The PSYOP of Protests - Occupy Wall Street Applied

There has been much ado about the “Occupy Wall Street” Movement here in the US during September and October of 2011. The late night news on 12 September had extensive coverage of how the ‘movement’ was spreading throughout the San Francisco Bay Area.

As it turns out, I was attending the 1^st San Jose Cyber Security Summit at the San Jose, CA City Hall. After watching the news last night I was more than curious to see the extent of the protest live. I took the photo in today’s posting using my iPhone, so I can assure you it was not retouched in any way. It turns out to be a ‘long shot’ with the tent accommodations of some of the protestors in the foreground and a bunch of ‘protestors’ about 75 feet away near Santa Clara Street, the main thoroughfare near the City Hall.

If the effect makes the entire effort look sparse – it’s because it was! This is in stark contrast to the tight shots being used on TV last night which gave the viewer the impression that there were quite a bit more protestors than in reality.

What’s all mean? Gatherings of crowds can serve useful purposes of anyone who is astute enough to photograph them in a way that supports their case. Magnifying the size and scope of a gathering serves to amplify the message. This amplification can serve to stimulate recruitment, increase media coverage, provide useful ‘background roll” for later use or all of the above.

Merely showing a group of people protesting doesn’t prove anything by itself. Analysts would have to look at the objective size of the crowd, their demographics, trends in the previous days or weeks and compare this analysis with other similar situations.

For influence professionals it’s a gift! Images of various demographic groups, particularly individuals whose image clearly portrays a specific group can be very effective in promoting one’s cause. Counter propaganda analysts need to not only perform the objective analysis , but determine the potential uses our enemy could make of the images and recommend what the best counter messages might be.

In the Internet age the local protest can turn into the strategic message very quickly.

Put Down The Loudspeaker And Pick Up The Cell Phone

Today’s crazy optempo doesn’t allow a moment to think much about the future. The April 9^th, 2011, Economist featured an article: “Mobile telecoms in Africa” – Digital Revolution. (See http://www.economist.com/node/18529875?story_id=18529875) which is also the photo source.

I’ve mentioned the need to be on the look out for future locations where PSYOP/MISO missions will be played out and I’ve also pointed out that Africa is an area where scant attention has been paid – Libya and the Middle East countries are an exception of course. The article noted the implementation of 3 submarine cables to Africa and a corresponding price reduction of 90%.

At the moment basic handsets dominate with Nokia the dominate player. Other product notes include that a $90 Android operating system smartphone made by China’s Huawei “sold out in several African countries in less than a month”.

There are strategic and tactical aspects for PSYOP to consider. On the one hand it would be nice to get on the inside track of the mobile provider and be able to easily send mass messages of all types: voice, SMS, Twitter, etc. On the other there is a need to send targeted messages to selected devices.

Most likely the mobile phone campaign would be supplementing other effort, yet total reliance on a single device as may be the case with some targets makes dominating that communications medium critical. This leads to a couple of questions: what organizational level should have the capability to employ the mobile media of today and the more complex devices of tomorrow and what equipment and support will be needed?

At this point I don’t have any particular answers, but I thought it was important to raise the question and reference the article.

PSYOPing Karzai With Grass Roots Politics

It’s now (April 2010) clearer than ever that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is not the right man for the job and it is our duty as champions of democracy to help the people of Afghanistan replace him and his cronies with a leader and a government that will govern for the benefit of the people and not personal fortunes or ego.

Even the charismatic and charming President Obama has failed with Karzai. Karzai’s denouncements of the West – read that the US – are yet one more slap in the face. While I don’t generally quote Ralph Peters as a good source, I’m afraid I have to mostly agree with his April 6, 2010 article in the NY Post: “Karzai’s new low – We’re stuck with no Plan B” (http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/karzai_new_low_JfRxe6UV6zXCjdEalGAsLM)

As it turns out, I have a plan B and a Plan C. Plan B is develop bottom up public support for a coalition government that will oust Karzai and replace him with someone is perhaps less corrupt and who can serve as a catalyst security and economic self-sufficiency from the village up. Of course this plan would require resources and assistance from the US and other sources – we know that and according to Peters, we have invested: “A thousand dead Americans and billions of dollars poured into a cesspool?”

