On September 26, 2017, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Joseph Dunford, USMC https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_APQs_09-26-17.pdf)
testified before the US Senate Committee on Armed Forces (see:
testified before the US Senate Committee on Armed Forces (see:
Part of his testimony appears below:
“Do you think that the Department of
Defense needs to better integrate its capabilities and planning for cyber
operations and information warfare?
Yes. The Department must improve our
ability to exploit the potential of cyberspace as a pathway for Information
Operations to drive adversary perceptions, decisions, and actions (or inaction)
in ways favorable to our strategic ends. We must also improve our ability to
reassure friends and support allied and partner military efforts to defend
against and defeat adversary propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation, much
of which is delivered via cyberspace.
If so, how would you recommend that
this goal be achieved?
Cyberspace is one of many domains
through which we can conduct Information Operations. In order to improve
cyber-enabled Information Operations, we should continue to prioritize growing
and maturing our cyber forces. We are working toward this goal by integrating
our approach to the information fight from the ground up, building Information
Operations and cyberspace doctrine, guidance, and tasks into our strategy
development and execution orders, adopting an active and innovative approach to
improving understanding and fluency in the domain, and developing new
operational and organizational constructs and advanced tools designed to keep
pace with the environment and the threat.”
I have repeatedly commented on my
perception of the schism between cyber operations and MISO. While there is no
denying that cyber is a significant IO vector and that Social Media is evolving
to be more important than broadcast media, I have not seen any evidence that
DOD is on top of this challenge.
While there is a published DOD Cyber
Strategy from 2015 (see: https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf),
there doesn’t seem to be a coherent strategy for US government wide Strategic
Communications or influence, nor does there seem to be a current DOD wide MISO strategic plan, nor any documentation on
spider webbing MISO and cyber influence capabilities throughout the Force.
In June 2016 DOD published the
“Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment” which you can see at: https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-in-the-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf.
However, this document is also short on specifics and of course, was published
under the former Administration.
A couple of thoughts on what needs to
happen.
1.
We need a coherent, US government wide
strategy recognizing that influence and counter disinformation and propaganda
must stretch across all Federal Departments and resources.
2.
DOD needs to emphasize the need to put
MISO and Cyber Operations resources at the point of the kinetic spear. Meaning
that the Marine Corps and Army Forces should be augmented with tactical
Influence Operations forces.
3.
Career tracks should be established
across the force to cross train selected personnel in Public Affairs, MISO and
Cyber Operations. This force should also include highly qualified personnel
from other Federal Departments such as Department of State, Commerce, Treasury
and Energy.
Reader comment invited.