PSYOP REGIMENTAL EVENTS AND SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS
POVA Commentary on the DOD Inspector General released report:
Evaluation of the DoD Military Information Support Operations Workforce (DODIG-2024-068)
24 April 2024
By Lawrence D. Dietz, COL (R), US Army, President PSYOP Veterans Association
Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF)
The 2022 National Defense Strategy indicated that “The Department will employ an integrated deterrence approach that draws on tailored combinations of conventional, cyber, space, and information capabilities, together with the unique deterrent effects of nuclear weapons” (p9) This requires the employment of US Army Psychological Operations personnel as the principal DOD influence operations work force.
Regrettably, the DOD IG report points out that this workforce is being mismanaged and hobbled for a variety of reasons. This paper highlights key aspects of the report and is augmented with additional material and analysis.
What we have learned or confirmed:
The Military Information Support Operations (MISO) role has been downgraded in command stature and influence.
Active Component (AC) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces are subordinate to Special Forces Groups. (Are PSYOP Groups subordinate to SF Groups or rather to higher authority?)
Reserve Component (RC) PSYOP forces are subordinate to Civil Affairs Commands.
It appears that the SF community is exploiting MISO slots and resources to serve the Special Forces.
For example, it has been observed that PSYOP Colonel (O-6) slots have been awarded to SF-18 (or CMF-18?), Special Forces officers with little regard to PSYOP training and experience.
Recruiting has been unnecessarily hobbled by limiting the direct accession of personnel into PSYOP.
The Army does not have enough MSIO Personnel to meet DOD’s growing demand: PSYOP Groups are only at 60% strength.
AC PSYOP will only support Special Operations while RC PSYOP will support the conventional Army.
What Needs To Be Done
USASOC must conduct a MISO Workforce Capabilities based Assessment as recommended by the IG.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel andReadiness needs to monitor and conduct annual reviews of the Information Operations Career Force recruitment, training, and promotions, including MISO forces,n accordance with DOD policy and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Services.
Consideration should be given to unification of the Active and Reserve PSYOP units into a new appropriate Army lead organization for coordinating all non-kinetic battlefield systems used in influence/information operations.
II Extracts from the Report
(U) Findings
(U)The Army has not recruited, trained, or retained the military workforce needed to meet the DOD’s growing MISO demand, especially in the reserve component.
Specifically, in FY 2023, the Army Reserve’s PSYOP groups operated with only 25 percent of the captains required to complete their missions. Army officer career management policy prevents the PSYOP branch from admitting officers directly upon commissioning, making it more difficult for the Army to attract officer candidates with the skills PSYOP commanders say they need.The inability to assign newly commissioned officers into the PSYOP branch, combined with possibly taking years to fully train reserve PSYOP officers, contributes to10 of 32 manned reserve PSYOP detachments not having PSYOP-qualified commanders.
(U)Also, the Army lacks an active component conventional (non-special operations )MISO workforce, relying on the Army Reserve to fill the global, full-time requirements for conventional MISO. Meanwhile, the active component special operations PSYOP groups, also operating well below their authorized strength, have been worked beyond the Army’s standards of one month deployed to two months at home.
(U)This has occurred, in part, because the Army has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of its MISO capabilities in over 20 years. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has not monitored and reported on the growth and sustainment of the DOD’s overall Information Operations work force as required by DOD policy.
(U)As a result, Army PSYOP, theDOD’s primary MISO workforce, has remained sized, structured, and staffed at levels that cannot meet the DOD’s growing demand for both conventional and special operations MISO at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The resulting operational tempo required of this under-resourced force risks burn out of these specialized Soldiers, which only serves to worsen the underlying conditions.
(U) Recommendations
To address these conditions, we recommend that:
(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness monitor and conduct annual reviews of the Information Operations Career Force recruitment, training, and promotions, including MISO forces, in accordance with DOoD policy and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Services.
