MISO and the Generation Gap

For the past week I have been attending an elite information security conference (www.COSAC.net) in Ireland. Unlike most cyber security conferences which are mired in technical details, this one explores higher level issues.

Photo Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/joi/455111587/#/photos/joi/455111587/lightbox/

One of the more interesting topics was the nature of personal privacy or the lack thereof on the Internet. A key side bar was the fact that the younger generation has little or no concerns and is given to texting and social networks for even the most intimate communications.

There are a number of important PSYOP principles that flow from these trends. First of all, as Sun Tzu would advise - know your target. This means campaigns addressed to younger audiences probably should be crafted by that age group.

A second observation is that lack of expected privacy opens up a significant opportunity for the potential use of deception in the IO campaign.

Thirdly, denial of electronic communications can mean infliction of a high level of stress and anxiety.

Consequently, campaigns targeting any age specific population group should employ a collaborative environment that includes people within the target age categories in addition to appropriate linguistic and cultural knowledge. If such a mix is not available, then it is highly recommended that rigorous pretesting be employed prior to launching the campaign.

Hactivists and the Internet: Lessons For PSYOP/MISO

The 8/26/2011 issue of netgov (http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20110826_6276.php) had an article “Analysts say online ‘hactivism’ is becoming a preferred tool of protests”. The article proposes that Computer Network Attack (CNA) has emerged as a powerful force for protesters. The article talks about the protests against the San Francisco centered Bay Area Rapid Transit System which appear to be organized by the group Anonymous.

That group has innovated in its TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures) by combing CNA with on ground activity. The attack vectors are dependent on the desired result. If the group is looking to harm a target whose actions it opposes, it has turned to cyber attack as in the case of attacking Visa because it decided to stop accepting donations to Wikileaks.

Where the goal is more traditional – say blocking traffic, protesting on subway platforms or interfering with the daily commute the organization will demonstrate physically. They shield their identities in a number of ways with the Guy Fawkes mask featured in the movie “V for Vendetta” being a common means.

When dealing with urban AOs today’s MISO needs to be at least as flexible and techno savvy as our adversaries and enemies. We must appropriately employing digital influence and digital PSYACTs. Unlike non-state actors, military organizations must play by the rules. Unfortunately, in the case of the digital world the laws, rules, and doctrine have not kept pace with the battle. Computer Network Operations (CNO) are still pretty much behind the 21^st century ‘green door’ and tactical MISO soldiers are not likely to have the CNO tools and authority.

MISO is often marked by innovation on the ground, SWC and the MISO chains of command need to support digital influence in a big way. Perhaps the new MISG can establish a joint ‘center of excellence’ with the other PSYOP Groups to develop doctrine, and TTP. This Digital MISO Center of Excellence should be located at the Naval Post Graduate School so that it could benefit from the latest in IO thought leadership. Fort Hunter Liggett should be considered as a proving ground where the technique could be honed in relative isolation and supported by both Active and Reserve personnel.

Information Engagement Is Fine – But Sometimes Kinetic Works Better

The Middle East is among the most complex of all information engagement battlefields. Religious and historical overtones often over shadow political realities and generations of conflict lead to an inbred sort of hatred that is generally hard to overcome with reason and/or economic incentives.

The BBC of 19 August 2011 reported “Israel strikes Gaza after Palestinian rockets in Ashdod” (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14587101). Violent attacks were also reported against Israelis near Eilat. Israel blames Hamas who in turn claims it cannot control everyone in its territory and that Israel killed children. (Photo source: Getty Images from the cited website)

Media in Gaza continue to show anti-Israeli programs to audiences of all ages and Israel for its part tries to bolster its position on the world stage while attempting to assuage its own population.

Rockets from Gaza are met with air strikes. Groups claiming responsibility for attacks on Israel find themselves targets.

The Israeli government, unlike the US government is more than willing to quickly commit lethal force when it feels that commitment is justified and in its best interests. From a MISO/PSYOP perspective, one would expect that these kinetic actions are complemented by cyber attacks aimed at high value targets via their mobile phones, e-mail, etc.

While militants put on a tough face in public, they cannot change how they feel inside when it appears that the bell is indeed tolling for them.

