PSYOP and the Starfish

One of the regular contributors to the Blog recommended that I read “The Starfish and the Spider” by Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom. (You can find a good summary at: http://ugnchicago.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/Starfish-and-Spider-Ori-Brafman-Summary.pdf)

The premise of the book is that decentralized organizations have neither head nor formal infrastructure – just like the starfish is able to regenerate from a severed leg. One of the beginning vignettes is on how the Spanish Army could easily conquer the Aztecs, but the Apaches got the best of them for 200 years.

The messages for MISO/PSYOP professionals are actually pretty clear. Historically major conflicts have been force on force. Formal military organizations faced each other and the MISO battle was fairly straight forward. It was as I like to call it the “Surrender now and avoid the rush.” Campaign centered on getting the opposing force to surrender. This is no longer the case and the traditional, centralized, military Command and Control of influence operations needs to evolve to deal with ‘starfish’ type enemies.

When Al Qaeda surfaced as a principle enemy after 9/11 the influence war was turned on its head. While we had dealt with non-traditional forces such as the Viet Cong, the notion of a global, decentralized enemy was a new one. While military leaders are ensconced in a formal hierarchy, terrorist organizations such as AQ were a mass of amorphous decentralized cells.

The book proposes three strategies for defeating starfish:

1. Changing Ideology

Life is hopeless vs. there is hope, I can make my life better

2. Centralize them

Change from no hierarchy to some form of top down. Provides resources to the formerly resource poor leaders so that they become more fixated on using the resources for reward, etc.

3. Decentralize yourself – if you can’t beat’em join’em

Just how relevant are these suggestions to PSYOP/MISO?

For one thing PSYOP must work hand in glove with the Embassy Team and Civil Affairs to help eliminate or minimize the root causes that are stimulating the opposing force. By eliminating or reducing the root causes, the effect is to change the environment and with it the ideology driving the starfish.

Secondly, I believe MISO needs to be as decentralized as possible to be able to tailor the influence approach to the target at hand. However, we need to empower MISO soldiers with the resources needed to do the job whether this is a robust ‘reachback’ or cultural and linguistic resources or support of local credible spokespeople.

As we ponder which organization will be the Branch Proponent we need to take a serious look a doctrine and learn how to deal with the starfish and what other creatures come up.

A Rare Good Example: Libyan Rappers

The January 11, 2012 issue of the NY Times featured an article “Now Able To Exhale, Libyan Rappers Find a Voice” (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/world/africa/young-libyans-revel-in-freedom-to-speak-out.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Now%20Able%20to%20Exhale&st=cse) which is also the photo source.)

The article talks about the new found freedom of expression in Libya. The GAB Crew have apparently been able to express themselves in ways they couldn’t even contemplate under Qaddafi. The group’s efforts are especially noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First of all of they represent a key demographic of individuals across the globe, especially those within Islamic societies. Secondly they have an international audience by virtue of appearing on You Tube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hyULOKDL_o)

PSYOP/MISO is like an orchestra. The end product is the cumulative effect of all the individual ingredients. Credible, local people are the best spokes people in virtually all situations. In some cases, especially where the language is common, the arts – specifically video and audio and can have dramatic effects on a number of audiences.

The GAB Crew appear to be a very good example of efforts that should be reported upon and supported.

Force Development Based on Fixed Parameters in a Variable World = Recipe for Disaster

I have some real concerns about the future of MISO under the newly released (5 January 2012) military strategy. (see http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf). The goal of the strategy is to protect America while optimizing the defense expenditures over the next decade. There is no argument about the complexity of the future security environment and the primary missions of the Joint Force are equally clearly stated as:

· Counter Terrorism & Irregular Warfare

· Deter and Defeat Aggression (1.5 major state conflicts)

· Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges

· Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

· Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space

· Maintain a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent

· Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities

· Provide a Stabilizing Presence

· Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations

· Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief and Other Operations

While the new strategy clearly states: “Likewise, DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.” The document goes on to say that the “active-reserve component balance” and other factors “is a key part of our decision calculus”. And “The challenges facing the United States today

and in the future will require that we continue to employ National Guard and Reserve forces.

The expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant driver in

determining an appropriate AC/RC mix and level of RC readiness.”

The President clearly wants to communicate to the American people that he understands tomorrow’s threats and that he and the DOD are aware of the challenges of defeating these threats while getting the best bang for the buck.

