PSYOP and the Starfish

One of the regular contributors to the Blog recommended that I read “The Starfish and the Spider” by Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom. (You can find a good summary at: http://ugnchicago.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/Starfish-and-Spider-Ori-Brafman-Summary.pdf)

The premise of the book is that decentralized organizations have neither head nor formal infrastructure – just like the starfish is able to regenerate from a severed leg. One of the beginning vignettes is on how the Spanish Army could easily conquer the Aztecs, but the Apaches got the best of them for 200 years.

The messages for MISO/PSYOP professionals are actually pretty clear. Historically major conflicts have been force on force. Formal military organizations faced each other and the MISO battle was fairly straight forward. It was as I like to call it the “Surrender now and avoid the rush.” Campaign centered on getting the opposing force to surrender. This is no longer the case and the traditional, centralized, military Command and Control of influence operations needs to evolve to deal with ‘starfish’ type enemies.

When Al Qaeda surfaced as a principle enemy after 9/11 the influence war was turned on its head. While we had dealt with non-traditional forces such as the Viet Cong, the notion of a global, decentralized enemy was a new one. While military leaders are ensconced in a formal hierarchy, terrorist organizations such as AQ were a mass of amorphous decentralized cells.

The book proposes three strategies for defeating starfish:

1. Changing Ideology

Life is hopeless vs. there is hope, I can make my life better

2. Centralize them

Change from no hierarchy to some form of top down. Provides resources to the formerly resource poor leaders so that they become more fixated on using the resources for reward, etc.

3. Decentralize yourself – if you can’t beat’em join’em

Just how relevant are these suggestions to PSYOP/MISO?

For one thing PSYOP must work hand in glove with the Embassy Team and Civil Affairs to help eliminate or minimize the root causes that are stimulating the opposing force. By eliminating or reducing the root causes, the effect is to change the environment and with it the ideology driving the starfish.

Secondly, I believe MISO needs to be as decentralized as possible to be able to tailor the influence approach to the target at hand. However, we need to empower MISO soldiers with the resources needed to do the job whether this is a robust ‘reachback’ or cultural and linguistic resources or support of local credible spokespeople.

As we ponder which organization will be the Branch Proponent we need to take a serious look a doctrine and learn how to deal with the starfish and what other creatures come up.

Psychological Effects of Security Operations

I’m up in Idaho, my favorite PSYOP laboratory. It’s a great laboratory because the rural town we frequent is more or less isolated from the media and the pace is quite a bit slower than our Silicon Valley home base. On June 7, 2011 I wrote a post about people ultimately believing what they want to believe concerning the building of a wind farm.

Photo Source: http://www.ridgelineenergy.com/pdfs/Wind_Turbine_Information.pdf

In that post I explained that many of the local population were upset because of what they perceived as secret goings on and collusion between government, specially chosen farmers who have leased land for the wind farm project and other co-conspirators.

As it turns out, there was a ‘blade signing’ for dignitaries including the City Council, the Mayor, the local newspaper and other special guests. Security precautions were ‘tight’. Invited guests only – please and you had to have a badge to get on the bus from the High School to the site.

As many times as I’ve looked down the freeway I have not seen any camels with riders toting AK47s, but the threat level must have been high. To be fair thought, there was a report of a man in a Bunny Suit terrorizing children in Idaho Falls. Perhaps it was because the LT Governor was invited, although you would have to work pretty hard to find his schedule from the official website (http://lgo.idaho.gov/).

While a certain amount of security is always reasonable, your level of security depends on the threat. In this case the perceived threat might have been those farmers who missed out on the lease money and might have made the event less festive.

From a MISO/PSYOP perspective the point is that what a force does has psychological impact. Commanders must be made aware of the potential repercussions of offensive and defensive operations. MISO can help by campaigning to insure that all audiences are aware of what is going on and the truthful reason the operation is conducted.

Nevertheless, the enemy will exploit anything they can to support their propaganda campaigns. Given that the enemy enjoys a ‘home court’ advantage much of the time, MISO/PSYOP should be aggressively employed via credible local spokespeople to minimize the negative effect of necessary military operations.

Put Down The Loudspeaker And Pick Up The Cell Phone

Today’s crazy optempo doesn’t allow a moment to think much about the future. The April 9^th, 2011, Economist featured an article: “Mobile telecoms in Africa” – Digital Revolution. (See http://www.economist.com/node/18529875?story_id=18529875) which is also the photo source.

I’ve mentioned the need to be on the look out for future locations where PSYOP/MISO missions will be played out and I’ve also pointed out that Africa is an area where scant attention has been paid – Libya and the Middle East countries are an exception of course. The article noted the implementation of 3 submarine cables to Africa and a corresponding price reduction of 90%.

At the moment basic handsets dominate with Nokia the dominate player. Other product notes include that a $90 Android operating system smartphone made by China’s Huawei “sold out in several African countries in less than a month”.