Psychological Effects of Security Operations

I’m up in Idaho, my favorite PSYOP laboratory. It’s a great laboratory because the rural town we frequent is more or less isolated from the media and the pace is quite a bit slower than our Silicon Valley home base. On June 7, 2011 I wrote a post about people ultimately believing what they want to believe concerning the building of a wind farm.

Photo Source: http://www.ridgelineenergy.com/pdfs/Wind_Turbine_Information.pdf

In that post I explained that many of the local population were upset because of what they perceived as secret goings on and collusion between government, specially chosen farmers who have leased land for the wind farm project and other co-conspirators.

As it turns out, there was a ‘blade signing’ for dignitaries including the City Council, the Mayor, the local newspaper and other special guests. Security precautions were ‘tight’. Invited guests only – please and you had to have a badge to get on the bus from the High School to the site.

As many times as I’ve looked down the freeway I have not seen any camels with riders toting AK47s, but the threat level must have been high. To be fair thought, there was a report of a man in a Bunny Suit terrorizing children in Idaho Falls. Perhaps it was because the LT Governor was invited, although you would have to work pretty hard to find his schedule from the official website (http://lgo.idaho.gov/).

While a certain amount of security is always reasonable, your level of security depends on the threat. In this case the perceived threat might have been those farmers who missed out on the lease money and might have made the event less festive.

From a MISO/PSYOP perspective the point is that what a force does has psychological impact. Commanders must be made aware of the potential repercussions of offensive and defensive operations. MISO can help by campaigning to insure that all audiences are aware of what is going on and the truthful reason the operation is conducted.

Nevertheless, the enemy will exploit anything they can to support their propaganda campaigns. Given that the enemy enjoys a ‘home court’ advantage much of the time, MISO/PSYOP should be aggressively employed via credible local spokespeople to minimize the negative effect of necessary military operations.

PSYOP/MISO: Battlefield Wild Card

I have just finished my 4^th iteration of being the PSYOP/MISO SME for an exercise for Public Affairs Officers. The scenario is that a Joint Task Force (JTF) is deployed in a semi-permissive tactical environment to provide Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) at the invitation of the government of a nation stricken by an earthquake.

(Photo source: http://www.uhsda.com/)

While the actual tactical situation is merely the backdrop for the real purpose of the exercise – exposing junior PAOs to life on a Joint Staff commanded by a 2*, I was able to give some thought to how MISO would support an actual operation of this kind especially if the tactical environment turned ugly.

As long as the environment is permissive, meaning no one is shooting at us, MISO functions primarily as an information channel. Loudspeaker teams with appropriate speakers or recorded messages would broadcast locations and schedules for aid distribution. Host nation and JTF print resources could be used to print with signs directing people to the aid resources and educational messages designed to teach people how to reduce their susceptibility to water borne diseases like Cholera and Typhus. Loudspeakers could also be used to broadcast into a collapsed building to assure the victims that help was there.

What happens when the bad guys start shooting? There is a great deal of doctrine and precedent on how Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT) support the CDR in a traditional force on force situation. There’s a lot less out there on how TPT would be involved against insurgents in localized firefights – or if they would be at all.

Given that many insurgent operations are ‘hit and run’ – it strikes me that the MISO emphasis must be more on the long-term campaign, the one designed to convince adversaries to join the good guys. Perhaps there is a place for deception in making the bad guys think we have more resources than we do, or to induce them to direct their firepower at the wrong targets.

In some situations MISO could give way to EW and CNO under the right circumstances and for the proper targets. These IO options can generate the positive psychological effects as direct PSYOP/MISO.

Reader comment invited.

Cyber PSYOP: Google vs. China

The recent “activity” surrounding Google’s China market search engine business and the Chinese government’s political, economic and technical actions to impose censorship on searches illustrates the critical nature of the cyber component of PSYOP and free information flow.

One of PSYOPs core principles is that truth is the best PSYOP weapon. The Chinese government goes to great lengths to insure that Chinese citizens only have access to truth that has been approved by the government and considered fit for consumption. Google has been an unparalleled success story and the wealth of its high tech founders is the stuff of legend. However, they have failed to learn by history.

