Military Efforts To Influence Foreign Media Wasted Says Washington Post

The April 25, 2011 Washington Post Slams DOD for “influencing media in a foreign country – particularly those where U.S. troops have fought – is not very good, and recent attempts by US military units have been even worse” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/for-us-managing-foreign-media-is-a-no-win-proposition/2011/04/23/AFhTRlkE_story.html) Also the photo source.

Walter Pincus essentially feels DOD is wasting tax paper money with extensive contractor and military efforts to impact foreign media especially in areas where the US has extensive combat forces He blasts activities in Iraq and quotes a source (a writer from the New Yorker) describing how US efforts have established Afghanistani media moguls (Saad Mohseni, chairman of the Moby Group and his brothers).

According to the New Yorker source (Kenneth Auletta) a USAID (State Department Agency) grant jump started their business which has blossomed to produce a variety of “reality” TV programs. Auletta wrote that the programming has a more profound impact on the Afghan people then would a newscast.

Much of this is of course déjà doo – doo meaning I’ve seen this sh*t before. First of all TV is entertainment even the news is entertainment. Most TV, reality shows in particular are not intended to appeal to the Harvard Business School (or Yale as in the case of Mr. Pincus) crowd. In some countries TV is among the few escape vehicles that the people have. For example in Bosnia during my 1997-98 tour there Venezuelan soap operas were among the most popular shows.

I guess I didn’t get what problem Mr. Pincus was trying to highlight. There are certainly quite a few: contractors and media enterprises require heavy funding that could perhaps be used elsewhere; citizens are naturally pre-disposed to regard foreign troops on their soil as a bad thing; should governments have the power to influence media in the first place?

All of those seem to be profound topics worthy of discussion, but to me, throwing the military under the bus in a couple of dismissive sentences is shoddy journalism. Did Mr. Pincus mean ISAF? Did he mean DOD or did he mean the actions of PSYOP/MISO teams on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan. Perhaps he was actually criticizing President Obama for the lack of an overarching information engagement strategy. No matter, the opinion piece falls short on several counts.

Unfortunately PSYOP lacks the clout to counter this rhetoric as it bounces around Capitol Hill. Our challenge is to insure that the accomplishments of our PSYOP forces receives at least as much ink as their alleged failures.

Jiminy Cricket in the Form of a Non Government Organization

As many of you may remember, Jiminy Cricket was Pinocchio’s conscience. He helped to coach the puppet to be truthful so that the puppet’s dream of turning into a ‘real boy’ could be realized.

Today’s Washington Post featured an article entitled: “Obama says U.S. is ‘on track’ to achieve goals in Afghanistan” (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121601259.html?wpisrc=nl_natlalert). The President claims that the US is making progress, but as he noted "the gains we've made are fragile and reversible.". The President added …..Taliban momentum has been "arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas, although these gains remain fragile and reversible,"

Photo Source: TVAcres.com

The impression of this rather strategic communication was to convey a positive view of where we are in Afghanistan. The target audience was of course beyond those fortunate enough to be at the White House. The target audience is world opinion.

When I see statements like this I become quite skeptical and while I have never been to Afghanistan, I have spoken to many who have been there, and my impression is that Afghanistan is a feudal state that has resisted centralized control of any type – whether driven by Afghanis or by outsiders for centuries. It didn’t seem quite right to me that we are succeeding were so many others have failed. So I dug a bit deeper.

Interestingly, another seemingly innocuous article popped up on my radar screen. The NY Times reported on 15 December 2010: “For Red Cross, Aid Conditions Hit New Low in Afghanistan” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/asia/16redcross.html?_r=1)
The article quotes the Reto Stocker, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (a non-government organization with HQ in Switzerland): “By every measure that the Red Cross tracks, the situation has worsened throughout the country for civilian casualties, internal displacement and health care access and all of it is “against the background of a proliferation of armed actors,”.

Who is a reasonable person to believe? The President of the United States, a duly elected former Chicago politician or one of the world’s leading charities?

The point of this post is not to argue who to believe, but to point out that today’s information battlefield is a dynamic one where neutrals and friendlies can mute the impact of even the most carefully orchestrated campaign and where it is impossible to color bad news as good in the 21st century.