Plan C is build an enduring self-sufficiency from the village level up.
This crossroads presents a unique opportunity for Secretary Hillary Clinton to engage the DOD to help her further the goals of the President and actually establish a foundation that would facilitate a withdrawal of US troops sooner rather than later. To do this a holistic information influence strategy would need to be developed that would combine direct and indirect communications channels and would (perhaps covertly) support appropriate Karzai opposition. In parallel, my Plan C calls for local campaigns to strengthen the local leadership so that they can govern in the absence of a competent national government.

Plan C is a good one because it builds from the nature of the Afghan people and their history. It also appeals to the independent nature of the local villages and, at the same time can negate some of the influence of the Taliban. This plan would require tight coordination through ISAF and implies an ISAF level task force that has situational awareness down to the village level and that has the authority to divert resources and concentrate efforts where they are likely to do the most good.

Peters’ assumption about our counter insurgency doctrine assuming a friendly competent government also seems unfortunately on the mark. Doctrine writers on all levels are on notice that they need to change the rules of the game so that we can as Clint Eastwood once said “Improvise, adapt and overcome” (attributed to his role as Gunny Highway in Heartbreak Ridge)

Attacking The Terrorist Mind

The January 10, 2010 NY Times features an article entitled: “The Terrorist Mind: An Update” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/weekinreview/10kershaw.html?scp=1&sq=terrorist%20mind&st=cse)

The author analyzes works by a number of academicians who have studied the terrorist mind. According to the article, Dr. John Horgan of International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State is credited with leading “much of the research into what is known as disengagement – a terrorist’s departure from the organization”. Dr. Horgan claims that there are a couple of key reasons why terrorists leave the movement. This is not to say they abandon their radical views, but rather they have left the group and renounced violence.

Leading reasons include: the small groups they are in “are rife with jealousies and personal competition; life is boring; pressure of maintaining a double life is too exhausting. Others include “aging out” where the member has grown to the point of wanting more stability and perhaps starting a family. Some may sense that the group’s goals are unattainable and/or they have reached their moral limit. Others are dismayed to find elderly and children engaged in battles.

From a PSYOP perspective we want to stimulate and reinforce these views. The Internet is likely the ideal medium to transmit dramatizations and perhaps ‘testimonials’ form former terrorists (to include Taliban) that underscore the feelings noted above.

The Internet has been cited as a key medium for recruitment for Al Qadea and Others (see NY Times, December 31, 2009, “Focus on Internet Imams As Recruiters for Al Qaeda” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01imam.html?scp=1&sq=Focus%20on%20Internet%20Imams&st=cse)) Consequently it is logical to assume that the same medium would be the way to reach the terrorist member and transmit messages reinforcing the desire to leave the movement.

Chatrooms and other virtual meeting places need to be designed that can attract terrorist recruits and members and that offer messages stimulating disengagement. In my view it makes sense to post messages from various sources on websites known to espouse terrorism. I am a believer of using the Internet like the ocean. Taking down offending websites is like playing Whack A Mole because new ones will pop as quickly as others are taken down.

It seems to me that these kinds of operations need to be joint (more than one service) and ideally combined (more than 1 nation). Furthermore the best work product is likely to come from a combination of military, diplomatic and civilian minds – groups designed to think like the customer with the native linguistic ability to carry the creativity and disengagement messages forward in multiple directions on the Internet and elsewhere.

Palestinian Polarity: Implications for Afghanistan and Beyond

The December 14, 2009 Washington Post featured an article: “The Palestinians' opposite poles.” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/14/AR2009121403728.html?wpisrc=newsletter)

The article describes how two men grew up in the same refugee camp in Gaza. One ended up moving to the West Bank while the other remained in Gaza. The article goes on to describe how the man in the West Bank was able to begin a business and how his son will be going to college in Cyprus to study film making while the other’s son is studying in al-Quds University and has no idea as to his future.

It would seem that the purpose of the article was to show how these two men and their children were affected by the move and to highlight the growing dichotomy between the two Palestinian factions and areas.

To me there are some interesting lessons to be learned here. First of all, age old conflicts can take generations before there is even the slightest amount of movement towards resolution. Secondly, the soundest way to strengthen a society is from the bottom up starting with the family unit. The basis of the strength comes from insuring the basics of being able to live a life where there is security and stability, but more importantly, where there are bright possibilities in the future.

The ability for the children of the original Gaza refugees to seek out and obtain education beyond their own country where they are able to learn skills and nurture their talents to benefit their people is a key differentiator. Where squalor and hopelessness prevail, there is an incentive to lash out against real or perceived oppressors.