There are strategic and tactical aspects for PSYOP to consider. On the one hand it would be nice to get on the inside track of the mobile provider and be able to easily send mass messages of all types: voice, SMS, Twitter, etc. On the other there is a need to send targeted messages to selected devices.

Most likely the mobile phone campaign would be supplementing other effort, yet total reliance on a single device as may be the case with some targets makes dominating that communications medium critical. This leads to a couple of questions: what organizational level should have the capability to employ the mobile media of today and the more complex devices of tomorrow and what equipment and support will be needed?

At this point I don’t have any particular answers, but I thought it was important to raise the question and reference the article.

Technology and MISO – Leverage or Wasted Funding?

This week’s post was inspired by two issues of the highly informative PSYOP Association electronic publication, Frontpost. In FPI # 1515 Wired magazine’s article on Battlefield Holograms is referenced (see http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/military-one-step-closer-to-battlefield-holograms/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+WiredDangerRoom+%28Blog+-+Danger+Room%29) and in FPI # 1518 an article from the BBC News about the Colombian government giving the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) a special present (see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12025086)

Photo Source: Reuters via BBC website

Having been in high tech since the days of the punched card, and having seen technologies come and go, it would be fair to say that I am more than a little skeptical of technology in general, much less as an information weapons system. Holograms, 3 dimensional representations of objects or people can be projected to give the illusion that the object is real, while the technology is ‘cool’, I think the MISO application is limited as I will explain below.

It seems to me that this technology is as applicable to military deception as it might be to MISO under the proper circumstances and in fact, may be more useful in that area perhaps to deceive IMINT collectors, if the technology is that robust. Overall my instincts tell me that holograms would be most effective in a MISO application against technologically inexperienced targets such as those that might be found in rural Afghanistan. One of my sources who was stationed in Afghanistan for a year described several instances from his personal experience that lead me to believe this type of technology might work there. However, I believe its useful life would be quite short, and that the word would spread to the point that the technique’s effectiveness would diminish over time.

A far better application is found in the BBC article on the Farc. According to the article the Colombian Special Forces infiltrated the Farc’s area of operations (AO) and set up “a 25m (82ft) high tree with 2,000 lights”. The tree was surrounded by sensors, when movement triggered the sensors the tree lit up. I loved this one!
First of all it showed that the Colombian SF could infiltrate what might have been considered a very well defended position, secondly there is the emotional reaction to the sudden burst of light throughout the dark jungle and lastly, perhaps most significantly the symbolism of the tree generally makes people think of their homes, friends and families. The simple and powerful message: now is a good time to go home.

Kudos to the Colombians!

As 2010 draws to a close, I wish my brothers and sisters in the MISO community Happy Holidays and may 2011 be your most peaceful and satisfying year ever. Next entry will be in January unless something really cool comes up.

Jiminy Cricket in the Form of a Non Government Organization

As many of you may remember, Jiminy Cricket was Pinocchio’s conscience. He helped to coach the puppet to be truthful so that the puppet’s dream of turning into a ‘real boy’ could be realized.

Today’s Washington Post featured an article entitled: “Obama says U.S. is ‘on track’ to achieve goals in Afghanistan” (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121601259.html?wpisrc=nl_natlalert). The President claims that the US is making progress, but as he noted "the gains we've made are fragile and reversible.". The President added …..Taliban momentum has been "arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas, although these gains remain fragile and reversible,"

Photo Source: TVAcres.com

The impression of this rather strategic communication was to convey a positive view of where we are in Afghanistan. The target audience was of course beyond those fortunate enough to be at the White House. The target audience is world opinion.

When I see statements like this I become quite skeptical and while I have never been to Afghanistan, I have spoken to many who have been there, and my impression is that Afghanistan is a feudal state that has resisted centralized control of any type – whether driven by Afghanis or by outsiders for centuries. It didn’t seem quite right to me that we are succeeding were so many others have failed. So I dug a bit deeper.

Interestingly, another seemingly innocuous article popped up on my radar screen. The NY Times reported on 15 December 2010: “For Red Cross, Aid Conditions Hit New Low in Afghanistan” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/asia/16redcross.html?_r=1)
The article quotes the Reto Stocker, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (a non-government organization with HQ in Switzerland): “By every measure that the Red Cross tracks, the situation has worsened throughout the country for civilian casualties, internal displacement and health care access and all of it is “against the background of a proliferation of armed actors,”.

Who is a reasonable person to believe? The President of the United States, a duly elected former Chicago politician or one of the world’s leading charities?

The point of this post is not to argue who to believe, but to point out that today’s information battlefield is a dynamic one where neutrals and friendlies can mute the impact of even the most carefully orchestrated campaign and where it is impossible to color bad news as good in the 21st century.

You Can Only Win If You Know What Game You Are Playing

A quote about Viet Nam attributed to President Lyndon Johnson caught my eye this morning “"I can't win, and I can't get out." (see the August 1, 2010 issue of the Beast @ http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-08-01/gelb-pentagon-papers-and-wikileaks/). Photo source is the same.

