable village leaders are loath to support us with F2F, radio, or loudspeaker messaging.
My time in country taught me that the whole "clear, hold, build" strategy is a joke. We can spend a day or two clearing a village, but there's nothing to stop INS from coming right on back.
Clear, Hold, Build is not a joke - it works. This strategy is the premise of VSO and is complemented by SFA.
ReplyDeleteOnce people feel protected, especially by their own local security force - then they will be more open to supporting the messaging effort led (not directed) by the US and International Community.
I caution against making bold judgements on strategy that are limited only to your respective lens. Effective MISO Soldiers are those who can look up and out - instead of being limited only to "their 25 meter target".
I wish you all the best, 4th POG SSG; you show signs of being astute in challenges that are beyond your immediate scope of influence.
Re: Anonymous
ReplyDelete"I caution against making bold judgements on strategy that are limited only to your respective lens. Effective MISO Soldiers are those who can look up and out - instead of being limited only to 'their 25 meter target'."
I agree- the conditions/strategies/analysis from my dinky little AO can't be extrapolated to cover the theater at large. The thing is though, it's not just my AO. Our inability to succeed at the "hold" phase is the norm for VSO sites across all of the RCs in Afghanistan. The only sites that we have been able to hold, and the only sites where we've been able to inspire some confidence in security, are the ones that barely needed to be "cleared" in the first place, such as predominantly Hazara areas, predominantly Tajik/Uzbek areas, and other areas where there has been a minimal or nonexistent INS presence since the invasion.
Although my "lens" is certainly incomplete, I worry that the lenses of many high-ups in this war are far more incomplete than mine. Much of what they see from SITREPs, intel, and analysis has been perpetually distorted and modified on its way up the chain of command by people trying to make themselves look good for their superiors. Even commanders who take the initiative to get out in the field and see things firsthand are likely to see a sanitized version of the reality on the ground. When General X goes out to a FOB and asks how things are going, he's rarely told "not good". Soldiers fond of and/or loyal to their leaders don't want to make them look bad, and soldiers scared of their leaders don't want to risk their wrath. The leaders themselves will rarely tell a high-up that a situation is "not good" for fear that they will be held responsible for it.
"Once people feel protected, especially by their own local security force - then they will be more open to supporting the messaging effort led (not directed) by the US and International Community."
I agree that IF LNs felt protected, especially by their own local security force, they would be more open to supporting CF. However, the phrasing "ONCE people feel protected..." suggests that this objective will be inevitably achieved. I am highly skeptical of our ability to pull this off at the vast majority of our VSO sites in Afghanistan.
Recruiting and training ALP has been a cornerstone of our VSO approach for some time now. But save for the aforementioned locations where security wasn't much of an issue to begin with, the effectiveness of ALP forces has been generally disappointing. The main reason for this is that even when our SOF teams and/or conventional trainers have managed to put together capable, adequately sized forces, the forces are still vulnerable to INS influence. It's just too easy for INS to threaten an ALP member's family and/or throw a few rupees/dollars his way, and he's going to turn a blind eye to whatever they do, if not actively help them.
"Clear, Hold, Build is not a joke - it works."
I should rephrase my earlier remarks- it's a joke to pursue a clear, hold, build strategy when we're not powerful enough to hold. In Iraq, we've at least had sizable, credible, seasoned forces (SoI/Sunni Awakening) that we've been able to pay to do much of the holding for us. The ALP, however, are far too small, weak, corruptible, defenseless, and inexperienced to play any kind of parallel role in OEF.
Thanks for your thoughts. I wish you all the best as well.