The parallel to Afghanistan is clear. The Taliban have succeeded in permeating the society and supplanting the government. They have done this on a village by village basis and they have done so over many years.

The ‘new’ US strategy is aimed at dislodging the Taliban because the Taliban provide safe haven to Al Qaeda and our other enemies. Given the number of villages and the time and treasure needed to establish their security and stability – I’m not optimistic.

In the meanwhile it will be up to the tactical PSYOP soldier, buttressed by efforts of local, regional and high level PAOs to constantly paint the positive picture envisioned under a non-Taliban (but not necessarily purely democratic) government. PSYOP and its allied disciplines must constantly strive to publicize ‘good examples’.

PSYOP will also have to be ever watchful for inevitable screw up where injuries or deaths to the civilian population are attributed to the International Security Assistance Force, (ISAF) so as to minimize the negative impact of these incidents and enemy propaganda. Neither of these are easy tasks nor will they be made easier by the surge. President Obama and his key leaders need to be ready to re-evaluate their ‘new’ approach early in the game and often to properly respond as the situation evolves.

Photo source: http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://cabalamuse.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/palestinian_kids_are_seen_sized.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.palestinecenterblog.org/2009/10/brief-palestinians-must-be-afforded.html&usg=__oNLFK4XB33iphJHq40vB4mEpsgE=&h=436&w=640&sz=79&hl=en&start=6&tbnid=QaOk5wAM-BwcVM:&tbnh=93&tbnw=137&prev=/images%3Fq%3D2009%2Bpalestine%26gbv%3D2%26hl%3Den

The Reality of an Influence Strategy in Afghanistan

The more I read about the situation in Afghanistan, the more I stand by my previous analysis of the bottoms up rural nature of the country. The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) the ‘trade association’ for the Signal Corps and IT in general has an electronic newsletter called NightWatch. Their December 8 edition had a particularly good analysis of Afghanistan which I commend to your reading at: http://nightwatch.afcea.org/NightWatch_20091208.htm

Photo by Bruce Hoffman and Seth G. Jones, NationalInterest.org (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.nationalinterest.org/uploadedImages/Public_Articles/2008_-_May_-_June/Hoffman/hoff10small.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx%3Fid%3D17916&usg=__JgGIPj5yXf7Z3U4xDyL1gh5WqgI=&h=315&w=420&sz=82&hl=en&start=7&itbs=1&tbnid=RcOK5E1PX87cpM:&tbnh=94&tbnw=125&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dafghanistan%2Bvillage%26gbv%3D2%26hl%3Den

“Winning” in Afghanistan needs to be defined as establishing a secure enough environment that the country would no longer be a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other enemies of the United States. Our goal is not and should not be for Afghanistan to become a modern, democratic state. That being said, the key mission is to bolster local governments at the village level to the point that the Taliban are no longer to establish their dominance nor are Al Qaeda or other foreign enemies be able to exploit the country or its people.

We must recognize that a Taliban lead insurgency is a chronic condition much like a disease. However, the major of Taliban are not militants and are probably not ‘anti-American’ by nature as much as they are anti- stranger and anti-occupier. Consequently there are a number of key messages that must be transmitted:

1. Local Governments Have The Integrity & Wisdom Needed to Govern and Provide Honest Justice
This mission means key villages must be identified and local governments installed that can offer a viable alternative to the Taliban shadow governments. It means that these governments must be corruption free (in a relative sense because a certain level of corruption seems endemic to Afghanistan) and able to provide the quick justice Afghans have found so appealing in the Taliban shadow governments.

2. The Taliban Way is Not the Afghani Way
This would reassert the need for a people oriented justice system rather than the Sharia law or law based on the Quran. History has shown that the people of Afghanistan are fiercely independent and have no taste for these draconian legal systems.

3. NATO and the US are Not Occupiers
The ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) is there to help the people of Afghanistan restore security and peace. The mission of ISAF is to train Afghani’s to handle their own security and law enforcement and will leave once the mission is accomplished.

These messages need to be transmitted at the local level more than any other. This will require the entire force to be cognizant of how to work with the local villages and require the Department of State to cajole or catalyze the Karzai government into the same mode. It is clearer than ever before that the only way to succeed in Afghanistan is from the Bottom Up. As a former precinct organizer, let’s hope that President Obama insures that this philosophy is core to our strategy and operations.

