Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy and PSYOP

The last week in May 2010 is a particularly complex time. Headlines included the sending of 1,200 National Guard troops to the Mexican Border and continued angst over the alleged North Korean sinking of a South Korean Naval Vessel.

However, from a long term perspective, the quiet White House release of the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United Stations. The NSS is the mother ship of security strategies from which all others such as the Defense Strategy, the Military Strategy, the Counter Terrorist Strategy, et al will be developed and with which they must conform. (See http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf)

There were some key themes that will have a significant impact on PSYOP and PSYOP forces during Obama’s administration tenure and perhaps beyond.


1. Alliances and Partnerships
While the President reserved the right to act unilaterally when necessary, he made it very clear that it was intent to capitalize on old alliances and new partnerships. His goal of strengthening and modernizing old ones while building new and deeper partnerships is complemented by stated tasks of training and assisting security systems (and forces) in at-risk states.

These notions combined with increased military to military contacts will no doubt put pressure on PSYOP to operate more frequently in a combined (multi-national) environment and to provide training, advice and assistance to forces of other nations that the President deems are important to US interests, values and international order.

2. Holistic Governmental Actions
The President made it very clear that he wants the Executive branch t to develop integrated plans and approaches. This includes more aggressive diplomacy where diplomats complement military forces no matter where they are needed and the ability to harness experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity (via development efforts).

The NSS also plans to employ economic and financial transactions as means to advancing US interests and promoting US values.
The bottom line here is a greater demand for Civil Affairs (CA) capability and a critical need for CA and PSYOP to work together seamlessly in a variety of environments.

3. Engagement Across the Spectrum of Conflict
The NSS points out other goals the cut across the spectrum of conflict:
- Disrupt, dismantle and defeat AQ and its violent extremist affiliates in AF, Pak.
- Pursue sustainable and responsible security systems in at risk stakes
- Prevent the emergence of conflict
- Counter violent extremism and insurgency
- Foster security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict
- Stop the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials
- Resolve and prevent conflicts and heal their wounds.

PSYOP is a non-lethal battlefield multiplier. It is also a critical means by which the USG can communicate messages designed to catalyst behavior in conformance with the goals of the NSS. PSYOP is the means by which civilian populations are informed of CA activities and is a critical capability in gaining and holding information dominance which is a prerequisite success on the global state in the 21st Century.
Unfortunately the PSYOP community has not shown the ability to influence law makers and senior members of the Executive Branch of its importance. The need to influence has been overshadowed by the specter of cyber this and cyber that. While CA enjoys the benefits of a cadre of retired flag officers and a resourced association, PSYOP does not.

The ill timed split of PSYOP across two general officer commands (USSOCOM and USARC) needs to be unwound immediately and SWC needs to step up to the plate, as Regimental Home Base Commander and act as a catalyst to strengthen PSYOP’s clout inside the military and position a robust association to ‘educate’ the Executive and Legislative branches.

PSYOP and the New NATO Strategy

On May 17, 2010 NATO released the report of a panel of experts containing recommendations for a new strategic approach by the organization. (see http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf)

I don’t suspect many of my loyal readers will peruse the document. For those of us who have served in NATO organizations, we recognize that there is a level of diplomacy among senior NATO civilians and commanders that requires a high degree of sensitivity and thus far has never called for much urgency.
In the following paragraphs I will provide a glimpse into the 58 page document.

Here’s the BLUF (Bottom Line UP Front)
PSYOP will be needed to deal with the spectrum of threats facing NATO. The US has the opportunity of being the lead dog by demonstrating our expertise and TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures). US PSYOP doctrine and TTP could be the standard for NATO if the USG is willing to make the commitment in terms of personnel and funding.

US training and doctrine could provide a jump start to the nascent ‘new’ NATO. Failure to engage will leave a vacuum that will either be filled by another nation or worse left unfilled resulting in disastrous consequences in NATO’s future conflicts.

The introduction to the 2010 Strategic Concept contains two key points in my opinion, the first of which is a new perspective on the NATO mission:
“Between now and 2020, it (NATO) will be tested by the emergence of new dangers, the many-sided demands of complex operations, and the challenge of organising itself efficiently in an era where rapid responses are vital, versatility critical, and resources tight. NATO” (Page 5)

The second stated point is that NATO has not done a very good job of building value in the minds of the citizens and politicians of NATO countries and notwithstanding its many accomplishments “could fail to retain the public backing and financial support it must have to perform critical tasks well.”

Strangely enough, at least to me, while there is ample mention of missiles and cyber threats, there is scant mention of the need to influence populations in areas where NATO forces find themselves. The strategy acknowledges that there are several factors “that magnify uncertainty”:

• The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;
• The ambitions of international terrorist groups;
• The persistence of corrosive regional, national, ethnic, and religious rivalries;
• The world’s increased reliance on potentially vulnerable information systems;
• The competition for petroleum and other strategic resources (thereby highlighting the importance of maritime security);
• Demographic changes that could aggravate such global problems as poverty, hunger, illegal immigration, and pandemic disease; and
• The accumulating consequences of environmental degradation, including climate change.

