Something Different: IO and Terrorists

Today's posting is something a bit different. Following is a concept paper I drafted for a colleague. Essentially I took the IO capabilities of DoD and then provided analysis on Terrorist employment of those same capabilities.

Comments and input are welcome of course.

Photo Source: http://samsonblinded.org/blog/osama-too-good-to-be-true-part-1.htm

Terrorist Use of Information Operations (IO)

COL (R) Lawrence D. Dietz; General Counsel & Managing Director Cyber Security,
TAL Global Corporation

I Introduction
The US Department of Defense employs Information Operations to influence the course of battle and act as a combat multiplier. Terrorists are also very successfully employing IO and technology to their advantage. This short paper will give you an overview to assist you in future research.

II Department of Defense IO Capabilities

Reference: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dmspo/Publications/Information%20Operations%20Primer%20AY11%20Web%20Version.pdf; Accessed 15 Mar 11

A. Core Capabilities

1. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) now Military Information Support Operations (MISO) – operations designed to influence the behavior of the target in line with CDR’s Concept of the Operation (CONOP)

2. Military Deception (MILDEC) – actions taken to shield true capability from the enemy (e.g Patton’s fake Army in the UK as a decoy for the Normandy invasion.

3. Operations Security (OPSEC) – all measures taken to shield information from adversaries and enemies

4. Electronic Warfare (EW) – dominance of the electronic spectrum, actions can include jamming to deny the enemy is communication, actions taken to identify enemy electronic emitters to facilitate identification of their units, other order of battle information, targeting for interception or jamming.

5. Computer Network Operations (CNO)
a. Computer Network Attack (CNA) – denying the enemy the use of their IT networks.
b. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) – using the enemy’s network for friendly advantage, e.g. intelligence collection, communications medium, storage of hostile software code, etc.
c. Computer Network Defense (CND) – defending one’s own network

B. IO Supporting Capabilities

1. Counterintelligence
2. Combat Camera (Air Force Unit that provides still and video camera support)
3. Physical Attack
4. Physical Security
5. Information Assurance – protecting electronic information

C. IO Related Capabilities

1. Public Affairs = Public Relations; a conduit to the media and creator of print, and broadcast media.
2. Civil Military Operations – military forces employing civilian skills to improve the life and infrastructure of a local population.
3. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy – Department of Defense support to the Department of State’s Public Diplomacy Operations

II Terrorist Use of IO Capabilities

A. Core Capabilities

1. Propaganda – Terrorists are making exceptionally good use of the Internet as a means to inform, influence and recruit. They are also being supported by ‘friendly’ media such as Al Jazeera which tends to spin the news in a way that is favorably received by the Arab Street. Terrorist propaganda is especially effective due to the speed with which they capitalize on events that serve their purpose. This rapid response is indicative of a streamlined or de-centralized chain of command and abbreviated approval cycle.

Allied information support operations tend to be much more cumbersome due to the heavy ROE and complex approval schema which can often include both military and civilian command cycles.

2. Military Deception (MILDEC) – In my view terrorist operations tend to be decentralized although they employ deception to shield their true intentions and make very effective use of ‘cover’ identities.

3. Operations Security (OPSEC) – Terrorist cells are generally quite secure due to their decentralized nature. Most terrorist organizations appear to have a very healthy respect for Signals Intelligence and will avoid electronic means of communications such as mobile phones to avoid detection. Trade craft to include steganography (the concealment of messages in pictures) is also employed along with other measures such as compartmentalized chat rooms, common password schemas, etc.

4. Electronic Warfare (EW) – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are often remotely detonated via mobile phones, garage door openers, etc. I am unaware of any large scale terrorist jamming efforts to date.

5. Computer Network Operations (CNO)

a. Computer Network Attack (CNA) – Experts believe that terrorists will employ cyber attacks in conjunction with a kinetic or physical attack. CNA may be employed prior to or subsequent to the kinetic attack depending on the type of operation.

b. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) – Terrorists, and nation states for that matter are routinely probing networks of interest. Terrorists are likely to employ a combination of human agents to infiltrate target organizations to be in a better position to exploit networks directly or to insert malicious code (such as the Stuxnet reported planted to damage the Iranian Nuclear Research program) for later execution.

Exploitation can also include gathering intelligence from the network. Terrorist cells must be self-financing. Harvesting data (personally identifiable information or PII) that allows them to steal identities which in turn allows monetization through theft of funds, goods or services is very effective.

Terrorist cells can also exploit networks by gathering information that may be of use to the movement in some way such as to identify potential funding sources or gather target information.

Terrorists are employing the Internet as a cost effective and for the most part, relatively secure communications channel. Their global operations lend themselves to Internet communications for availability, cost and security reasons.

c. Computer Network Defense (CND) – Unable to comment.

B. IO Supporting Capabilities

1. Counterintelligence – No comments

2. Combat Camera – Terrorist organizations make effective use of still and video cameras. They also exploit images captured by other sources such as the media.

3. Physical Attack – Mumbai type attacks are very likely to increase. They require a small footprint, are relatively low in cost and very difficult to defend against. They are very effective at exploiting soft targets which in turns results in dramatic chaos which is then exploited through the media and by the Terrorists’ own sources.