Converting the Taliban – A Worthy PSYOP Effort

The 21 Nov 09 edition of the LA Times carried an article about what it termed ‘a fledgling effort to convince the Taliban to turn in their weapons and turn away from violence in return for jobs and security (see http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-afghan-taliban23-2009nov23,0,2892908.story). The article described how this program was patterned after a similar program in Iraq, the Sons of Iraq, which was widely credited with reducing the level of violence there.

Photo from the LA Times, (Reza Shirmohammadi / AFP/Getty Images / November 21, 2009)
PSYOP support to this program and similar ones is critical and support of these programs can pay dividends in other ways as well. While I’ve never been to Afghanistan, it’s my belief that the Taliban are for the most part Afghanis and as such have a long term interest in their country. Furthermore, the Taliban are representative of the beliefs and values of many more Afghani citizens as evidenced by the kind of popular support they seem to enjoy in many parts of the country.

The Taliban and their fellow Afghanis hold certain beliefs about the purpose and long term goals of the American presence there. Unless we are able to shift these believes, a satisfactory end game in Afghanistan will continue to remain elusive. By showing that our intent is to help the Afghanis establish a secure and comfortable (by their standards, not ours) lifestyle we would go a long way to setting the foundation for an invigorated Afghanistan.

PSYOP efforts here should be a combination of direct and indirect messaging. Direct messaging should very definitely include true success stories showing how individuals made the decision to renounce violence and how they are now living secure and prosperous lives. Personifying the success and putting the average Afghani, especially the Taliban, in the picture of a more satisfying and secure life will help others visualize themselves in that enviable position.

Indirect messaging should show Afghanistan without the American forces and urge citizen cooperation to help get to that point by renouncing violence, engaging in peaceful livelihoods and helping to root out corruption in the Karzai government at all levels.

Given the agrarian nature of Afghanistan and the likely parallel push to replace the poppy as a major crop, there needs to be a parallel program of offering short and long term assistance to poppy farmers so that they can successfully transition from poppies to another crop. This program is likely to require a combination of assistance up front along with seasonally oriented agricultural resources and education. Care must be taken not to over rely on capital equipment for the new crops since that equipment will be difficult and expensive to maintain and to blend the new crops into the culture and lifestyle of the local farmers.

This kind of dual pronged positive PSYOP coupled with the resources to keep the promise of the programs will go a long way to establishing the stability that will facilitate an end game in Afghanistan.

Counter PSYOP – The Hasan Matter

Bad news, unlike wine and chicken soup, does not get better with age. The murders at Fort Hood will haunt our collective consciousness for some time to come. Make no mistake, our enemies are pondering how to use the tragedy for their own purposes and we need to be ready with counter PSYOP, in fact we need to be sending messages right now. Photo credit: AP via Washington Post

Hasan’s links to ‘radical cleric’ (see Washington Post, 18 November 2009 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/17/AR2009111703830.html?wpisrc=newsletter) is one of many Monday morning quarterback articles across the media. I won’t concern myself with the law enforcement aspects but point to the PSYOP aspect - -word of mouth, especially from credible (to their audience) religious leaders is a powerful recruiting tool and a means to keep their followers engaged against the perceived enemy.

From an enemy PSYOP perspective let’s honestly reflect on what they have to work with. First of all there is an incredible wealth of video and photographic imagery of the carnage at Fort Hood and pictures of MAJ Hasan in uniform. There is also a wealth of information on his alleged beliefs and even a PowerPoint.

The enemy is more than likely going to employ some of these on the Internet and perhaps even orchestrate the spider webbing of word of mouth showing how the jihad’s righteousness has been accepted by Muslims even in America and even by those who have mistakenly taken up the cause and worn the uniform of the infidel.

What do we need to do about it? First of all we need to reemphasize the message that we are not at war with Islam, but with terrorists. However, while there needs to be direct USG messaging from President Obama and Secret Clinton on down the line, American sources are not enough. We must enlist the aid of credible Muslim religious leaders to speak out against the atrocity and reiterate the criminal, anti-Islamic and abhorrent nature of the act.

We need to show that the defendant is assumed innocent until proven guilty. If appropriate messaging concerning his medical care after the incident along with the on-going story of the criminal prosecution may be of value.

It might also make sense to have messaging from Muslim Chaplains and individuals currently serving in the US military to underscore the fact that Hasan is an aberration and that serving in the US military is consistent with Islamic beliefs.