The author, Leslie H. Gelb, director of the Pentagon Papers project, argues that President Obama should take heed of the quote and learn from it because he is in the same boat with regard to Afghanistan.

If you don’t know where you are going you surely do not know how to get there. The Obama policy in Afghanistan is still not clear. The ‘doves’ epitomized by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, are pushing for a fast pace of withdrawal in line with the President’s previously announced deadline. Others in the Administration, such as Secretary Gates, have different views.

This leaves influence operations (PSYOP, MISO take your pick) in a very precarious position because a lack of an accepted and cohesive strategy clouds the nature of tactical missions. Troops on the ground need clear mission statements and goals. As the banter between @Salil and myself has shown over the past few weeks, there is a very significant gap between the lofty goals, strategies and policies at the top and the job of the solider on the ground.

The President and the Chain of Command owe us clear Commander’s Guidance. What is the goal in Afghanistan? At best we can only alter the conditions there a small bit. We cannot build a primordial state into a 21st Century democracy. We must respect the culture and the religious structure because it is their country after all.

If the goal is rooting out insurgency, we must be mindful that most of the fighters are Afghans and will be there after we leave. In the meanwhile the dedicated men and women of the PSYOP Community will have the day to day job of working with the Afghani people and facilitating the secure environment needed to help them build worthwhile and satisfying lives within their own cultural sphere and without violence to others.

If Admiral Olson’s pledge to re-cast influence operations on all levels is to be fulfilled it must be resourced and start now!

In Afghanistan The Coffee Klatch is Mightier Than the Sword

As a native Brooklynite I have had a long standing affection for coffee. I enjoy everything from latte’s to Turkish Coffee (medium sweet just like Mr. Bond). More importantly I recognize the importance of social gatherings around one’s favorite beverage be it coffee, chai, tea, or beer. Social gatherings foster support and tribal elder support is the key to success in Afghanistan as pointed out in the USA Today Article on March 30, 2010 (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/2010-03-29-Afghan-elders_N.htm).

While I applaud President Obama’s first visit as Commander-in-Chief, my marketing sense tells me that his visit was most likely more effective to the audience outside Afghanistan than it. First of all Afghanistan isn’t exactly a TV focal mecca so that the majority of the population is not glued to their TV sets watching the world stage. If they get their information over the airwaves it is more likely to come through the FM radio being filtered and polarized by the station’s management.

From an influence perspective this type of market means that the local officer or NCO in charge is going to be the key to success. It is my belief that all officers and NCOs should receive some form of sales training. When we deployed to Bosnia in 1997 I gave every soldier a copy of Zig Ziglar’s book Secret’s of Closing the Sale. An alternative is Willie Gayle’s book on Power Selling.

Afghanistan is the classic example of “all politics is local” and personal selling is the most effective form of PSYOP at the local level. The nature of the beast is that PSYOP personnel cannot be everywhere and the ‘winning of hearts and minds’ starts with the simple premise that people must like you as a person before they will listen to anything you have to say. Consequently the senior person on the ground must establish a rapport with the key local leader who, more than likely, will be the tribal elder or imam.

Unfortunately there is no easy way to do this, nor is there a simple, magic formula to train everyone to be able to relate to foreign audiences. I have found that Marines and Special Forces in general are far more adaptive than other service personnel and are able to adjust their behavior and approach more easily.

Success will come after the Afghans people feel like they are secure in their homes. Whether this feeling is a direct result of villages pushing out the Taliban, the Afghan government actually becoming an effecting governing force, or a combination of these and external forces, it is the feeling of security which will be a self-fulfilling prophecy that make the American effort in Afghanistan a success and differentiate it from past efforts.

Not All Good News Stories Are Good PSYOP

The Washington Times ran an article about Afghani girls flourishing in school. The Jan 6, 2010 article touts how the Marines have helped build the school and that the students are looking forward to bright futures (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/06/afghan-girls-flourish-in-new-school/).

Photo: Washington Times

This ‘feel good’ story concludes with “According to a report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, an estimated 63 percent of rural Afghan men and 90 percent of rural Afghan women are illiterate. In Now Zad, those illiterates are sending their children to school in defiance of threats from Taliban operatives.”

The story would have a positive influence on many audiences, especially Western minded audiences who hold the principle of gender equality in high esteem. However, this doesn’t mean that the story, pictures or excerpts would be appropriate for all audiences.

There is no question that education especially in the context of gender equality is a key American value. The issue is this the kind of value held by the target audience? If the target audience is male dominated and historically prone to control all aspects of female life in their society, then the story and its images and messages are not appropriate.

Having said that the story is not appropriate PSYOP, is it appropriate for the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) of the unit? That answer would have to be clearly “yes it is”. Marine support of core American values with happy smiling faces as testimonials is the kind of story that is likely to help bolster support for US forces and instill local pride in the deployed unit.

Perhaps a take away here is that PSYOP personnel need to be on the lookout for stories and images that, while they don’t necessarily apply to PSYOP, can be effectively used by our PAO colleagues.

Best to all of you for the New Year!