Green on Blue Attacks: Can Brochures Really Help?

All of us are concerned about “Green on Blue Attacks”.  Incidents where Afghans turn on coalition forces. The Afghan government has developed a 28-page "Brochure for Understanding the Culture of Coalition Forces" (see: http://www.rferl.org/content/excerpts-from-afghan-cultural-sensitivity-guide/24707518.html). The document which is being distributed to Afghan soldiers and presumably Afghan National Police, is regarded as a positive step in building bridges of understanding across the cultural divide.

Media reports and other sources keep saying that most of these attacks are angry, offended or troubled individuals. Reportedly foreign influence and Taliban infiltration are involved in a small percentage of the incidents.

What has this got to do with MISO/PSYOP?

We look at target audiences, assess alternative media and delivery means, develop messages and execute. We do all this to support the CDR and his mission. No one would deny that the mission in Afghanistan is complex, unique for us as a military force and unforgiving. 

Sowing distrust for allies is among the most classic forms of PSYOP. This very cost effective strategy exploits existing feelings, grudges, histories, preconceived opinions or other already negative impressions. 

Deception, such as  wearing the uniform of a friendly force is another classic technique. The Germans were renowned for their efforts employing this tactic during the Battle of the Bulge.

The Green on Blue attacks seem to include a bit of both of these.

Perhaps a brochure is fine for those who can read and for those who are open to learn. For those who can neither read or who are fixed in their beliefs or who lack the discipline and training to carry weapons, brochures are of no use.

If I were a cynic I might say the purpose of the brochure for the Afghan government to try and convince NATO that the government is actively involved in helping to stop the attacks by negating bad feelings through education. History, however, would not be on the side of this argument.

These incidents appear to be caused by individuals who have not been properly screened to see if they are suited to do what they are tasked to do. No amount of influencing will change this, so perhaps the brochure effort can serve as a very bad example on two fronts: 1. It will not accomplish the task for which it was developed and 2. It serves to show yet another misstep by the Afghan government. 

Photo Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-deadly-consequences-of-cultural-insensitiviy/24707511.html

MISO Billets and the Army National Guard

Searching for the right slot is always a challenge for MISO (PSYOP) personnel. Anyone intent on moving up in rank has to balance a number of factors when looking for their next slot. Geographic location, rank and MOS are high on the list. I was pleased to receive the 4^th QTR FY 12 issue of the MISO Advocate published by the Joint MISO Proponent Office at USSOCOM.

I was intrigued by the article “72 MISO Billets at NGB Maneuver Units” written by long time PSYOPer Phil Krigbaum. Just as the line between AC and RC is fuzzy, the line between USAR and NG can be even somewhat more mysterious.

During my 27 year career I came into contact with a few NG units because the USAR unit I belonged to was “Capstoned” to the NG Unit. I still fondly recall one weekend with the Dixie Brigade of the Alabama National Guard in Tuscalosa, AL. The Captstone designation  meant while we never trained together or perhaps even known very much about each other, we were destined to go to war together if ‘the balloon’ ever went up.

Just as the AC perhaps looked askance at the RC, my view of the NG was not entirely neutral. Fast forward to April of this month when I became involved with the DOD Employer Support to Guard and Reserve (ESGR) program and was immersed into the Guard world.

For better or worse, we (those serving) are all in the same boat.

The article indicates that the NG assignments are for a 2-3 year duration. The type of unit varies. SF Brigade, Brigate Combat Team, Infantry Division MP Brigade, and Fires Brigade seem to be the most common. Pay grades ranged from 04/05 and the range of NCO paygrades: E6, E7 and E9.

Locations were just as varied – Los Alamitos, CA; Rosemont, MN; Columbus, GA; Fort Belvoir, VA, Camp Douglas, WI and some interesting ones like Cheyenne, WY; Tupelo, MS and Boise, ID.

If were still serving and could apply for one of these slots I would. It’s not quite the glamour associated with a joint billet like Naval Special Warfare Group or an Air Force Cyber unit, but it could prove to be a great learning opportunity, and perhaps, just perhaps an alternative way to complete one’s service before retirement.

There are some ‘issues’ that exist when an Officer or NCO transfers from one component to the other and you need to carefully assess the possibilities. Perhaps there would be a way to try a slot by drilling with the NG but processing the paperwork as if you made up a USAR drill.

As always, y’all are closer to this than I am and comments are more than welcome.