The point is we know the enemy is resourceful and employs a high degree of information agility – we need to launch an information offensive before we are caught flat footed once again.

Congress and Strategic Communications – Are They On The Right Track?

Today’s Washington Post covered comments made by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees concerning Strategic Communications. Rather than point to failings of the military I believe it shows that President Obama – one of the great info warriors of our time – is paying more attention to communicating with the American Voter than to the world audience. (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701896.html)
(Pictured are Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Representative Ike Skelton, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee)

There were several key points raised by Congress in the article:

1. Strategic Communications Programs are too big, have grown too fast to allow effective oversight, it is impossible to determine whether the efforts are integrated within DOD or with the broader US government” and Pentagon planning “is insufficient compared to the needs.”

2. The military is producing propaganda and other materials that mask US government sponsorship and focus beyond traditional military IO – they are “alarmingly non-military propaganda, public relations and behavioral modification messaging.”

3. There needs to be a new legal review of the law prohibiting strategic communications (or PSYOP) accessible by American audiences.

Presidential Action Need to Command and Control Strategic Communications

Given that funding for Strategic Communications is rapidly approaching $1Billion and that there is no central control or coordination of these efforts across the USG it seems to me Congress is right on. There are other critical issues here though. First of all it appears that the President has not focused any attention on strategic communication. His information advisors are concentrating on making sure the Health Care Agenda goes forward and are paying scant attention to foreign audiences.

The President or his designated Information Leader needs to be the focal point for Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy because our efforts worldwide are moving to information engagement over kinetic operations and this trend is likely to accelerate over time. The President needs to be mindful of the previous criticism of USG information management and the disaster experienced by the Pentagon Office that sought to address this issue.

There needs to be an approved overall USG information engagement strategy and a designated leader for it reporting to the President. Only be applying the principle of unity of Command will the USG be able to effectively manage its information engagement efforts and determine the adequacy of planning and resourcing for the task.

Information Engagement Must Be More Than Military

Congress has missed the boat on the ‘military nature’ of strategic communications. DOD is the critical resource serving as a conduit of information to civilian audiences. US forces abroad are faced with the need to effectively communicate to foreign audiences on their own soil. This messaging is inherently non-military in nature. The so called ‘winning of hearts and mind’ is no longer the leaflet urging surrender. Rather the messages are support your government, help defeat the insurgents, explore possibilities for a more stable economy – the stuff of nation building and bolstering governments rather than the traditional messages associated with combat.

Information Laws Are Obsolete

The Internet Age has brought the world to smart phones, the notion of ideas being bound by traditional national borders is nonsense and the time has come to amend the laws restricting information engagement even if American audiences can receive the messages.

Blog Entry, 30 June 09 – PSYOP Skating to the Puck

I’m generally much of a sports fan, but I do follow, rodeo, football and hockey. And while I don’t often employ sports analogies, ‘skating to the puck’ is a good one. It implies that the player must anticipate where the puck is going and be at the right place at the right time to make the winning play.



Countries with the largest Muslim population as of 2008:
Indonesia 204 Million
Pakistan 164 Million
India 154 Million
Bangladesh 128 Million
Turkey 76 Million
Egypt 74 Million
Nigeria 73 Million
Iran 65 Million
Morocco 34 Million
Algeria 33 Million
Afghanistan 32 Million
Saudi Arabia 28 Million
Sudan 28 Million
China 27 Million
Egypt 27 Million
Iraq 27 Million
Ethiopia 27 Million

Source: http://islam.about.com/od/muslimcountries/a/population.htm
In my view skating to the puck means employing Strategic PSYOP to addre
ss audiences in Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria because while only Algeria has been in the news with respect to Al Qaeda (e.g. Washington Post @ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052901967.html) the other nations are critical to global long term peace and prosperity.

Indonesia should be at the top of the list because it has the largest Islamic population and because it is a keystone of Asia and a symbol to the rest of the world. According to the CIA Factbook “Indonesia's first free parliamentary election after decades of repressive rule took place in 1999. Indonesia is now the world's third-largest democracy, …. and home to the world's largest Muslim population. Current issues include: alleviating poverty, improving education, preventing terrorism, consolidating democracy after four decades of authoritarianism, implementing economic and financial reforms, stemming corruption, holding the military and police accountable for past human rights violations, addressing climate change, and controlling avian influenza.” (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ID.html)

Indonesia faces a myriad of issues and the USG clearly should have messaging that addresses many of them. Furthermore Indonesia’s role in Asia will become more pivotal as China’s political, economic and military influence continues to grow. Indonesia must receive significant strategic communications attention as a prophylaxis to alleviate potentially serious issues in the future.