Conclusions cited strikes by international terrorist groups and cyber assaults as key threats and point out that the organization must be able to make decisions rapidly and integrate help from countries and organizations outside NATO to deal with these complex threats. Partnership management was elevated to one of the 4 core NATO tasks highlighted by the 2010 Strategic Concept.

Neither PSYOP nor Information Operations were mentioned specifically. In fact nor was Strategic Communications. With regard to military missions, the document pointed out that military missions complement the core tasks and will include:
• Cooperate with partners and civilian institutions to protect the treaty area against a full range of unconventional security challenges.
• Deploy and sustain expeditionary capabilities for military operations beyond the treaty area when required to prevent an attack on the treaty area or to protect the legal rights and other vital interests of Alliance members.
• Help to shape a more stable and peaceful international security environment by enhancing partner interoperability, providing military and police training, coordinating military assistance, and cooperating with the governments of key countries.

Two other comments were worthy of note: NATO Special Operations should be elevated to a full component command and that “NATO should encourage the further evolution and coordination of national specialisation and niche capabilities”.

Civil Military Operations (CMO) came in for some special attention noting that these are key to complex operations and that civilian capabilities will have to be integrated into a range of operations especially where it is necessary to work with local authorities and combat forces for limited timeframes to provide security and needed public services.

USAF Cyberspace Badge: Another Example of Marketing Superiority

As a brand new 2 LT I arrived at my first Platoon Command in Quan Loi, Republic of Viet Nam in May 1969. Our Army Security Agency (ASA) platoon was headquartered next to the Air Force detachment that ran the airfield. The NCOIC delighted in tormenting me with the luxuries he routinely provided his airmen. Getting anything from lobster to pizza was not a problem.

Since that day I continue to marvel at just how the Air Force is plainly superior in marketing. Whether getting funding or taking Cyber Space as their own, the Air Force just gets it. The latest bit of Air Force activity to catch my eye is the authorization of a Cyber Space Badge. (see http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123201885).

"The Air Force mission -- to fly, fight and win in air, space and cyberspace -- acknowledges the significance and interrelationship of our three operational domains in effective warfighting. The establishment of the Air Force cyberspace badge underscores the crucial operational nature of the cyberspace mission," said Maj. Gen. Michael Basla, Air Force Space Command vice commander.

What does this all mean to me?
1. The Air Force has accepted Cyber Space as a key part of their mission.
2. The authorization of a badge means a main streaming of sorts and establishes credibility for a career field.
3. The multiple levels of badge and the ‘grandfathering’ provisions imply a continuity of career path.
4. The Air Force continues to have the inside track when it comes to mindshare of the public and Congress where Cyber Space is concerned.

The implication for PSYOP is pretty clear. Thus far we have paid lip service to the McClure award. SWC (the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC) is sitting on its collective butts in terms of authorizing the silver and bronze awards. The CG of SWC pays mere lip service to the PSYOP Branch. Perhaps when all the critical MOS billets are wearing blue a sense of urgency might appear.

The Psychology of Times Square

The vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) left in the smoking Nissan Pathfinder in Times Square on the evening of May 1, 2010 send a message even though the homemade bomb never went off. (Photo New York Times)


Times Square owns an indelible space in the psyche of America. It has been considered the crossroads of the world, the gateway to Broadway and one of America’s consummate gathering spots. Whether for the annual New Year’s dropping of the ball or celebrating the end of World War II, Times Square has been a focal point.

The brazen nature of the failed attack could be compared to the Doolittle Raid in World War II where US bombers were launched on a one way trip from the decks of aircraft carriers to strike at Tokyo as a way of showing the Japanese people that they were not invincible and that America could still attack. American has been relatively safe since 9/11 and our enemies would like to shock us once again.

The faceless, nation-less criminals behind the Times Square plot sent a message. While the intent of the message was to create bloodshed and tragedy in the heart of an American public gathering place the message received is that our enemy’s want to harm us and will stop at nothing to do so. They will not play by the rules of war and civilian targets, even purely soft ones are fair game.

The fact that a suspect was arrested in slightly more than 50 hours after the smoking van was spotted by a Viet Nam veteran street vendor was impressive. The fact that a terrorist on the watch list could get on a plane bound for Dubai was not.

What kind of psy-act could the US send in return? First of all who would be the target? Where are they? What kind of act would have such a dramatic effect so as to send the strong message? Sadly there is no easy answer. The shock of military action in Waziristan (the lawless area of Pakistan believed to be the hiding place of Osama Bin Ladin and others) has worn off. Only the unseen death caused by UAVs has seemingly had any effect.

Sometimes it’s hard to be the good guys and play by the rules even in PSYOP.

The Furlong Affair: PSYOP and Intelligence – What’s the deal?

