Amorphous international groups are especially difficult
PSYOP (these enemies require more than just MISO) targets. The February 5, 2014 Foreign Policy
Article “War on Error” (see: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/04/war_on_error_al_qaeda_terrorism)
piqued my interest for this week’s posting.
The article talks about how al Qaeda
is addressed inside the beltway and in the real world.
The article, in my opinion, properly concludes that al Qaeda “has
morphed from a discrete terrorist group into a wide-ranging fighting movement
that conducts insurgencies, recruits foreign fighters into conflicts, raises
funds, and conducts terrorism on the side -- almost certainly its
least-resourced component.”
The enemy forces arrayed under the al Qaeda banner include
those that are formally loyal to Zawahiri, as well as affiliates and allies and
self-proclaimed followers. This broad band of people makes target analysis
difficult.
One approach is to look at the target geographically with
heavy densities of al Qaeda concentrated in Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Mali, Syria
and Somalia. While this approach has some merit, it would exclude targets in
potentially active AOs such as other countries of Africa and dormant cells in
the US and UK.
Perhaps a better approach would be to look at the ‘who’ and
the ‘why’ so as to be able to develop influence products to counter the AQ
influence. This analysis must be multifaceted and include psychological, sociological and cultural aspects
Just as the targets occur across a broad swath, the influence
products needs to counter them will include a broad range as well. Graffiti, posters, “tweets”, and chat room arguments for example are needed along with more
traditional TV, radio and print efforts.
Given the changes in demography, economics and sociology
expected over the next decade, one could argue that the globally amorphous
target will emerge as more of the norm than the exception.
As always, reader input encouraged.
Photo Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/31/they_who_must_not_be_named_al_qaeda_terrorism_list
I think this makes the case for AOR-specific authorities.
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