4. Physical Security – No Comment

5. Information Assurance – See Opsec Above

C. IO Related Capabilities

1. Public Affairs = Public Relations; Terrorists are exceptional PR professionals. They understand the value of publicity, especially the emotional appeal of images. They are able to appeal to ‘friendly’ media to a very great extent.
2. Civil Military Operations – Hezbollah and the Taliban have been quite successful at using social welfare as a means to ingratiate themselves with local populations.
3. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy – Governments tend to hide their association with terrorist organizations.

Positioned For Troop Reduction? Who is PSYOPing whom?

The Washington Post of March 7, 2011 quoted Secretary of Defense Gates as indicated that the US was “well-positioned” for some troop reductions in Afghanistan in July. If you are a PSYOP (pardon me MISO) soldier, don’t get your hopes up. Don’t get me wrong, I’m a big supporter of Secretary Gates as seen in some previous posts, but my Brooklyn BS detector went off when I read that.

The Washington Post of March 7, 2011 quoted Secretary of Defense Gates as indicated that the US was “well-positioned” for some troop reductions in Afghanistan in July. If you are a PSYOP (pardon me MISO) soldier, don’t get your hopes up. Don’t get me wrong, I’m a big supporter of Secretary Gates as seen in some previous posts, but my Brooklyn BS detector went off when I read that.

While I have not been to Afghanistan, it strikes me that our information support operations forces be they military or civilian are stretched pretty thin. Furthermore, the tribal/rural nature of Afghanistan does not lend itself to mass marketing of any type.

At least Mr. Gates was straight forward by noting that reductions would be small and that a significant US force would remain behind. In theory, the notion of a military draw down should be a signal to NATO and to the US that the diplomatic information efforts need to ramp up. Civilian infrastructure and medical missions also need to be tightened up with realistic fiscal management and timetables coupled with accountability.

I’m still of the opinion that local economies are the fundamental building blocks in that AO. Villages and their traditional leaders will be there long after America departs.

Hopefully we and our NATO allies have the political will to insure a bottom up level of confidence and security otherwise, the terrorist elements within the country and those scurrying back and forth to Pakistan will once again ascend to power.

Taliban Ought to Teach at SWC and the State Department

In the past week I received tips on two interesting articles on how the Taliban are wining the influence war (notice how I cleverly avoided using either PSYOP or MISO). One was a May 3, 2010 Article from Time (Why the Taliban Are Winning the Propaganda War @ http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1895496,00.html) and the other an August 2, 2010 article from All Voices (Taliban use of psychological warfare techniques in Afghanistan @ http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/6441710-night-letters-taliban-psyops-campaign-appeals-to-afghan-sense-of-pride-and-patriotism-wikileaks). Photo Source: Time Magazine

Both articles are pretty good and point to some reasons why the Taliban are indeed winning. The more recent article is especially important because it claims to be based on a review of the recent documents leaked by Wikileaks and given the report number citations appears well documented. Here are my thoughts on why the Taliban are winning.

First of all they have a streamlined approval cycle and a unified chain of command for influence operations. This means they can get their messages out sooner.

Secondly, the Karzai Administration is even worse than the Obama Administration when it comes to influence war strategy and operations.

Third – the Taliban is far more credible and can be more locally focused through their shadow governments and local warlords who are able to back up their threats of violence with the promised horrific results.

Fourth – they seem to know their target audience better than we do as evidenced by their appeals to nationalism and patriotism.

Fifth – they employ a wide range of media designed for maximum reach to their various target audiences.

Sixth – they appear to beat the Western media at its own game by skillfully manipulating events and perceptions in their favor.

While they lack iPads and the latest technology, the Taliban have proven that are a formidable opponent who also has the weapon of time on their side. Perhaps we need to consider ‘out of the box’ ways to thwart their efforts and the US and Afghan government influence agents need to get on the same page – now!

Proposed New Law to Modify Smith-Mundt

On July 14, 2010, U.S. Congressmen Mac Thornberry (TX-13) and Adam Smith (D-WA), both members of the House Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, introduced “The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2010” (H.R. 5729)
( see http://www.thornberry.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=198167)

According to the Press Release which can be found at the above link: ““While the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 was developed to counter communism during the Cold War, it is outdated for the wars of today,” said Congressman Adam Smith. “Effective strategic communication and public diplomacy should be front-and-center as we work to roll back al-Qaeda’s and other violent extremists’ influence among disaffected populations. An essential part of our efforts must be a coordinated, comprehensive, adequately resourced plan to counter their radical messages and undermine their recruitment abilities. To do this, Smith-Mundt must be updated to bolster our strategic communications and public diplomacy capacity on all fronts and mediums – especially online.”

The bill’s co-sponsors include: Reps. Dan Boren (D-OK), Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ), James Langevin (D-RI), Jeff Miller (R-FL), Ted Poe (R-TX), Dennis Rehberg (R-MT), and John Tanner (D-TN)

This would be an opportune time to contact your Congress person and help them understand the importance of the work we do.

I’ll leave it to you to use a name for it that you’re comfortable with.