Picking The Right Spokesman

Renown actor and director Clint Eastwood was the big mystery guest at the Republic Convention last week . As PSYOPers we know that we need to select our messages and our desired results before we engage spokes people and energize the campaign. If you didn’t see the speech, then check it out on YouTube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yoqKdWY692k which is also the photo source. This is the official version published by gopconvention2012.

The 11 minute performance was perceived in predicable ways. Republicans and Conservatives thought it was great while Democrats and Liberals felt it was neither well done,  nor effective. Spokes people are often wild cards – Eastwood is above all a performer, and likely a performer with his own agenda – an agenda which apparently was close to, but not exactly a total match for with the Republican one.

To be fair Eastwood made a few good jabs and it was nice to see a more conservative actor on the political stage for a change. His conversation with an imaginary Obama had its up and downs. He made the point that attorneys shouldn’t be president – an easy target, no one favors attorneys. He also hit the key points of jobs and his feeling that President Obama hasn’t lived up to his own campaign promises.

Probably Mr. Eastwood was a warm up act – an act designed to energize the faithful and set the stage for the Nominee. He was credible to the target audience and he certainly has the communications skills needed to get his point across. 

The results were indeed mixed.

The bottom line is that you roll the dice every time at spokes person gets up and speaks or is quoted. Pandering safe lines to a safe and captive audience is always a safe bet. If Mr. Eastwood’s purpose was to fire up the troops- he succeeded. If his objective was to leverage off his star power to change minds and votes then he was a likely a flop.

After all, not every spokes person can make your day.

You Can’t Handle The Truth!

That famous line was spoken by Jack Nicholson as Colonel Nathan R. Jessep in “A Few Good Men” (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5j2F4VcBmeo&feature=player_detailpage).

Now we have another good man, Matt Bissonnette, writing under the pseudonym Mark Owen essentially saying that Osama Bin Laden was not a threat to the Seals who raided his compound.

While we could speculate that the objective behind ‘leaking’ information about the book, “No Easy Day” (http://www.amazon.com/No-Easy-Day-Firsthand-Account/dp/0525953728/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1346360258&sr=1-1&keywords=no+easy+day) which fueled the NY Times on August 29, 2012: “Book on Bin Laden Killing Contradicts US Account” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/30/us/book-on-bin-laden-killing-contradicts-us-account.html).

The issue from a PSYOP perspective is not whose account is correct, but the impact on the world audience seeding yet more doubt about the US and our motives.

Clearly a killing in self-defense, even on a raid that some (like the Pakistani government for example) believe was illegal is a better story than a murder. US policies and motives are already under attack from a variety of quarters. Nation states and non-state actors are all posed to strike at the US while a large junk of the world population is trying to make up its mind.

There was a book written in 2002 called “World Without Secrets” by Richard Hunter which stood for the proposition that in today’s world nothing can stay hidden for a long period of time especially if there are people with time and resources who want that information. This rule clearly holds true in major world events. Sooner or later ‘facts’ get out. At first the facts may be convoluted or incorrect, but ultimately other details seep out.

A core principle of PSYOP is that the truth needs to be the core of what we do. If Bissonnette’s facts are credible and discredit the White House, especially a couple of months prior to the election, learning this lesson will come at a steep price.

Can MISO put the Russkies in the Soup?

OK, so I’m reaching a little bit for this week’s posting. But give me a break, you can’t be a creative genius every week and I’ve spent the past several weeks in Idaho where I didn’t even get much of a chance to enjoy the country side.

Today’s posting was inspired by the Washington Times (not the Washington Post) article: “US and Russia in a new standoff” which appeared in the August 21, 2012 website at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/21/us-and-russia-in-a-new-standoff/. (Which is also the photo source)

The nub of the article is that Tajikistan is potentially a very strategic ally. That the Russians have had a strong military presence there which is slated to end in 2014. The year coincidentally that NATO would close its base in adjoining Krgrystan.

The article opines that while Russia is confident it can conclude a deal that would give them long term access, this is not necessarily the case. It appears that other countries such as India are also interested in employing Tajikistan as a military logistics point.

Suppose for the moment that DOD wanted to use Tajikistan very badly and that they were willing to offer military type assistance through increased mil to mil activities and by providing military equipment along with the training to the Tajik military. 

The question I pose for the community is: should MISO be part of the mil to mil exchange so that the Tajiks could learn the fine points of Military Information Support Operations? I must confess that I really don’t know too much about the history of Tajikistan so that I can’t comment if they even consider non-kinetic operations as significant. 