(U)The Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command conduct a Capabilities-Based Assessment of the total Army MISO workforce.1
Other Key points and elements:
(U)This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the senior official Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness and the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command either did not agree with, or did not fully address, the recommendations presented in the report. ( p7)
(U)DOD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. (p7)
Management Comments
OASD Readiness p 31
USASOC CG
P 33
Commander, 2nd PSYOP Group
P 35 and 36
Commander, 7th PSYOP Group
2. Elected Official Contact Guidance
Elected Official Contact Guidance
Fellow POVA Members,
The POVA Board has serious concerns about recent actions with regard to the PSYOP Force. We have agreed that our membership needs to raise our voices on these important issues. Many critical decisions affecting PSYOP as a combat multiplier as well as our nation's security are made by our less informed elected representatives in Congress. Making your voice heard is essential!
Finding Your Representatives:
You can find your elected representatives by entering your address here.
This is a screenshot of my elected officials. Notice that there is a “Contact” link. If you click on that link it will take you to the rep’s website where you can enter an email.
Contacting Your Representatives:
The Senate and House have Armed Services Committees. Each of those committees have subcommittees that do the actual work. It is especially important to learn If your elected representative is on one of these subcommittees. As a constituent of someone on the committee, your voice will be stronger than those living outside the elected’s domain.
Senate Armed Services Committee:
We are interested in the Subcommittee on “Emerging Threats and Capabilities”
Majority Members
Minority Members
House Armed Services Committee:
We are interested in the “Intelligence and Special Operations” Committee:
Chairman
Jack Bergman
Michigan
Republican Members
Austin Scott
Georgia
Elise Stefanik
New York
Trent Kelly
Mississippi
Ronny Jackson
Texas
Nancy Mace
South Carolina
Morgan Luttrell
Texas
Cory Mills
Florida
Ranking Member
Ruben Gallego
Arizona
Democratic Members
William Keating
Massachusetts
Elissa Slotkin
Michigan
Sara Jacobs
Jeff Jackson
North Carolina
Jennifer McClellan
Virginia
Jimmy Panetta
California
Here are some general tips for contacting your representatives:
Be Respectful: maintain a respectful and professional tone. (not sure how anyone will know what their stance is on PSYOP matters)
Be Clear and Concise: Briefly state the issue you're concerned about and your position.
Personalize Your Message: A personalized message holds more weight than a generic email. Share how the issue affects you or other veterans you know.
Call to Action: Clearly state what outcome you desire. Do you want them to vote a certain way or introduce new legislation
I am also providing a draft for you to edit as you see fit:
Your Name
Your Address
Your Phone Number
Your Email
Date”
Dear Congressman,
It is very clear that the US is losing the information war. Part of the reason why we are losing is because the United States lacks an overarching information strategy. Information, like defense, is a major tool of statecraft. A whole of government approach is needed to be able to transmit our messages and counter the barrage of disinformation sent out by our enemies and adversaries.
I am very concerned because the Army Special Operations Command is systematically degrading Psychological Operations (PSYOP) combat support capabilities or also known as Military Information Support Operations (MISO).
According to the DOD Inspector General in a March 25, 2024 report “Evaluation of the DOD Military Information Support Operations Workforce”: Some key findings were:
1. The Army has not recruited, trained, or retained the military workforce needed to meet the DoD’s growing MISO demand, especially in the reserve components.
2. Army officer career management policy currently prevents the PSYOP branch from admitting junior officers directly upon commissioning, making it more difficult for the Army to attract officer candidates with the skills PSYOP commanders say they need. The inability to assign newly commissioned officers into the PSYOP branch, combined with possibly taking years to fully train reserve PSYOP officers, contributes to 10 of 32 manned reserve PSYOP detachments not having PSYOP-qualified commanders.
3. The Army lacks an active component conventional (non-special operations) MISO workforce, relying on the Army Reserve to fill the global, full-time requirements for conventional MISO. Meanwhile, the active component special operations PSYOP groups, also operating well below their authorized strength, have been worked beyond the Army’s standards of 1 month deployed to 2 months at home.
The Report recommended that “The Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command conduct a Capabilities-Based Assessment of the total Army MISO workforce.” We urge you to support this recommendation and take whatever steps are necessary to conduct this vitally needed assessment.
Sincerely,
3. Authorization of Armed Forces Expeditionary Campaign Stream for Operations in Bosnia Herzegovina
PSYOP NEWS - APRIL 2024
26 Apr 24 Prez Xi launches Information Support Force, a new wing of Chinese Military
Chinese President Xi Jinping on Friday launched an Information Support Force, a new wing of the People's Liberation Army, which he said will be a strategic branch, a key pillar and a vital power in modern warfare for the world's largest military.