The PSYOP Brand – A Commercial Perspective

As a Reservist I have the privilege of orchestrating two parallel careers. As Colonel I served in both PSYOP and MI slots in a variety of settings ranging from SIGINT Platoon Leader to IO Officer at SOCOM. On the commercial side my career was concentrated in High Tech marketing. My last full time salaried position was with Symantec Corporation, the makers of Norton Antivirus. My first boss was the Executive VP in charge of “Brand and Communication”. He was hired by the CEO because while at IBM my boss demonstrated exceptional skills at Branding and Public Relations (Public Affairs or PAO in military jargon). Another of my VP bosses was an acknowledged leader in marketing techniques.

(Photo Source: China Wholesale Gifts)

I learned quite a bit about branding and marketing in my 6 years at Symantec. Above all - the purpose of the brand is to increase the value of the company and make it easier to sell products and services. Brands need to be easy to recognize, and simple to understand. The brand should convey the essence of the organization and its product or service at a glance.

In my view the issue at hand with branding for influence operations is as more the big picture than the PSYOP name change. Neither “Information Operations” nor IO is a well understood phrase or a lead element in most commands. While Senior Leaders and Commanders believe that it is important to prep the information battlefield and that the need to influence foreign audiences is greater than ever, it would be fair to say that IO is still a nascent discipline that has less than universal acceptance and is nowhere near on an equal footing as kinetic operations.

Most CDRs and staffs at the GOFO (General officer/Flag Officer) levels have not demonstrated the real desire or ability to orchestrate and coordinate information weapons systems. PAO remains aloof and dedicated to the purity of being the CDR’s voice; CNO remains a dark art practiced only by the chosen few and we in PSYOP are now running around like a dog chasing its tail self-flagellating over the name change.

Here’s the real deal – SecDef Gates and Secretary Clinton need to sit down and lay out the path for the use of information as a an instrument of US government (USG) power. It would be ideal for the President to provide his guidance, not because he is the Commander-in-Chief, but because his election shows a mastery of the information battle space. In any event their staffs need to clarify the jargon and doctrine across Strategic Communications down to tactical Military Information Support and cascade the results throughout the USG.

MG Csrnko and SWC need to work quickly with SOCOM to develop the common grounding for the PSYOP Community so that we can all move out smartly at the same time and start on the same foot.

MISO: Is it soup yet?

With lightning and a clap of thunder from the Pentagon, PSYOP is to be stricken from the Defense system just as the name Moses was removed from the legacy of Egypt. The Secretary of Defense has approved the recommendation to change PSYOP to Military Information Support and/to Operations (MISO). The Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, Jr. has directed his staff to develop and orchestrate a plan designed to replace “PSYOP” with MISO in the Army (and presumably DOD) lexicon and branches.
Photo source: http://www.ecosalon.com/simple-miso-soup/

The name change follows the recommendation of the DSLC or Defense Senior Leader’s Conference. This is a conference co-hosted by SecDef (Secretary of Defense) and the CJCS (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Attendees typically include the Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs and elements of the Strategic Planning Council. The meetings are held three times a year (Jan, May and Sep) and are executed by the Director, Joint Staff. For some key bullet points on DSLC see: http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/dmcs/Routine%20Reports%20&%20Meetings/DSLC.htm.
The name change has been an emotional topic and has been bandied about for years. On the one hand, “PSYOP” has a long and distinguished history with traditions and a nascent branch espirit de corps. On the other, demand for PSYOP forces is escalating and the optempo is breathtaking.
Lack of emphasis of influence operations by senior combat CDR and the bifurcation of PSYOP forces between SOF and Reserve chains of command continues to hobble efforts to optimize and standardize PSYOP training and operations. Key challenges are: elevate the status and importance of information support (PSYOP/PAO) to the force; optimize force development, command and control to deal with burgeoning demand, provide for future conflicts where cyber influence – especially on non-state actors is critical.

Perhaps the name change signals a renaissance of the influence profession and missions.

It is past time for the influence aspect of military operations to assume its rightful role as a leading element in today’s force. This implies strong senior leadership support in terms of resourcing and fast tracking the policy and doctrinal changes that are needed in today’s world.

The name change is a perfect reason for renewed efforts to ‘educate’ Congress on what we do why MISO is an important instrument of government power. As a non-lethal battlefield multiplier MISO can more positively impact world opinion of US efforts than kinetic operations.

As good soldiers we have been given a lawful order and must execute it. We need to put aside any personal feelings we might have about the loss of tradition, and consider how we can leverage the name change and the massive activity that is needed to revise ‘the system’ across personnel, operations, training and logistics required to effect the change.

This is also an opportune time for the re-design of the Information Operations (IO) playing and career fields. In particular the need to integrate PAO and MISO as synergistic tools for the CDR is critical. Renaming and repositioning MISO can be a catalytic process to help foster this process.

All of us in the community need to embrace the change regardless of our personal feelings and use this window of opportunity to strengthen the community – perhaps not so much for ourselves, but for those who will come after us.

The Furlong Affair: PSYOP and Intelligence – What’s the deal?