Iraq: Post War Proves More Difficult Than The War

The US has already downsized its efforts and removed ‘combat’ forces from Iraq. Conceptually the departure of US combat forces was supposed to signal a new era of self-sufficiency, security and prosperity for Iraq and is people. The new era part may be true, but the rest of it is clearly in doubt.
Photo Source: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/

While the world watches new hot spots like Korea, continually festering ones like Afghanistan while trying to digest supposed revelations over Wikileaks , US forces are still preparing to deploy to Iraq where the number of troops hovers around 50,000 -- PSYOP (Military Information Support) personnel are among them.

I believe the MISO job in Iraq will be more difficult that it was support tactical combat operations and I believe it will be even more nuanced that the Afghanistan mission. MISO works best when it is based on truth and where there is some leverage in the mind of the intended audience. Information support of any kind cannot fix underlying problems. It can help to highlight achievements and can accentuate positive while reducing the negative, but it cannot alleviate underlying problems.
There are four critical problems that need to be addressed by the US and our allies so that the Iraqi people at least have a fair chance to establish a stable and prosperous environment. Here are the issues as I seem them (not necessarily in order).

1. Dreadful Economy
Unemployment in Iraq is reportedly high and there has been no influx of new opportunities to give Iraqi’s jobs. Unemployment is exacerbated by the fact that many Iraqi’s were dependent on US forces or contractors to US forces for their jobs and these sources have dried up as well.

2. Governmental Impotence
The Iraqi federal government is still in political tatters and appears unable to address the needs of the population (electrical power likely still being a big issue). Regional and local governments are likely to be no better off.

3. Increased Secular Conflict
Sunni, Shia and others seem to be in a state of turmoil fanned by insiders and outsiders.

4. Outside Influence
There appears to be undue influence by outsiders, especially Iran who delights in seeing a weak government. The security vacuum has also reopened the door for foreign ‘fighters’ to return and foster havoc as well.

In my view there are a couple of keys to success that must be explored even in the face of these four significant challenges. First of all, the US needs to insure dominance over the TV airwaves inside Iraq. This means developing on-going and mutually beneficial relationships with local and regional TV broadcasters. These relationships might include sharing of advanced journalistic techniques and technology (which ought to be spear headed by the Public Affairs Office) and spreading around of advertising dollars.

Secondly, credible spokes people need to be recruited and nurtured. There is no shortage of physical danger in Iraq, but there always seems to be a small core of people willing to stand-up for their beliefs. These are valuable resources and must be guarded and protected.

Third, if ever there was a time for the other Cabinet Departments to pitch in, it is now. State needs to insure that there is no shortage of coordinated public diplomacy, while Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture along with DHS need to provide their expertise to help Iraq regain its national strength.

NATO and other allies should be doing their fair share. Fair share here can mean economic support as well as military boots on the ground.

Finally the President and his advisers need to afford the Iraqi AO the priority it deserves to preserve the hard hardened gains and investment in blood and treasure we have already made.

Combat Mission Over Declares PSYOPer-in-Chief

President Obama, the PSYOPer –in-Chief declared that combat operations are over in a White House speech delivered at 8 PM Eastern time on August 31, 2010 and which can be found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq

(Photo Source: The White House)

He is of course the second US President to declare a “mission accomplished” of sorts, but what did the President really say and what does it mean to the influence operations community?

First, the departure of ‘combat’ units was chronicled far and wide and the President was kind to recognize the achievements of service personnel in executing whatever tasks they were given – “At every turn, America’s men and women in uniform have served with courage and resolve. As Commander-in-Chief, I am incredibly proud of their service. And like all Americans, I’m awed by their sacrifice, and by the sacrifices of their families.”

The President also noted that he kept his campaign promise, he too has to be re-elected of course. He went on to add that “This completes a transition to Iraqi responsibility for their own security”. The speech goes on to say that there is a transition force and that the military draw down will be paralleled by a ramp up of “dedicated civilians”.

A bit over half way through the direction turned to the sorry state of the US economy and the need to more or less stop spending on war and spend on ourselves, or so it seemed to me.
Various sources peg the number of troops in Iraq at around 50,000, not a trivial number by any means.
Where does that leave MISO forces?