USG strategic communications will of necessity combine Department of State and Department of Defense information engagement efforts. As a core principle of democracy, the Executive Branch’s civilians drive Strategic Communications under the direction of the Ambassador in line with guidance from the President and Secretary of State Clinton.

Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command has a number of informational resources at his disposal as does the Commander of the US Special Operations Command. These DOD resources ought to be ‘de-conflicted’ so that they are additive in effect. After all marketing is cumulative. These efforts will likely include traditional media and the Internet. Given the burgeoning growth of mobile phones in Asia, campaigns employing Text Messages, e-mails and social networking are also appropriate especially to reach the young adult population which is a very large chunk of the overall population.

Time in the posting does not permit an analysis of other countries and their potential for strategic communications. Suffice it to say that Turkey is critical the US and global security so that it should be singled out for special attention as well.

PSYOP and Iran

I believe that the US should stay out of the melee in Iran, however, the events unfolding there can be harnessed for great effect in other theaters to convey some very important and powerful messages:

1. Fundamentalist dictatorships will never acquiesce to their people’s wishes.

2. Support of fundamentalist regimes can lead to violence against citizens who dare to oppose them.

3. In times of stress Fundamentalist dictatorships will do all they can to limit communications. State media will often be the only ‘authorized’ media covering events. Those seeking to let the outside world know the truth will have to rely on technology and creativity to get their messages out and wills subject to personal peril.

There are some observations which ought to be noted as well:

1. The Internet and amateurs may be one of the few ways to transmit messages and images from forbidden/denied areas and incidents.

2. Covert cameras need to be employed during incidents to reduce the chances of the communicator being singled out of a crowd.

3. Even the most repressive of governments (North Korea perhaps being an exception) cannot keep a total lid on negative images and communications flowing out of their countries.

From a military PSYOP perspective harnessing the images and Internet exploitation of them should take several directions. A trans-regional campaign is in order to inform moderate Islamic audiences of the events unfolding in Iran and transmitting the messages I’ve noted above and others as appropriate. Tactical PSYOP production units should accumulate file footage (often called b-roll or background roll) to be used as needed later on.

Training institutions such as SWC should develop case studies to be used in future PSYOP training and/or exercises based on two alternative scenarios. One scenario is that PSYOP forces are inside the country where the events are taking place and the other is that PSYOP forces are outside the country. The second scenario would pose questions as to how or if these images and news stories coming out of Iran should be used elsewhere and if so how.

Consideration should also be given in the use of covert cameras during hostile situations so that local images may be captured for subsequent use as well. This training should be provided out of DINFOS as well as SWC and other appropriate training venues.

I would also recommend that PSYOP Groups assign an informal project team to keep track of the events in Iran and to search out, store and categorize the images and stories as they unfold.

Source of Photo: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,528133,00.html

White House Homeland Security Council Merged Into the National Security Council

President Obama has directed that the White House Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council be merged with the combined staff of about 240 personnel reporting to National Security Advisor General James Jones, USMC (Ret).

(See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR2009052603148.html?sub=AR or http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/27homeland.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Security%20Shuffle&st=cse) (Photo Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/newsstoryPhoto/2003-01/200301092a.jpg)

The White House website does not have a listing of the members of the NSC except for those who are required to be members by statute. According to the White House Website:

“The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.” (http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/)

This is prudent recognition that the dangers facing our country no know borders. The action should have the effect of increased information sharing among staff members and perhaps a more cohesive approach to security issues overall.

A key question that should be raised is: how will the new and improved organization address information engagement issues across the board? It is reasonable to assume that the NSC has a Strategic Communications representative and it is clear that the Press is a critical component of the Homeland Security Council.

At issue is how information will be crafted and distributed under this new approach. The Department of State is the lead for Public Diplomacy, but often lacks the resources and reach to exert information influence in many parts of the world where conflicts exist. On the domestic front, Department of Homeland Security will work with the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) and coordinate incident response using the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Neither of these two organizations have the robust resources that DOD has to deploy under the kind of exceptionally adverse conditions that would exist after major natural disasters or terrorist attacks.

It would appear then the some real work needs to be done to fold DOD resources into the NSC/Homeland Security mix. This work entails more than the development of contingency plans, but has to include a modicum of training for PSYOP and PAO personnel and will have to run across Active, Reserve and National Guard Forces.