The New York Times among others has reported on investigations concerning alleged inappropriate activities by senior government official Michael D. Furlong (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/asia/28contractor.html?scp=1&sq=Furlong&st=cse). Furlong, currently a Senior Level executive, is the Strategic Planner and Technology Integration Adviser, Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas (reference: http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=11344) is at the center of a swirling controversy as to whether or not he inappropriately used funds allegedly earmarked for information operations for unauthorized intelligence gathering through contractors. (Photo courtesy US Air Force)

Furlong retired as a LTC after serving in PSYOP slots among others. The controversy seems to imply that there is an unholy alliance between PSYOP (or information operations which appears to be used synonymously in most media pieces) and intelligence.

There are some key points that need to be made here. First of all, PSYOPers are not intelligence collectors. They may be trained observers who can report what they see, but they are not out to collect intelligence. Good PSYOP, like effective marketing and sales, is based on a solid understanding of the target audience, what motivates it, its leadership, what influences it and what are the best ways to appeal to that audience and convince them to behave in the desired manner.

Most of the time PSYOP intelligence needs are not the same as the CDR’s intelligence needs. The CDR’s Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) generally relate to the operations at hand. Most CDR (General McChrystal excepted) are solely interested in that information that will allow them to accomplish their direct mission which is usually kill or capture the enemy. Predilections that are important for influence purposes rarely make it to the CCIR list.

At the core of the Furlong matter is the allegation that he employed a media company, International Media Ventures (http://www.imediav.com/) as an outsource for intelligence operations. The company’s website proclaims that they are in the strategic communications, media and content businesses. A look at the “About” section and you discover that the company leadership is mostly ex-SOCOM types.
What’s the point? If Furlong was outsourcing intelligence, that’s a bad idea, if International Media Ventures was engaged in intelligence operations that’s stupid business because it compromises their ability to provide the kind of products and services expected in support of USG sponsored influence operations.

When the dust settles I am willing to bet that no laws will have been broken, however, the DOD ‘brand’ has suffered just as surely as Toyota is still recovering from their gas pedal issues. Perception is reality especially where PSYOP and influence operations are concerned. Practitioners are under a higher duty of care to insure that USG strategic communications and operational/tactical PSYOP are not tarnished.

In Afghanistan The Coffee Klatch is Mightier Than the Sword

As a native Brooklynite I have had a long standing affection for coffee. I enjoy everything from latte’s to Turkish Coffee (medium sweet just like Mr. Bond). More importantly I recognize the importance of social gatherings around one’s favorite beverage be it coffee, chai, tea, or beer. Social gatherings foster support and tribal elder support is the key to success in Afghanistan as pointed out in the USA Today Article on March 30, 2010 (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/2010-03-29-Afghan-elders_N.htm).

While I applaud President Obama’s first visit as Commander-in-Chief, my marketing sense tells me that his visit was most likely more effective to the audience outside Afghanistan than it. First of all Afghanistan isn’t exactly a TV focal mecca so that the majority of the population is not glued to their TV sets watching the world stage. If they get their information over the airwaves it is more likely to come through the FM radio being filtered and polarized by the station’s management.

From an influence perspective this type of market means that the local officer or NCO in charge is going to be the key to success. It is my belief that all officers and NCOs should receive some form of sales training. When we deployed to Bosnia in 1997 I gave every soldier a copy of Zig Ziglar’s book Secret’s of Closing the Sale. An alternative is Willie Gayle’s book on Power Selling.

Afghanistan is the classic example of “all politics is local” and personal selling is the most effective form of PSYOP at the local level. The nature of the beast is that PSYOP personnel cannot be everywhere and the ‘winning of hearts and minds’ starts with the simple premise that people must like you as a person before they will listen to anything you have to say. Consequently the senior person on the ground must establish a rapport with the key local leader who, more than likely, will be the tribal elder or imam.

Unfortunately there is no easy way to do this, nor is there a simple, magic formula to train everyone to be able to relate to foreign audiences. I have found that Marines and Special Forces in general are far more adaptive than other service personnel and are able to adjust their behavior and approach more easily.

Success will come after the Afghans people feel like they are secure in their homes. Whether this feeling is a direct result of villages pushing out the Taliban, the Afghan government actually becoming an effecting governing force, or a combination of these and external forces, it is the feeling of security which will be a self-fulfilling prophecy that make the American effort in Afghanistan a success and differentiate it from past efforts.

Cyber PSYOP: Google vs. China

The recent “activity” surrounding Google’s China market search engine business and the Chinese government’s political, economic and technical actions to impose censorship on searches illustrates the critical nature of the cyber component of PSYOP and free information flow.

One of PSYOPs core principles is that truth is the best PSYOP weapon. The Chinese government goes to great lengths to insure that Chinese citizens only have access to truth that has been approved by the government and considered fit for consumption. Google has been an unparalleled success story and the wealth of its high tech founders is the stuff of legend. However, they have failed to learn by history.