First of all the absence of a warfighter means that influence operations must shift gears dramatically to shore up US Department of State and other efforts and to document and publicize successes in a credible and forceful way to help the Iraqi population appreciate the efforts of the US and our allies.

Most importantly “someone” must work with local and regional media to help them upgrade their efforts and to insure that standards of fair and impartial journalism govern the media. This may require out of the box thinking. Lack of warfighters may also mean a lack of PAO resources and since the PAO is the CDR’s representative to foreign media this means that the Department of State must step up to the plate.
Having said that, select MISO NCOs and officers may be just the right candidates to help mentor journalists as long as those journalists are not tarred by the brush of working with the US military.

The post-combat MISO mission promises to be more complex , challenging and probably more dangerous. Hopefully the chain of command understands that in the real world campaign promises don’t count for much.

PSYOP and Iraq: It Ain’t Over Yet

Notwithstanding declarations touting the end of combat operations in Iraqi, the influence war is far from over. Seemingly coordinated attacks across the country are sending forceful and graphic messages to Iraqis that their lives remain perilous. (Photo: NY Times)

With the withdrawal of the Warfighter, influence operations must take on a new flavor and tempo. Unlike Afghanistan which is mostly tribal and rural, Iraq has significant urban centers. These centers are served by local and regional media to include TV. In many quarters of these cities there are even likely (I haven’t been there so I can’t say for sure) Internet cafes and ISPs serving a growing body of Internet and smart phone users.

Iraq serves as a laboratory for future conflict. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) must now TRULY be in support – but this time of diplomatic efforts to thwart the insurgency and raise the conscious of Iraqis. Security is no longer just the problem of government. Citizens need to be more vigilant and supportive of their fledgling police and security forces. Aggressive influence operations are needed to mobilize the support of the population.

The people of Iraq need to dry up the sea of support that allows the insurgents to move freely. The government should help the process by maintaining truly anonymous channels of communications to allow citizens to provide tips on the enemy without fear of retribution.

DOD information support can and ought to come in several ways: First, PSYOP personnel can augment and assist State Department through the embassy and its outreach efforts. PAO personnel can facilitate the Iraqi media and in concert with the State Department, aid in the maturing of a potent and objective media that can inform and help the Iraqis defeat their insurgent. Other avenues could include training Iraqi MISO and PAO personnel and facilitating working arrangements between these Iraqi government personnel with local and regional media.

In addition to these programs, Strategic Communications efforts aimed at the Region should be undertaken via the Internet and other channels designed to ‘reach the street’.

The bottom line is that the influence war needs to ramp up even more than during combat and that all government instrumentalities need to be brought to bear under a clearly articulated strategy and with a mindset to learning on the fly. Lessons learned over the next few years should not have to be relearned in new influence battlefields where ever they may be.

Attacking The Terrorist Mind

The January 10, 2010 NY Times features an article entitled: “The Terrorist Mind: An Update” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/weekinreview/10kershaw.html?scp=1&sq=terrorist%20mind&st=cse)

The author analyzes works by a number of academicians who have studied the terrorist mind. According to the article, Dr. John Horgan of International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State is credited with leading “much of the research into what is known as disengagement – a terrorist’s departure from the organization”. Dr. Horgan claims that there are a couple of key reasons why terrorists leave the movement. This is not to say they abandon their radical views, but rather they have left the group and renounced violence.

Leading reasons include: the small groups they are in “are rife with jealousies and personal competition; life is boring; pressure of maintaining a double life is too exhausting. Others include “aging out” where the member has grown to the point of wanting more stability and perhaps starting a family. Some may sense that the group’s goals are unattainable and/or they have reached their moral limit. Others are dismayed to find elderly and children engaged in battles.

From a PSYOP perspective we want to stimulate and reinforce these views. The Internet is likely the ideal medium to transmit dramatizations and perhaps ‘testimonials’ form former terrorists (to include Taliban) that underscore the feelings noted above.

The Internet has been cited as a key medium for recruitment for Al Qadea and Others (see NY Times, December 31, 2009, “Focus on Internet Imams As Recruiters for Al Qaeda” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01imam.html?scp=1&sq=Focus%20on%20Internet%20Imams&st=cse)) Consequently it is logical to assume that the same medium would be the way to reach the terrorist member and transmit messages reinforcing the desire to leave the movement.