Many of the missions stated above are MISO/PSYOP heavy. Some of them, like Irregular Warfare and Cyber Operations are being executed while their supporting doctrine, legal ROE and TTP are being developed. This means that the picture of the Joint Force (JF) needed to fight and win these battles and conflicts is still emerging. It also means that the influence warrior of tomorrow will need to be pound for pound more agile and adaptable than any in history.

The restrictions placed on the force will also challenge the supply and deployability of trained and competent individuals. All of this implies that DOD must approach MISO Force Development with a view to the total competency of the force. Leveling of talent means leveling of training and other requirements. The difficult component balance challenge decisions that have been floating around for years need to be acted upon quickly or else the MISO force will be left on the wayside like yesterday’s weapons systems.

Unfortunately Congress has been historically focused on weapons and programs because they bring local jobs which bring local votes.

Somehow, the MISO/PSYOP Community at all levels needs to energize itself upward and the responsible DOD Senior Executives need to step forward quickly to bolster the funding and resourcing needed by the MISO Force expected to carry out this new strategy.

Good OPSEC Helps To Control PSYOP

The death of Kim Jong Il, seemed to have taken the Western World by surprise. The viel of secrecy over North Korea allowed the North Koreans to pick their time and their messages concerning the death of one leader and the succession of his handpicked replacement. While the West scurries about trying to figure out what will happen to North Korea, the world’s most secretive country moves forward anointing their new leader.

The December 23, 2011 Wall Street Journal featured an article: “Kim Ki Nam has one of the toughest jobs in North Korea” (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203686204577114193593219330.html). The lead in the article is “The 82-year-old former professor heads the department in North Korea's ruling party responsible for filling North Koreans' minds with awe, devotion and unswerving respect for the dictatorial Kim dynasty.” No doubt multiple government agencies are now preaching the gospel of Kim Jong Eun (photo source AP via the WSJ).

The North Koreans are master propagandists. They have shown their ability to create myths, recast history and seem to be able to mold the thoughts of one of the poorest nations on earth. One of the ways that they have been able to maintain such an ideological grip is because of the ‘lock down’ nature of the society and the government’s almost total control of life north of the 38^th parallel.

A key take away for PSYOP/MISO is that OPSEC can be a ‘booster shot’ for campaigns. By shielding the target audience from key facts or events, the launch of an influence campaign can be that much more effective.

This will be my last post until the week of 9 January 2012. To all my readers – the best to you and yours for the Holiday Season and may 2012 be your best year ever!

Unity of Command?

The principle of Unity of Command is a core tenet of military operations. Unity of Command increases accountability, prevents freelancing, improves the flow of information, helps with the coordination of operational efforts, and enhances operational safety.

There is no denying that today’s battlefield is unlike those of the past. Afghanistan has evolved throughout the past decade into a mosaic of AOs, each with its own bred of enemy. PSYOP, now MISO is critical to the battle and to the maintenance of a lasting peace. Given the length of the conflict and the amorphous nature of the enemy, not to mention the criticality of the recalcitrant ally, Pakistan, it would seem that DOD should do all it can to organize for success.

The diagram at right is my view of the PSYOP/MISO chain of command. To quote Harry Truman, the buck stops at the top, in this case with the Secretary of Defense. To even the most casual of observers this should appear ludicrous. Even if we argue that the MISG and the POG are troop providers, there is no easy way to determine if the forces being provided are trained and ready for the mission at hand.

In my view the force needs to be united and united under a single Command. Furthermore, the Branch Proponent as to be the Proponent for entire branch, not just one component or the other. While President Obama may declare the war in Iraq over today (15 December 11), it is not since Iraq has not shown that it is capable of standing on its own. The notion of Afghanistan being self-sufficient after 2014 is also pretty farfetched at this point.

Influence operations support will likely be more in demand over time. As yet unnamed conflicts in Africa, Latin America and Asia will surely require PSYOP/information support. This support cannot be developed overnight. As we stare the budget cuts in the face, it is incumbent on DOD to finally get off the dime and move RC PSYOP back into the SOF world where it belongs.

SWC As the Branch Proponent

This week, I'm asking for your help. I am interesting learning how y'all view SWC as a proponent. What have they done right? What are they doing wrong? What do you think they should being doing that they are not?

It has been my philosophy to post every anonymous comment I get except if it's commercial, SPAM, etc. If you would rather e-mail me then use ldietz@talgobal.com

Have a very good week.

Logo source: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/about.html

LDD