I was quoted in Computerworld UK concerning the Google/China affair: “In Google's case, there are two aspects of why the Chinese government would pay special attention to Google: first of all open access to information is contra to the philosophy of the government of the People's Republic of China and secondly Google as a business offers lessons to be learned. Consequently it should be no surprise that Google has been attacked from inside and outside.” (http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/security/data-control/in-depth/index.cfm?articleId=3084; March 1, 2010)

From a strategic PSYOP perspective the Chinese of been able to: 1. harness their citizens to ‘protect’ the state, 2. muster significant technology resources and muscle to enforce their political will, 3. sacrifice short term economic gain for long term consistency, 4. Coordinate the disparate arms of government (foreign policy, economic development, military, and legal) to achieve an information objective that is part of their well understood governmental strategic communications strategy.

Taking the other tact for a moment, Google sought to evade China’s grip by redirecting searches from the Chinese Mainland to Hong Kong. Apparently they lost sight of the fact that in 1997 Hong Kong reverted back to the government of the People’s Republic. While Hong Kong retains traces of its former British governance and aspects of friendliness to the West, make no mistake it is part of China.

Google’s mantra of ‘do no evil’ smacks in some ways of the Star Trek Prime Directive (do not interfere with other cultures), however even this technological giant has met its match in the People’s Republic of China. The message for us is clear – we must develop an Influence Operations Strategy and President Obama must orchestrate its operations and tactics.

A small baby step in this direction would be to appoint a White House level coordinator along the lines of Howard Schmidt, the Cyber Coordinator. While Mr. Schmidt has no real authority he is a single point of contact and can act as a conductor to facilitate the performance of many players. Our global communications strategy deserves no less.

Why drive if you don’t know where you’re going? Or Rudderless in Afghanistan

I have had a nagging feeling that the Af-Pak War as dubbed by correspondent Michael Yon (http://www.michaelyon-online.com/) is a quicksand pit. The more you struggle, the deeper you sink. My sensitivity to the Af-Pak situation was heighted by my recent experience at DINFOS and by watching the PBS documentary Frontline on the evening of 13 October 2009 (http://video.pbs.org/video/1295117818).

President Obama and his advisors are still pondering the strategy for Afghanistan. With apologies to Tommy Turtle who pondered why he could not run (he could not run because HE WAS A TURTLE!), there are a few things that are evident about this conflict:

1. A national government in Afghanistan is a-historic. This means it goes against the country’s history. The country is a collection of disparate tribes who sometimes ban together for their common good.
2. There way of life is alien to the American norm due to a mosaic of corruption, poverty, illiteracy, poppy cultivation, corruption and the less than second class citizen status of women.
3. “Success” in Afghanistan is more than a military effort it will require the national resole, political and public support and significant resources.
4. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a NATO force; the reality is that it is very much a US Force.
5. The Taliban are not a homogenous, hierarchal enemy but a collection of clans, tribes and families with resolve, cunning, adaptability who have time on their side.

The lack of a strategy means PSYOP is ‘on hold’. Any positive momentum that has been achieved thus far is likely to be lost with the exception of much localized situations where the efforts have been focused on gaining and maintaining positive relationships rather than delivering an array of messages.

In my view the approach is to work backwards, think bottom up rather than top down. If the goal is to truly change the lives of the Afghan people, then specific tribal and matching geographic areas must be mapped out.

Next develop a desired end state for each area and formulate the plan and resources needed to get there. Each area would be considered a separate ‘project’ and served by a different project team. The team would include age appropriate representatives to work with the tribal elders and resources with knowledgeable and capable interpreters.

The team would then take the vision of the end state and adjust it for reality. We do not want to be in the drastic makeover business. Michael Yon describes Afghanistan as lunar and having been to the Craters of the Moon State Park (http://www.nps.gov/crmo/index.htm) I can tell you that means remote, desolate and primitive.

Our goal therefore is to look at each area and decide what the appropriate and reasonable goals are and identify the resources needed to achieve them. Examples might include reorienting local agriculture from poppy growing to something else by being cognizant of the seasons, the need for farmers to have year round income, the ability to market what is grown, etc. Other examples might include other forms of agricultural assistance.

Local projects would run parallel to a few, well chosen national programs such as training the Army and Police, establishing a functional justice system and upgrading the educational system.

But – no progress can be made until a strategy is set and I urge the President to remember that “Lite” is never as good as the real thing.

Waffling on Afghanistan Strategy Impacts PSYOP – Belies Separate Nature of Two Missions

The recent waffling by the Obama Administration on the strategy for Afghanistan will have a significant dampening effect on the PSYOP effort. PSYOP, like marketing is cumulative. The nature of Afghanistan with its nooks and crannies of tribes and its unforgiving terrain makes the battle for mindspace even more troublesome than in Iraq. The time consuming task of relationship building is paramount.

It would appear that there are two alternative courses of action being considered in Afghanistan. Background can be found in a September 22, NY Times article “Obama Considers Strategy Shift in Afghan War” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html?ref=world) and elsewhere.

Counter Terrorist Strategy

The strategy shift advocated by VP Biden (how he has risen to the level of military strategist is beyond me) is to focus on counter-terrorism. Employ Special Forces, drones, etc. to root out Al Qaeda thereby making American safer from terrorist attacks. Apparently VP Biden proposed this strategy in March as well.

Concentrate on Population Centers

MG McChrystal has told his subordinates to concentrate on populated areas. Background found in the Washington Post article, September 22, 2009 “U.S. Commanders Told to Shift Focus to More Populated Areas” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092103704.html?wpisrc=newsletter)

From a military perspective, it seems to me that the President needs to appreciate the fact that there are two different missions. While the end game of reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks may be the same for either approach -- there are still two missions.