Chatrooms and other virtual meeting places need to be designed that can attract terrorist recruits and members and that offer messages stimulating disengagement. In my view it makes sense to post messages from various sources on websites known to espouse terrorism. I am a believer of using the Internet like the ocean. Taking down offending websites is like playing Whack A Mole because new ones will pop as quickly as others are taken down.

It seems to me that these kinds of operations need to be joint (more than one service) and ideally combined (more than 1 nation). Furthermore the best work product is likely to come from a combination of military, diplomatic and civilian minds – groups designed to think like the customer with the native linguistic ability to carry the creativity and disengagement messages forward in multiple directions on the Internet and elsewhere.

Strategic Communications: Funding Little Old Grannies Who Wear Veils

It’s very hard to find something positive to say about Strategic Communications these days. Afghanistan and Iraq dominate the headlines and make the world appear to be a very bleak place.However, there are a couple of bright spots for those in Strategic Communications willing to think out of the box and take a longer range view than tomorrow’s headline. The September 3, 2009 Arts Section of the NY Times featured an article entitled: Dubai Superheros: Little Old Grannies Who Wear Veils (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/arts/television/03animated.html?scp=1&sq=Dubai%20Superheros&st=cse) Photo: NY Times

Mohammed Saeed Harib nor Freej, the United Arab Emirate’s (UAE) and therefore very likely the Middle East’s first 3-D animated series may not be as well known as the Simpsons or South Park, but the potential for the Grannie Superheros is worthy of note because it indicates a societal maturation. Societies that have a means to look at themselves and raise issues through ‘characters’ are better able to deal with issues and inequities thwarting the appeal of fundamentalism.

During my service in Bosnia it was clear to me that a free and credible media was a fundamental cornerstone of any nation. Citizens need to be informed and be able to dialog about their societies.

The next level of sophistication is another way for society’s to view themselves and that’s entertainment as a vehicle to address social issues. Freej cannot attack issues head on like The Simpsons or South Park and must of necessity is an indirect approach.

Supporting an entertainment venture like Freej might not seem like Strategic Communication – but it clearly is because as Freej and other forms of entertainment open up issues for discussion and perhaps potential action they can facilitate the positive transformation of a society.

Over time sociological entertainment from the UAE would likely be exported to other areas of the region and perhaps even spawn copy cat programs that would have a local spin, yet still have the positive effect of expanding societal expression.

I should also point out that Mr. Harib attended Northeastern University in Boston which has itself evolved from a commuter based university built on balancing work experience and academic study to one of the top 100 universities in the US, and oh yes, my Alma Mater!

PSYOP and PT Barnum

This week’s lead posting was supposed to be a thoughtful perspective about PSYOP Regimental Week last week at Fort Bragg. However, there is just too good of a target of opportunity to pass up.

Sunday’s (8 June 09) Washington Post featured an article entitled: “A High-Priced Media Campaign That Iraqis Aren't Buying” (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/06/AR2009060602144.html)

The article leads off by describing Baghdad Now, a newspaper that according to the article “has no publicly known editor, no bylines and no ads”. The article continues by saying that the paper is free and distributed by soldiers.

Is this a giant waste of money or not? It should be obvious that Baghdad Now is not a ‘real’ paper because it doesn’t cost anything and doesn’t have any ads, but does that mean the entire effort is a waste of money?

At the risk of sounding like an attorney, it depends. On the one hand there would appear to be a real credibility gap, but on the other, even if only a limited numbers of Iraqi’s read the paper hasn’t it accomplished something? Actually I think the money and energy could be better spent in other ways.

There is a big difference between tactical PSYOP support to a particular operation or set of operations. For example, PSYOP in support of a cordon and search operation has a finite beginning and a clear end point. PSYOP support to induce an enemy force to surrender or to convince insurgents to leave the area also has concrete metes and bounds. These assignments are clearly the meat and potatoes of tactical PSYOP in general and US Army PSYOP in particular.

However, these missions are in stark contrast to the loftier, more strategic goals of supporting the USG’s goals of bolstering the Iraqi government and insuring a secure environment as US troops withdraw.

Publishing a newspaper even for an audience you know well is not easy. The financial woes of the US printed newspaper industry are not exclusively a US problem and attest to the difficulties facing this medium.