Having said that I would wager that if NATO offered some of the cyber expertise from their Estonian Center, this might be a very powerful incentive.

Thoughts?

PSYOP in Syria – Employing Lessons Learned in Libya

USA Today.com had an article “As Syrian Rebels advance, intervention holds promise” (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-08-13/syria-rebels-us-intervention/57039798/1). The world has been watching events unfold in Syria and for the most part that is exactly what they have been doing - watching. Just as with Libya, the temptation to intervene on the side of ‘the people’ has been resisted by the world community. 

According to the article while the President “has resisted calls for military intervention…” Secretary of State Clinton “said over the weekend that the U.S. is discussing several options, including establishing a no-fly zone, with Syria’s neighbor Turkey.” The no-fly zone tends to favor the rebels since the “Assad’s forces seem to have stepped up the use of helicopters and attack jets recently” the article states.

What does all this mean to the influence war? The first thing I did was take a look at the balance of urban versus rural. According to Nationmaster.com it’s a 50/50 split (http://www.nationmaster.com/country/sy-syria/peo-people). This would bode well for the use of traditional media and the Internet as the means of influence. If it were me, my approach would be a combination of mass messaging and targeted. First and foremost I would single out those who are on the fence and might be induced to defect or support the anti-government forces. Once they were identified I would do a social network analysis and determine linkages.

From a targeted perspective I would employ mobile phones as the delivery vehicle. Part of my strategy would also be to provide video and graphic content to a variety of sources that would show the government’s unconscionable acts and balance that with content showing successes of the rebels and support by the people.

Clearly the White House and the State Department are the driving forces at this point in time. The mere fact that Secretary Clinton is making public statements is a strong indication that other actions, often those behind the scenes activities which have become a hallmark of her management style, are also under way.

MISO at varying levels from no fly zone through ground engagement ought to be at least  templated, perhaps based on the Libyan scenario.  

One of the interesting aspects of a career in MISO is that as Gilda Radner, the famous comedian once said, “there’s always something”.

Photo Source: By Khalil Hamra, AP

Syrian men inspect a hole allegedly made during an airstrike by government forces in the town of Marea, Syria, on Monday.

USA Today article referenced above.

PSYOP Training in the 21st Century

I’m up in Idaho for my annual summer rural reintegration training. As I pondered this Blot entry I recalled that it’s been quite a while since I went through the POOQ (PSYOP Officer Qualification Course). 

Like most Reserve courses of the day, as I recall, it was a combination of correspondence and physical attendance. I also had the opportunity of attending the US Army War College Distance Learning program from which I graduated in 2002. Since 2009 I’ve been teaching on-line for American Military University.

I’ve noted some ‘issues’ between the AC and RC with respect to training and qualifications. My stated philosophy is that both AC and RC soldiers and officers need to be trained to the same standard and perhaps more importantly need to be able to work with each other quickly, under stress with mutual respect and trust.

The AC POOQ is taught in 6 phases and extends over 40 weeks long. The Reserve program involves about 4 weeks at Fort Bragg which overlap the last phase of the Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Core and the two week Cumulative Exercise (CULEX). Some NCOs are also involved in the CULEX as well.

In looking over the AC program at Bragg there are some obvious differences in addition to the time factor. PT is an ever present part of the training and there is of course M4 and M9 qualification. AC folks also get language training that RC personnel do not. 

Another unknown for me is the scope and depth of the CORE subjects on both sides of the ledger. While I don’t think language training is an absolute requirement, I do believe that the use of interpreters needs to be a core subject mastered by all PSYOP Officers. 

It occurred to me that the Resident Phase IV (MISO Core) could include some distance learning components to allow the AC and RC officers to cross fertilize the courses and broaden their mutual experiences. 

I’m also wondering if there is a battery of tests and a  series of role play exercises that are administered at the end of the Core phase. In my mind there needs to be an assurance that all officers have the same baseline of achievement with respect to the Core materials.

I also noted that the AC Graduation Week has a Regimental Induction. I am hopeful that the RC is a part of that event so that all of the graduates recognize that they are a part of the same Regiment. It would be a pity to disperse a cohort that had spent two weeks together in a Culmination Exercise without completing the process of bonding and incorporation into a greater whole.

As always – comments invited.

Photo source: http://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/intelligence-and-combat-support/psychological-operations-officer.html