Buried on page 266 is sec.1033, Limitation on use of funds
for United States Special Operations Command Global Messaging and
Counter-Messaging platform. Key portions of this section are shown below:
“Specifically, the committee believes
the MISO enterprise remains too focused on tactical activities using
traditional media and has not evolved to adequately counter adversary messaging
through social media and other modern forms of communication. The committee
notes that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) ‘‘Web Ops’’ capability was
established to counter online propaganda of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
and is the predecessor to the proposed SOCOM GMCM platform. Despite the
existence of a military information support military occupational specialty for
decades, the MISO enterprise played only a minimal, supporting role in the
activities of the CENTCOM Web Ops platform. The committee believes this
situation is symptomatic of broader deficiencies in the MISO enterprise. Therefore,
the recommended provision requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review
of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel and facilities applicable to military information support
capabilities with a goal of improving the capabilities of the MISO Enterprise
to more effectively operate in the information environment against both state
and non-state actors”.
Here's my assessment:
On a
high level, there is quite a bit going on, much of it centered on the
spectacular lack of success of US DOD influence (especially cyber influence)
efforts. Recently the JCS elevated information to a joint function (see: https://www.rmda.army.mil/
In
parallel with this movement are separate initiatives in each of the services to
develop their own influence (MISO) capabilities.
The
Senate Armed Services Committee has latched on to SOCOM who has the lead for
MISO and would likely to be responsible this lack of success. The Committee
wants to be sure that any further allocation of funds is warranted. Tagging
this particular project is just one element of machinations going on at the
highest levels.
There
are several factors at play here.
1.
DOD
MISO is quite diluted as it goes across the force.
2.
There
are no visible results from any digital/cyber MISO efforts.
3.
The
MISO force is not synergistic. The Army still has an artificial split between
the AC and the RC even though doctrine flows from SWC. It’s sort of a doctrinal
“Animal Farm: where the AC is more equal.
4.
Non-state
actors in particular have been able to harness an asymmetrical advantage by
using the Internet for recruiting, communications, etc. ISIS in particular.
5.
SOCOM
has not done a very good job of shepherding the influence resource across the
force.
6.
CyberComm,
is the land of the geeks and is totally divorced from the influence force. In
essence you have the campaign/message/theme people isolated from the digital
delivery experts and also unable to direct the use of digital weaponry as an
influence tool.
7.
Congress
doesn’t seem to realize that the amount that they have allocated is not very
much to accomplish the mission they have assigned.
I could
go on, but you get the idea. It appears that the Senate wants to see a detailed
review of what SOCOM is doing from a MISO perspective, how that relates to what
the combatant commanders are doing and how it interfaces/impacts/relates to
other government influence efforts, chiefly the Department of State. And, it
wants this review before any more funds should be allocated to those efforts.
Let’s
all stayed tuned and don’t be shy about contacting your Senator if you’re so
inclined.
Photo Source: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
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