Newspapers must give their readers a reason to pick them up. Local papers in particular are succeeding by providing local news that the regional or national media just can’t provide. Local politics, local social events, local religious celebrations and news of one’s neighbors are the stuff of well read local papers. Local papers also prominently publish obituaries because they are important to the community. A newspaper that only published fluff and generalities would quickly find itself out of business.

Of course the Washington Post may not be presenting the full picture, after all their job is also to sell papers and stories about USG efforts that are going well or can’t be connected to the Abu Ghraib debacle won’t sell nearly as well as those that do. Having said, it seems to me that US influence efforts would be better spent in partnership efforts with existing credible media. The resulting product won’t be the everything is rosy approach of Baghdad Now, but the interaction with credible local journalists can ultimately develop into the relationships and journalistic philosophy necessary for an impartial reporting of the news or at least a less judgmental view that doesn’t tar all the actions of the Iraqi government or the US forces trying to support it.

Bad News And Commanders

Getting hit in the media can sometimes have more long term negative effects than physical casualties. The recent credibility debacle arising from airstrikes in Afghanistan is disturbing on many levels and a very good – bad example.

First of all CDR, especially senior ones, should know that, unlike wine or chicken soup – bad news does not get better with age. CDR should also know that sooner or later the ‘truth’ will come out. Consequently it makes sense to know where your bombs are landing and to be ready to admit when things going awry.

Commercial Public Relations (PR) experts will advise to get out in front of the event and take the moral high ground. Admit what happened, take responsibility, describe how you will help to set things right and then detail the steps you are taking to make sure it won’t happen again.

Of course this has to be in the context of not giving the enemy the feeling that you are abandoning the weapons systems and conveying that you won’t hesitate to bring air power to the fight whenever necessary.

Enemies With No Rules Need Counter PSYOP

The NY Times has been covering the Afghani popular backlash against American airstrikes blamed for the deaths of civilians. (see http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/world/asia/08afghan.html?_r=1&ref=world) Photo from the article.

Protests erupted in the western province of Farah. The protests in turn spurred police response and generated support from some local government officials. The US government admitted that there were airstrikes but balked at responsibility for the civilian deaths.

The US information engagement response was an expression of regret and announcement of a joint investigation by Secretary Clinton and a statement by Gen David McKiernan: “We have some other information that leads us to distinctly different conclusions about the cause of the civilian casualties.”
The article continued with accounts of bodies and anonymous US forensics evidence that seemed to indicate the attacks were the results of grenades, not bombs. And from the Pentagon the world media heard: “We cannot confirm the report that the Taliban executed these people,” said Capt. John Kirby, the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. “We don’t know if it’s true, and we also don’t know how many civilians were killed as a result of this operation.”
· Let me be clear that I am not, nor have I ever been in this theater so I really have no idea what ground truth is. However, this much I do know:
· Popular support will be even more important as more troops pour into Afghanistan.
· NATO forces ought to know where they bombs are falling and ought to be able to estimate the people and property damage to be expected.
· The local population appears to want to believe that the Americans are always the bad guys.
· Declarations of regret are nice but have no local effect.
· Joint investigations will take some time delaying their impact and their credibility will be in doubt unless they have insured local credibility through local leaders.
I have a few recommendations:
· Air strikes are common enough phenomena that the USG must have a proven SOP for dealing with their actual and perceived harm. This SOP needs to stress information engagement tailored to the local area.
· Technology should be employed with the entertainment value of the TV series. I would envision a Lawrence Fishburne or Dennis Haysbert type authoritative figure narrating a simulation that shows how the bodies were created by a Taliban attack. This computer imagery would be employed in the local area and if appropriate made available to regional and international media as well as on YouTube.
· Print versions of the simulation with local language translation should be made available. If there is no written local language then audio (like greeting cards) should be used.

PSYOP Surged in Afghanistan?

President Obama has agreed with SecDef Gates that a surge is what is needed in Afghanistan to turn the growing tide of violence and to deal with the annual Taliban spring offensive. Units that were scheduled to go to Iraq are being re-directed to Afghanistan with the popular opinion that “a surge worked in Iraq and by golly it ought to work in Afghanistan also.”