The first mission is to locate and destroy Al Qaeda and their allies wherever they may reside. Media reports and conventional wisdom seems to indicate that this mission is centered on the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan and often shifts into Pakistani territory. The nature of PSYOP and other elements of influence in this mission are far different from the tasks in Afghanistan. Of necessity targeting in the anti-terrorist mission must be precise, the means varied and the ways innovative. PSYOP via advanced technologies coupled with CNO, EW and other disciplines ought to be aggressively employed. It could be argued that MG Chrystal’s Special Forces experience makes him the perfect orchestrator for such an effort.

The mission inside Afghanistan is quite a bit different. That mission, simply stated is to stabilize the environment within the country to insure that the Taliban is not able to assume control of any portion of the country that would enable Al Qaeda to establish and maintain a safe haven. This is the counter insurgency (COIN) mission and will only succeed if coupled with a robust PSYOP effort.

The challenge to victory is great since the Karzai government has done little to enhance its own legitimacy and to serve the needs of the Afghani people. Consequently, the diplomatic aspect of the Afghanistani mission is to foster good government in spite of ages of corruption and an apparently flawed election.

There is great peril should the Administration embrace the counter terrorism mission and ignore the counter insurgency mission. Ignoring the current flammable situation in Afghanistan and abandoning efforts to thwart the Taliban from gaining power footholds is tantamount to giving Al Qaeda and our other enemies a clear path to establishing safe havens. Once this happens, it will only be a matter of time until the terrorists reach the critical mass needed to launch another attack.

Strategic Communications: Funding Little Old Grannies Who Wear Veils

It’s very hard to find something positive to say about Strategic Communications these days. Afghanistan and Iraq dominate the headlines and make the world appear to be a very bleak place.However, there are a couple of bright spots for those in Strategic Communications willing to think out of the box and take a longer range view than tomorrow’s headline. The September 3, 2009 Arts Section of the NY Times featured an article entitled: Dubai Superheros: Little Old Grannies Who Wear Veils (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/arts/television/03animated.html?scp=1&sq=Dubai%20Superheros&st=cse) Photo: NY Times

Mohammed Saeed Harib nor Freej, the United Arab Emirate’s (UAE) and therefore very likely the Middle East’s first 3-D animated series may not be as well known as the Simpsons or South Park, but the potential for the Grannie Superheros is worthy of note because it indicates a societal maturation. Societies that have a means to look at themselves and raise issues through ‘characters’ are better able to deal with issues and inequities thwarting the appeal of fundamentalism.

During my service in Bosnia it was clear to me that a free and credible media was a fundamental cornerstone of any nation. Citizens need to be informed and be able to dialog about their societies.

The next level of sophistication is another way for society’s to view themselves and that’s entertainment as a vehicle to address social issues. Freej cannot attack issues head on like The Simpsons or South Park and must of necessity is an indirect approach.

Supporting an entertainment venture like Freej might not seem like Strategic Communication – but it clearly is because as Freej and other forms of entertainment open up issues for discussion and perhaps potential action they can facilitate the positive transformation of a society.

Over time sociological entertainment from the UAE would likely be exported to other areas of the region and perhaps even spawn copy cat programs that would have a local spin, yet still have the positive effect of expanding societal expression.

I should also point out that Mr. Harib attended Northeastern University in Boston which has itself evolved from a commuter based university built on balancing work experience and academic study to one of the top 100 universities in the US, and oh yes, my Alma Mater!

Congress and Strategic Communications – Are They On The Right Track?

Today’s Washington Post covered comments made by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees concerning Strategic Communications. Rather than point to failings of the military I believe it shows that President Obama – one of the great info warriors of our time – is paying more attention to communicating with the American Voter than to the world audience. (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701896.html)
(Pictured are Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Representative Ike Skelton, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee)

There were several key points raised by Congress in the article:

1. Strategic Communications Programs are too big, have grown too fast to allow effective oversight, it is impossible to determine whether the efforts are integrated within DOD or with the broader US government” and Pentagon planning “is insufficient compared to the needs.”

2. The military is producing propaganda and other materials that mask US government sponsorship and focus beyond traditional military IO – they are “alarmingly non-military propaganda, public relations and behavioral modification messaging.”

3. There needs to be a new legal review of the law prohibiting strategic communications (or PSYOP) accessible by American audiences.

Presidential Action Need to Command and Control Strategic Communications

Given that funding for Strategic Communications is rapidly approaching $1Billion and that there is no central control or coordination of these efforts across the USG it seems to me Congress is right on. There are other critical issues here though. First of all it appears that the President has not focused any attention on strategic communication. His information advisors are concentrating on making sure the Health Care Agenda goes forward and are paying scant attention to foreign audiences.

The President or his designated Information Leader needs to be the focal point for Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy because our efforts worldwide are moving to information engagement over kinetic operations and this trend is likely to accelerate over time. The President needs to be mindful of the previous criticism of USG information management and the disaster experienced by the Pentagon Office that sought to address this issue.