Xi, 71, who also heads the Central Military Commission (CMC), the overall high command of the Chinese military, besides heading the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Presidency, said that the establishment of the Information Support Force (ISF) is a major decision made by the CPC and the CMC in light of the overall need of building a strong military.
25 Apr 24
How Russia and China Leverage Deepfakes to Sway Voters
2024 is a crucial election year for democracies around the world. While hundreds of millions are expected to go to the polls, election disinformation experts are tracking a steep escalation in AI-fueled disinformation from state-affiliated actors in Russia and China.
In their annual assessment on global security concerns for 2024, U.S. intelligence officials warned that both nations were developing new methods of leveraging generative AI and deepfakes to impact election outcomes.
17 Apr 24
Microsoft finds Russian influence operations targeting U.S. election have begun
SAN FRANCISCO, April 17 (Reuters) - Microsoft said on Wednesday that Russian online campaigns to influence the upcoming U.S. presidential election kicked into gear over the past 45 days, but at a slower pace than in past elections.
Russia-linked accounts are disseminating divisive content aimed at U.S. audiences, including criticising American support of Ukraine in its war with Russia, researchers at the tech giant said in a report.
The Russian embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment, but the Kremlin said last month it would not meddle in the November U.S. election. It also dismissed U.S. allegations that it orchestrated campaigns to sway the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections.
While the Russian activity Microsoft observed is not as intense as around the previous elections, it could increase in the coming months, the researchers said.
17 Apr 24 NSA Unveils New Guidelines for Safe AI Deployment in Defense Sector
In a very short time, artificial intelligence (AI) has gone from being little more than a buzzword of science fiction to a widely employed technology that could impact the world in still unforeseen ways. It offers countless opportunities but also poses significant threats. To ensure the safe use of AI, the National Security Agency’s (NSA’s) Artificial Intelligence Security Center (AISC) – working with several additional U.S. and foreign agencies – this week released a Cybersecurity Information Sheet (CSI) intended to support National Security System owners and Defense Industrial Base companies that will be deploying and operating AI systems designed and developed by an external entity.
16 Apr NSA’s transformation from secret agency to public cybercrime warrior
The National Security Agency, once so secretive that its acronym NSA was jokingly referred to by intelligence insiders as “No Such Agency,” is out of the shadows.
NSA’s Cybersecurity Director Rob Joyce even appeared recently at New York City’s International Conference on Cyber Security to warn about the new dangers AI will raise as an enabler of increasingly sophisticated espionage, terrorist attacks and criminal activity.
Joyce and other NSA leaders now regularly speak in public, unclassified forums about the NSA’s offensive and defensive cyber missions. Organizationally, NSA now collaborates openly with other agencies in defense, law enforcement, and homeland security to openly discuss foreign efforts to infiltrate American and allied information networks, threaten our critical infrastructure, and disrupt our supply chains.
10 Apr 24 How Army special operators use deepfakes and drones to train for information warfare
With a sample of your voice and a gaming laptop, this Army psychological operations instructor can make you appear to say anything: an order for pizza, a call to the doctor, or just hello.
In peacetime, it’s a party trick. In war, it’s a tool that can be used for deception, luring enemies into traps, or encouraging defection by mimicking the voices of enemy soldiers.
Dubbed Ghost Machine, the tool helps Army Special Operations Forces instructors teach operators how cheap, easily-available tech is reshaping governments’ abilities to target and influence soldiers.
The basic idea behind Ghost Machine is not new—armies have broadcast the voices of collaborators to encourage allied surrender since at least World War II. In the 2010s, ARSOF members encouraged defections within Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony’s force by broadcasting messages from members’ families.
9 Apr 24 China is Using Generative AI to Carry Out Influence Operations
China is using generative artificial intelligence to carry out influence operations against foreign countries, including the U.S. and Taiwan, and fuel social disorders.