Furthermore, the kinds of holistic responses that may be required may also need to employ contingency commercial resources that need to be identified and trained beforehand as well.

Given that DOD is still working out the kinks of how PSYOP and PAO will work together, watching the new and improved NSC unfold will be interesting. Let’s hope the equipping, planning and training takes place before any negative incidents.

Bad News And Commanders

Getting hit in the media can sometimes have more long term negative effects than physical casualties. The recent credibility debacle arising from airstrikes in Afghanistan is disturbing on many levels and a very good – bad example.

First of all CDR, especially senior ones, should know that, unlike wine or chicken soup – bad news does not get better with age. CDR should also know that sooner or later the ‘truth’ will come out. Consequently it makes sense to know where your bombs are landing and to be ready to admit when things going awry.

Commercial Public Relations (PR) experts will advise to get out in front of the event and take the moral high ground. Admit what happened, take responsibility, describe how you will help to set things right and then detail the steps you are taking to make sure it won’t happen again.

Of course this has to be in the context of not giving the enemy the feeling that you are abandoning the weapons systems and conveying that you won’t hesitate to bring air power to the fight whenever necessary.

Afghan Poppy PSYOP

The Associated Press ran a story on 30 March “US launches new fight against Afghan drug trade”,




Photo Source: Daily Mail, October 13, 2008

see(http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hCUxKbunroDLpz-QKfiKnqI0iAWQD978J8OG0).

The latest approach to negating the flow of money to the Taliban and Al Qaida is much like the DEA’s similar campaigns in Latin America. In addition to attacking the supply of opium and driving up its price, the strategy will also concentrate on drug dealer money laundering.

At first glance this appears to be a win – win situation. Not only do you reduce the amount of drugs in circulation, but you strangle the money faucet to terrorist organizations. Success in Latin America is cited as the model outcome.

I’m not convinced it is as cut and dry as it appears. The crux of my discontent is my continuing crusade for a bottom up information engagement campaign. In this case the bottom of the pile is the farmer. The AP story begs the question of the farmer and concentrates on the Obama Administration’s strategy’s emphasizing the supply and money chains.

Long term problems with drugs will persist as long as there is big money to be paid for drugs and the culture and economic well being of the farmer are dependent on opium. The Department of Agriculture needs to be energized to develop a systematic crop replacement for opium. This replacement needs to be cognizant of the growing environment in Afghanistan and the world demand for whatever the replacement crop needs to be. In addition the crop should mirror growing seasons and be highly adaptive to the climate and soil conditions where poppies are currently cultivated.

The program should also include short term financial support and/or supply of food and other items that would be needed by the farmers while the new crop is growing and the system to harvest and market it matures.

From an information view point a classic marketing ‘teaser’ campaign where pictures of a future secure and prosperous life without the terrorists, Taliban or even unwelcome outsiders of any kind controlling the farmer’s destiny. The messages would stress the increased welfare of the farmers and the positives attributes of the new crop such as positive growing characteristics and a higher income potential.

Unless there is research needs to confirm that there is value to messages concerning the reduction of suffering by elimination of the drug trade, I would not employ these messages, not even in passing.

In short the combination of agricultural insight, micro-financing and tribally tuned information engagement is the right way to deal with the Afghan opium supply and a strategy that has a far better chance of long term success.

PSYOP Lessons Learned From Gaza

There have been a couple of very good articles on PSYOP in Gaza published in the last few weeks. USA Today ran “Cellphones Put to 'Unnerving' Use in Gaza” (http://www.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/2009-01-13-gazaphones_N.htm) The photo is by Abdalrahem Khateb, AP . The article addressed how both sides were employing cell phones, SMS and land lines in an effort to influence their opposition. A similar article, “The unreported battle with Hamas: psychological warfare” was published by Haaretz (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1054916.html).

The third article the Economist, “A war of words and images” (http://www.economist.com/world/mideastafrica/displaystory.cfm?STORY_ID=12953839) claims that Israel had lost the propaganda war at the time of its publishing, 15 January 2009.

What can US PSYOP forces learn from the Gaza conflict that might serve them well in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond?

Lesson 1 – Be Realistic On Expectations – At least in your own mind.