There needs to be an approved overall USG information engagement strategy and a designated leader for it reporting to the President. Only be applying the principle of unity of Command will the USG be able to effectively manage its information engagement efforts and determine the adequacy of planning and resourcing for the task.

Information Engagement Must Be More Than Military

Congress has missed the boat on the ‘military nature’ of strategic communications. DOD is the critical resource serving as a conduit of information to civilian audiences. US forces abroad are faced with the need to effectively communicate to foreign audiences on their own soil. This messaging is inherently non-military in nature. The so called ‘winning of hearts and mind’ is no longer the leaflet urging surrender. Rather the messages are support your government, help defeat the insurgents, explore possibilities for a more stable economy – the stuff of nation building and bolstering governments rather than the traditional messages associated with combat.

Information Laws Are Obsolete

The Internet Age has brought the world to smart phones, the notion of ideas being bound by traditional national borders is nonsense and the time has come to amend the laws restricting information engagement even if American audiences can receive the messages.

White House Homeland Security Council Merged Into the National Security Council

President Obama has directed that the White House Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council be merged with the combined staff of about 240 personnel reporting to National Security Advisor General James Jones, USMC (Ret).

(See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR2009052603148.html?sub=AR or http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/27homeland.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Security%20Shuffle&st=cse) (Photo Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/newsstoryPhoto/2003-01/200301092a.jpg)

The White House website does not have a listing of the members of the NSC except for those who are required to be members by statute. According to the White House Website:

“The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.” (http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/)

This is prudent recognition that the dangers facing our country no know borders. The action should have the effect of increased information sharing among staff members and perhaps a more cohesive approach to security issues overall.

A key question that should be raised is: how will the new and improved organization address information engagement issues across the board? It is reasonable to assume that the NSC has a Strategic Communications representative and it is clear that the Press is a critical component of the Homeland Security Council.

At issue is how information will be crafted and distributed under this new approach. The Department of State is the lead for Public Diplomacy, but often lacks the resources and reach to exert information influence in many parts of the world where conflicts exist. On the domestic front, Department of Homeland Security will work with the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) and coordinate incident response using the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Neither of these two organizations have the robust resources that DOD has to deploy under the kind of exceptionally adverse conditions that would exist after major natural disasters or terrorist attacks.

It would appear then the some real work needs to be done to fold DOD resources into the NSC/Homeland Security mix. This work entails more than the development of contingency plans, but has to include a modicum of training for PSYOP and PAO personnel and will have to run across Active, Reserve and National Guard Forces.

Furthermore, the kinds of holistic responses that may be required may also need to employ contingency commercial resources that need to be identified and trained beforehand as well.

Given that DOD is still working out the kinks of how PSYOP and PAO will work together, watching the new and improved NSC unfold will be interesting. Let’s hope the equipping, planning and training takes place before any negative incidents.

Bad News And Commanders

Getting hit in the media can sometimes have more long term negative effects than physical casualties. The recent credibility debacle arising from airstrikes in Afghanistan is disturbing on many levels and a very good – bad example.

First of all CDR, especially senior ones, should know that, unlike wine or chicken soup – bad news does not get better with age. CDR should also know that sooner or later the ‘truth’ will come out. Consequently it makes sense to know where your bombs are landing and to be ready to admit when things going awry.

Commercial Public Relations (PR) experts will advise to get out in front of the event and take the moral high ground. Admit what happened, take responsibility, describe how you will help to set things right and then detail the steps you are taking to make sure it won’t happen again.

Of course this has to be in the context of not giving the enemy the feeling that you are abandoning the weapons systems and conveying that you won’t hesitate to bring air power to the fight whenever necessary.

Public Diplomacy: Big Buck PSYOP Needs A Boost

The Washington Post reported: “U.S. Running Out of Time to Join Shanghai Expo”
(see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/06/AR2009050603888.html?wpisrc=newsletter)

According to the article the US has missed a critical deadline for commitment and there is grave concern that the US pavilion will not be built in time. The expo and its mascot featured in the accompanying picture is expected to attract 70 million visitors during its 6 month life span and is being compared to “World’s Fairs” of the past. (official site: http://en.expo2010.cn/ ).

Secretary of State Clinton has weighed in to the fray saying "I believe it is crucial for the United States to be present along with the other 180 nations participating in this major global event," Clinton wrote. "The U.S. presence at the Expo will showcase American business, culture and values in China's most dynamic city and foster an even stronger friendship between the American and Chinese peoples."

Interestingly enough the Secretary’s position is that she doesn’t want USG money, nor does she want to take money from the Chinese. It is hoped that commercial organizations will help fund the project to ensure US representation.

The ability to strut one’s stuff in front of an estimated 70 million people should make commercial mouths water and one wonders why that is not the case. Having purchased hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of marketing services while I was at Symantec I can only conclude that potential sponsors haven’t been able to connect the dots from showing off to sales. Nothing stimulates corporate action more than the prospect of juicy revenue. Nothing except perhaps saving money.

Secretary Clinton might consider working with Congress to pass some special tax incentives that would benefit sponsors through reduced taxes. Clearly a President as intellectually astute as President Obama recognizes the long term benefits of this exercise of soft power as a way to showcase positive aspects of “American business, culture and values” as noted by Secretary Clinton.