According to the report published by the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), titled Same targets, new playbooks: East Asia threat actors employ unique methods, China-linked threat actors are using generative artificial intelligence to create content aimed at influencing U.S. voters.
https://securityaffairs.com/161608/security/china-ai-influence-operations.html
8 Apr 24 What Does the Future of U.S. SOF Look Like Within Great Power Competition
At first glance, one may be led to believe that Great Power Competition will solely be within the realm of the conventional armed forces. That conclusion would be incorrect. The conventional military forces of all sides will or should act as buffers against high-intensity warfare, due to the immense toll, in both human and economic terms, that would result from a conventional war. The Gray Zone between the conventional formations of the competing states is precisely where special operations forces will maneuver and be most active and impactful.
Short of a conventional war, a primary and crucial role for special operators will be advancing, consolidating and securing influence with partner or prospective partner states. The acquisition of influence then raises barriers to entry of America’s rivals, denying them the space to operate both diplomatically and militarily. To this point, former Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers aptly stated, “…Great power direct conflict shouldn’t dominate the force. I want as much influence around the world as I can; the main competition is where SOF lives” (Ball, 2020, p. 7).
https://sof.news/special-forces/sf-future-gpc/
3 Apr 24 New IDF Mountain Brigade to bolster Israel’s northern defenses
JERUSALEM — The Israel Defense Forces have inaugurated a new northern Mountain Brigade, the first major reorganization for the IDF since Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack and one suggesting Jerusalem sees the need to reinforce its northern defenses against Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iran-backed groups in the area.
The new brigade, established in March, will operate in a unique area in the north along the borders of Lebanon and Syria, covering the highest mountain on which the IDF operates, Mount Hermon, nestled in the northern-most parts of Israel and sandwiched between Syria and Lebanon, and down to around Mount Dov, which lies southwest of Hermon on Lebanon’s southern border. According to the IDF, the brigade will come under the command of the 210th division.
The new brigade represents a consolidation of Israeli forces in the north, which an IDF official told Breaking Defense made sense as operating across the whole mountainous area requires specialized gear, vehicles and training.
2 Apr 24
New Report reveals Dirty Secret of Army Psychological Operations
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him,” Sun Tzu wrote in the 4th century, one of those warfare aphorisms that the modern-day U.S. Army has adopted as part of its psychological operations career group. “Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant,” the Army says in a recruiting video released last year. But it is the Army that is pretending to be strong. A devastating new Defense Department inspector general report finds that its own psyops ranks are critically short at a time when Washington is obsessed with stoking influence against America’s many adversaries.
The IG report, “Evaluation of the DoD Military Information Support Operations Workforce” finds that the Army, the primary Defense Department proponent for battlefield influence and deception, has failed to staff its own psyops units at a time when the Pentagon struggles with fighting Russian, Chinese, and Iranian disinformation campaigns, particularly about U.S. military operations and bases.
A December 2010 secretary of defense memorandum, issued during the Obama administration, discontinued the use of the term “psyops” and replaced it with Military information Support Operations, or MISO. The memo stated that the term “psyop” had become misleading and, “although psyop activities rely on truthful information, credibly conveyed, the term psyop tends to connote propaganda, brainwashing, manipulation, and deceit.” The memo noted that for that reason, the Pentagon would “no longer use the term psyop to describe activities (in peacetime or during combat operations) that are intended to influence foreign audiences.” Nonetheless, the Army continues to use the term “psyop” or psyops when referring to its units and to the overall career field.
https://theintercept.com/2024/04/02/pentagon-army-psyops/
28 Mar 24
The Army doesn’t have enough PSYOP soldiers to fight the information war, IG says
The Army doesn’t have enough PSYOP soldiers to fight the information war with China and Russia, the Department of Defense’s Inspector General said in a report released Wednesday.
The IG report found the Army has not recruited, trained, or retained a big enough workforce to meet the growing demand for Military Information Support Operations (MISO), commonly referred to as “psychological operations, or PSYOP” which aim to influence the beliefs and actions of other countries’ populations.
Without enough active duty soldiers trained in PSYOP warfare, the service has relied on reservists to “fill the global, full-time requirements for conventional MISO.” In fiscal year 2023, the Army’s four active and reserve Psychological Operation Groups operated with only 60% of their authorized strength, according to the report.
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-psyop-soldiers/
Army doesn’t have enough PSYOP soldiers to fight information war
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