The New York Times among others has reported on investigations concerning alleged inappropriate activities by senior government official Michael D. Furlong (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/asia/28contractor.html?scp=1&sq=Furlong&st=cse). Furlong, currently a Senior Level executive, is the Strategic Planner and Technology Integration Adviser, Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas (reference: http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=11344) is at the center of a swirling controversy as to whether or not he inappropriately used funds allegedly earmarked for information operations for unauthorized intelligence gathering through contractors. (Photo courtesy US Air Force)

Furlong retired as a LTC after serving in PSYOP slots among others. The controversy seems to imply that there is an unholy alliance between PSYOP (or information operations which appears to be used synonymously in most media pieces) and intelligence.

There are some key points that need to be made here. First of all, PSYOPers are not intelligence collectors. They may be trained observers who can report what they see, but they are not out to collect intelligence. Good PSYOP, like effective marketing and sales, is based on a solid understanding of the target audience, what motivates it, its leadership, what influences it and what are the best ways to appeal to that audience and convince them to behave in the desired manner.

Most of the time PSYOP intelligence needs are not the same as the CDR’s intelligence needs. The CDR’s Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) generally relate to the operations at hand. Most CDR (General McChrystal excepted) are solely interested in that information that will allow them to accomplish their direct mission which is usually kill or capture the enemy. Predilections that are important for influence purposes rarely make it to the CCIR list.

At the core of the Furlong matter is the allegation that he employed a media company, International Media Ventures (http://www.imediav.com/) as an outsource for intelligence operations. The company’s website proclaims that they are in the strategic communications, media and content businesses. A look at the “About” section and you discover that the company leadership is mostly ex-SOCOM types.
What’s the point? If Furlong was outsourcing intelligence, that’s a bad idea, if International Media Ventures was engaged in intelligence operations that’s stupid business because it compromises their ability to provide the kind of products and services expected in support of USG sponsored influence operations.

When the dust settles I am willing to bet that no laws will have been broken, however, the DOD ‘brand’ has suffered just as surely as Toyota is still recovering from their gas pedal issues. Perception is reality especially where PSYOP and influence operations are concerned. Practitioners are under a higher duty of care to insure that USG strategic communications and operational/tactical PSYOP are not tarnished.

Back From the Sea

I know you are all curious as to why I missed a couple of weeks. Uncharacteristically I decided to go on an adventure. The former CDR of the CJICTF (Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force) organized a week long sailing adventure on a 210 foot schooner which was a replica of an 1880s schooner. (www.libertyfleet.com).

The trip was billed as the Grumpy Old Men Bucket List Tour and consisted of mostly – Pretty Mellow Old Guys. We left Fort Lauderdale on Sunday the 18th and docked in Charleston on Friday 16 April. Consequently my efforts were focused on maximizing my preparedness for the trip.

From a PSYOP perspective I learned that a diverse group of strangers could work together in a common effort outside of their comfort zone. This underscores the power of face to face communication and the notion that deep down – we are all just people.

PSYOPing Karzai With Grass Roots Politics

It’s now (April 2010) clearer than ever that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is not the right man for the job and it is our duty as champions of democracy to help the people of Afghanistan replace him and his cronies with a leader and a government that will govern for the benefit of the people and not personal fortunes or ego.

Even the charismatic and charming President Obama has failed with Karzai. Karzai’s denouncements of the West – read that the US – are yet one more slap in the face. While I don’t generally quote Ralph Peters as a good source, I’m afraid I have to mostly agree with his April 6, 2010 article in the NY Post: “Karzai’s new low – We’re stuck with no Plan B” (http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/karzai_new_low_JfRxe6UV6zXCjdEalGAsLM)

As it turns out, I have a plan B and a Plan C. Plan B is develop bottom up public support for a coalition government that will oust Karzai and replace him with someone is perhaps less corrupt and who can serve as a catalyst security and economic self-sufficiency from the village up. Of course this plan would require resources and assistance from the US and other sources – we know that and according to Peters, we have invested: “A thousand dead Americans and billions of dollars poured into a cesspool?”

Plan C is build an enduring self-sufficiency from the village level up.
This crossroads presents a unique opportunity for Secretary Hillary Clinton to engage the DOD to help her further the goals of the President and actually establish a foundation that would facilitate a withdrawal of US troops sooner rather than later. To do this a holistic information influence strategy would need to be developed that would combine direct and indirect communications channels and would (perhaps covertly) support appropriate Karzai opposition. In parallel, my Plan C calls for local campaigns to strengthen the local leadership so that they can govern in the absence of a competent national government.

Plan C is a good one because it builds from the nature of the Afghan people and their history. It also appeals to the independent nature of the local villages and, at the same time can negate some of the influence of the Taliban. This plan would require tight coordination through ISAF and implies an ISAF level task force that has situational awareness down to the village level and that has the authority to divert resources and concentrate efforts where they are likely to do the most good.

Peters’ assumption about our counter insurgency doctrine assuming a friendly competent government also seems unfortunately on the mark. Doctrine writers on all levels are on notice that they need to change the rules of the game so that we can as Clint Eastwood once said “Improvise, adapt and overcome” (attributed to his role as Gunny Highway in Heartbreak Ridge)