While the expo is not the province of PSYOP or DOD it is indicative of the synergy Public Diplomacy and soft power can play on the world stage to bolster the American image.

Enemies With No Rules Need Counter PSYOP

The NY Times has been covering the Afghani popular backlash against American airstrikes blamed for the deaths of civilians. (see http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/world/asia/08afghan.html?_r=1&ref=world) Photo from the article.

Protests erupted in the western province of Farah. The protests in turn spurred police response and generated support from some local government officials. The US government admitted that there were airstrikes but balked at responsibility for the civilian deaths.

The US information engagement response was an expression of regret and announcement of a joint investigation by Secretary Clinton and a statement by Gen David McKiernan: “We have some other information that leads us to distinctly different conclusions about the cause of the civilian casualties.”
The article continued with accounts of bodies and anonymous US forensics evidence that seemed to indicate the attacks were the results of grenades, not bombs. And from the Pentagon the world media heard: “We cannot confirm the report that the Taliban executed these people,” said Capt. John Kirby, the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. “We don’t know if it’s true, and we also don’t know how many civilians were killed as a result of this operation.”
· Let me be clear that I am not, nor have I ever been in this theater so I really have no idea what ground truth is. However, this much I do know:
· Popular support will be even more important as more troops pour into Afghanistan.
· NATO forces ought to know where they bombs are falling and ought to be able to estimate the people and property damage to be expected.
· The local population appears to want to believe that the Americans are always the bad guys.
· Declarations of regret are nice but have no local effect.
· Joint investigations will take some time delaying their impact and their credibility will be in doubt unless they have insured local credibility through local leaders.
I have a few recommendations:
· Air strikes are common enough phenomena that the USG must have a proven SOP for dealing with their actual and perceived harm. This SOP needs to stress information engagement tailored to the local area.
· Technology should be employed with the entertainment value of the TV series. I would envision a Lawrence Fishburne or Dennis Haysbert type authoritative figure narrating a simulation that shows how the bodies were created by a Taliban attack. This computer imagery would be employed in the local area and if appropriate made available to regional and international media as well as on YouTube.
· Print versions of the simulation with local language translation should be made available. If there is no written local language then audio (like greeting cards) should be used.

President Plans Diplomatic Surge in Afghanistan

The March 18 edition of the Washington Post reported that “A civilian "surge" of hundreds of additional U.S. officials in Afghanistan would accompany the already approved increase in U.S. troop levels” (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/18/AR2009031802313.html)

If this comes to pass it will be a giant step forward in Afghanistan, and, in my view, much needed shift in emphasis for much of the USG strategy in troubled nations. Key of course will be security and coordination between DoS and DoD personnel.

While the article states that a heavy concentration of these diplomats will remain at the Embassy in Kabul, there is also mention of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), a concept which is generally regarded as successful in Iraq. Given the nature of Afghanistan as noted in my previous posts – the more that are out in the villages – the merrier and the more likely USG objectives are to be obtained.

Since I’ve commented on negative aspect’s of USG efforts, I felt it was important to point out this positive step.

PSYOP and the Reverse Surge in Iraq

President Obama appears to be carrying through on his promise of ‘ending the war’. He recently announced that the combat mission in Iraq will be over by 2010 (see http://www.military.com/news/article/February-2009/obama-sets-august-2010-for-iraq-withdrawl.html among others). Commanders have announced that a drawdown of forces will start this year, assuming that the level of security in Iraq allows it.

(Photo: Courtesy the Whitehouse: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/02/27/Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/)

The President made a number of key points in his 27 February speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina:

“This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.”

“Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end.”

“After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country.”

(Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/)

There is no specific mention of support of an Iraqi journalistic infrastructure, nor are there comments on the future of military information engagement as this transformation unfolds over the next few years. Clearly there is no indication of how State Department Public Diplomacy would ramp up as military capabilities ramp down.

I believe this is likely to be a critical fault of the overall exit strategy and perhaps a negative indication of President Obama’s ability to synergize all of his tools of statecraft simultaneously.

Unfortunately a ramp down in Iraq has been accompanied by a ramp up in Afghanistan, the demand for PSYOP has gone up, the supply however, has not. This is very likely to mean a temptation to draw down the information engagement resources in Iraq and transfer them to Afghanistan or the theater dejure.

The Administration and DOD must recognize that the information engagement does not end because the combat forces leave, nor does it necessarily change direction because the mission has moved from combat to ‘supporting’.

Information engagement, like sales and marketing is a continuous process. This process must be focused and resourced until the desired behavioral objectives have been achieved.

It is possible that DOD has or is developing a strategy to replace military information engagement with contractor resources, however, this hasn’t been made clear nor has there been a major increase in recruiting of PSYOP personnel leaving the military by contractors. While a contractor resource may be able to do the job, one wonders if private industry is the right party to do so. The President has pushed an agenda of engagement and transparency – transitioning from those who serve because they want to, to those who serve because, while they may be no less dedicated than those in uniform, are not graded by an OER, but at the end of the day – by profits may not be the best course of action at this point in time.