I’m reminded of the expression “ready to fight the last war”. Afghanistan has withstood the efforts of would be conquers for centuries, Pakistan is no more settled on its approach to the tribal no man’s land today than it was years ago. Is more troops the answer? I’m inclined to think not exactly.

Merely increasing the amount of US footprint might increase the security for a while, but unless there are fundamental changes in the Afghani tribal security picture, the economy and the government, a troop surge is like adding more crew to the Titanic.

Some fundamental questions need to be raised – which have hopefully been asked answered. Questions like:

Is there an overall information engagement plan for the country?

Have the vagaries of large numbers of disparate tribes with low levels of literacy or specialty dialects been factored into the overall plan?

Are PSYOP soldiers training with the newly redirected units?

Has the linguistic pool been increased to provide the larger force with the coverage they will need?

What lessons learned in Iraq can REALLY be applied to Afghanistan?

Will the low level of technology and mass media aid or hamper PSYOP and information engagement efforts?

Does it make sense to build up a journalistic infrastructure in Afghanistan? If so, under whose auspices?

Given that Afghanistan is a NATO mission will US training and doctrine easily mesh with other nations’?

Are multi-national exercises or combined-joint pre-deployment training planned?

Strikes me that the mission in Afghanistan is far more dangerous and far more complex than Iraq. Afghanistan lacks the urban clusters of Iraq and it’s ethnic composition is more of a mosaic than a simple bifurcation.

It’s clear to me that adaptation and innovation are key to success in Afghanistan. Perhaps we’ll need to mount some loudspeakers on the local transportation show above. (Photo courtesy of: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/homepagephoto/2008-07/hires_080709-M-6668G-021b.jpg)

Interpreters Banned From Wearing Masks – the PSYOP Impact

Sometimes I struggle to get out a weekly post. I pride myself on combining the topical with a bit of sarcasm and perhaps a sense of history. Today’s post was prompted by an article in the Washington Post: “Ban on masks upsets Iraqi interpreters” (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27758855/).

I have had the pleasure to work with interpreters in both military and commercial settings and I can attest to the fact that a good interpreter is worth more than his or her weight in gold. This quote from the article that hit me pretty hard this morning:
"Now that Obama wins, they are going to leave sooner or later," said Maximus, who works with a psychological operations unit. "We've fought for them all this time. When it's all done, nobody appreciates it." (emphasis added by me)

We, in the PSYOP community tend to think of ourselves as a above the rank and file in terms of our understanding of human culture. PSYOP is about influencing people’s behavior and influencing behavior means you understand it.

I recognize that contractors are ‘employees at will’ meaning that they can be fired at any time for any reason. In analyzing the quote it struck me that hiring of interpreters in a hostile zone requires some thought to the end game – what happens after US forces leave. While there is no legal duty to care for at will employees, there appears to be not only an ethical duty but a logical and powerful reason why working with interpreters should take more of a long range view. It strikes me that if someone is putting their life and the welfare of their families on the line they are demonstrating a level of commitment beyond a simple paycheck.

Are interpreters in a hostile zone paid sufficiently to compensate for this exposure? Should the quid pro quo for an interpreter the really just paycheck? Seems to me there is more at stake here.

Cultural understanding is a prerequisite to information engagement success. Native speakers willing to work with or for USG causes and assignments are hard to find. Furthermore, the USG lacks credibility in the overall Muslim world partially because of a perceived USG cowboy mentality and a lack of credible spokespeople. A void which could be filled as former interpreters stream into journalism, business and government leadership.

The time has come to take a longer range view. In my opinion, each AO (linguistically divided) needs to assess their interpreter work force. Interpreters who are of college age or interested in pursuing journalism, public affairs or even business administration should be marked for future training in the US and/or put on a track to be connected with international publications and business organizations who will have a need for their services after US forces withdraw.

Interpreters who are ‘seniors’ should be groomed and encouraged to become peer leaders and influencers in their communities. We need to adopt the best practices of organizations who truly value employees and where employees repay that concern with longevity and superior service. In the case of interpreters, this service would be rendered for the overall good and supporting USG messages and efforts for years to come.

In short the PSYOP community in particular should get into the mentoring and outplacement business for its interpreters. This implies that the USG indeed gets its act together on how to employ the multiple forces of national power in concert to achieve its goals.