I don’t have any inside knowledge as to the goals of Israeli PSYOP in Gaza. However I think It is it fair to say that the Israeli PSYOP target was as much the popular opinion in the West as the residents of Gaza. I frankly don’t believe it is reasonable to assume that a cell phone call or a text message will convince anyone to betray their neighbor. In fact I’m doubtful that tactical PSYOP campaigns aimed at civilians during kinetic actions will serve any purpose except to provide information for civilians on how to avoid being killed or injured. The horrific nature of urban close combat and the disruption of the civilian infrastructure are likely to be too big of an obstacle to overcome. Furthermore, the vehemence of beliefs was cemented long before the IDF rolled into Gaza.

Lesson 2 – Technology to Suit The Target

A useful lesson is that media must be varied to suit the target. While I don’t recall if any of the articles mentioned the age of the PSYOP targets, I suspect that the most fruitful target would be those engaged in active combat, smuggling, rocket firing or other acts of or in support of terrorism. This is likely to mean an audience between the ages of 13 and 40. Mobile phones and texting is the medium of choice and must be exploited. However, the product must be credible and appear to be correct in terms of jargon, style and content. Failure to understand the linguistic and local cultural nuances of the messages will instantly destroy their effectiveness.

Lesson 3 – There Are No Secrets

Sooner or later the true sources of all PSYOP will come out. PSYOP planners need to understand this principle up front. Exposure of sources can be OK if the time value of that source has expired, if the source and the medium in question are destined for long term use, than a very prudent perspective – should be employed. The arguments here will likely mirror the arguments used in the intelligence community where one side wants to employ the intelligence and the other does not because it would expose the source and render it useless in the future.

Every conflict yields lessons, let’s hope we learn some of them.

Silver Bullet Messages – Where Are They?

DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charles E. Allen recently addressed the Washington Institute for Near East Policy saying “I find it particularly alarming that al Qa'ida is improving its ability to translate its messages to target Europeans and North Americans.”

He went on to describe their overall efforts - - “At the top of this sophisticated marketing machine, al Qa'ida leaders have carefully crafted and controlled their words. Al Sahab produces the audio or videotapes; the al-Fajr online media network plays the messages on numerous electronic platforms to include messages that download onto "I-PODs" and similar electronic devices. The Global Islamic Media Front then translates, re-packages, and re-disseminates these messages onto numerous - sometimes redundant - websites with the capacity to regenerate any website if a government or private entity attempts to bring it down.” (full text at: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1210107524856.shtm)

At the heart of the al Qa’ida effort is their messaging which the Secretary described: “Al Qa'ida media themes throughout 2007 were consistent with previous messages of building unity in the Muslim community while instilling a sense of duty to support violence in defense of Islam.”
Simple and powerful messages are the hallmarks of successful marketing and public relations. Marketing materials and spokes people must reinforce each other’s efforts employing the common messages.

In the interest of full disclosure, be advised that I am writing this entry relying on my over 35 years marketing experience, but without the benefit of first hand experience in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

It strikes me that local commanders probably know what their key messages ought to be because their objectives are close at hand. This means that tactical PSYOP teams should have their messages pre-planned and reinforce them employing whatever media is at hand. Each team member should be keenly aware of these messages.

PR trainers go so far as to teach their students to employ several ‘safe messages’ that can be relied on when the spokes people are being forced off track. This would be a useful technique for tactical teams to employ as well.

Messaging should theoretically come on three levels: Corporate (Global), Regional and Local. The senior PSYOP Officer in theater should function as the Regional lead and take the appropriate steps to insure deconfliction and reinforcement of messages across the AO. The Regional leads should also be the touchstone for “Corporate” messaging and work with global and national partners such as the JMISC for the same purposes.

It is important to point out that there is a key difference between corporate messaging and government messing. Corporations promote different business units or product lines, Government messaging should be consistent across all levels. This consistency should be managed employing a corporate like management capability across cabinet departments.

Given the hierarchical nature of the military it could be argued that DoD information should be able to invoke this kind of coordination. When it comes to the US government overall, this does not appear to be the case.

There is no single Chief “Marketing” Officer at the Cabinet level, nor does the President employ a functional approach to information operations. Perhaps a Special Advisor to the President (and an ex officio member of the National Security Council) would an effective means to insure this homogeneity throughout the Executive Branch. This Advisor could function as the President’s lead for information in the same way that Chief Marketing Officers work with their counterparts on the CEO’s staff to accomplish the information goals of the corporation.

We must learn from our enemies if we are to defeat them.