I was quoted in Computerworld UK concerning the Google/China affair: “In Google's case, there are two aspects of why the Chinese government would pay special attention to Google: first of all open access to information is contra to the philosophy of the government of the People's Republic of China and secondly Google as a business offers lessons to be learned. Consequently it should be no surprise that Google has been attacked from inside and outside.” (http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/security/data-control/in-depth/index.cfm?articleId=3084; March 1, 2010)

From a strategic PSYOP perspective the Chinese of been able to: 1. harness their citizens to ‘protect’ the state, 2. muster significant technology resources and muscle to enforce their political will, 3. sacrifice short term economic gain for long term consistency, 4. Coordinate the disparate arms of government (foreign policy, economic development, military, and legal) to achieve an information objective that is part of their well understood governmental strategic communications strategy.

Taking the other tact for a moment, Google sought to evade China’s grip by redirecting searches from the Chinese Mainland to Hong Kong. Apparently they lost sight of the fact that in 1997 Hong Kong reverted back to the government of the People’s Republic. While Hong Kong retains traces of its former British governance and aspects of friendliness to the West, make no mistake it is part of China.

Google’s mantra of ‘do no evil’ smacks in some ways of the Star Trek Prime Directive (do not interfere with other cultures), however even this technological giant has met its match in the People’s Republic of China. The message for us is clear – we must develop an Influence Operations Strategy and President Obama must orchestrate its operations and tactics.

A small baby step in this direction would be to appoint a White House level coordinator along the lines of Howard Schmidt, the Cyber Coordinator. While Mr. Schmidt has no real authority he is a single point of contact and can act as a conductor to facilitate the performance of many players. Our global communications strategy deserves no less.

Winning the Battle – Losing The War

You don’t often see simple and elegant statements that describe complex issues. I found one such statement in the January 22, 2010 edition of Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/01/winning-the-ground-battles-but/ ). I have commented about the lack of unity of effort for information engagement. While no one would argue that LTG Patton was always in charge, today as well stated by the Small Wars Journal: “Our enemies are winning in the information environment, while we continue to discuss and debate how to operate in this environment. Our adversaries are using simple, cost-effective means to close the physical battle space gap by taking control of the narrative and effectively subverting with their radical ideology and propaganda. It is absolutely critical for every government agency within the U.S. government to participate, coordinate, cooperate, and arrive at a final, integrated and definitive standard of Strategic Communications against terrorists.”

Photo Courtesy of: http://www.americaslibrary.gov/aa/patton/aa_patton_subj_e.html
The authors are all senior deployed practitioners with extensive experience and the article concentrates on Cyberspace. I’d like to do the authors one better by saying isn’t this the case for all communications both verbal and nonverbal?
As the January 2010 earthquake relief assembled and poured into Haiti a unity of purpose seemed apparent. While there were disparate actions in terms of search and rescue, food and water distribution and medical care, you just got the feeling that each of the pieces were moving forward, albeit slowly.

The Iraqi ‘battlefield’ may no longer be fraught with daily small arms fire and may have moved into cyberspace. However, Afghanistan is just ramping up. PSYOP soldiers on the ground are at the center of a maelstrom of Afghani political jockeying, Taliban insurgent activity, combat troops moving around attempting to secure ground and people while the citizens wonder when all the interlopers will leave.

It would appear that the State Department needs to concede information coordination to the military command responsible for a regional AO. Each region needs to adapt them to the local environment. This means understanding all the aid efforts and using concrete achievements and testimonials as a means of informing the local population and as a way to shape positive influence. This presupposed that the State Department or the military command knows what is going on to include activities by Non Governmental Organizations (NGO).

The regional effort in turn would be translated into village programs that ultimately become a two way flow of information from national down and from local up. The local information can consist of success stories, testimonials in video and other formats which could in turn be harnessed by other regions and local campaigns. At the national level the programs and input could be consolidated with access granted to other information programs globally.

However, all this implies a unity of effort that we have yet to see. Perhaps this Small War Journal article can be one small step to information dominance.

Cyber PSYOP

There is a veritable frenzy of cyber command activity. The New York Times reported that the President will constitute a new Command, likely to be headed by LTG Alexander, Director of NSA. The new Command will have responsibility for “attack and defense strategies in Cyberspace warfare” according to the Times. (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html?_r=1&hp)


Formation of the command is part of an extensive effort orchestrated by President Obama. By forming the command the President hopes to consolidate all cyber military efforts. This military consolidation is complementary to the new direction on civilian side created as a result of the “60 Day Review” completed for the White House on 17 April by acting Senior Director of Cybersecurity for the NSC, Melissa Hathaway (see http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/AdvisorsToConductImmediateCyberSecurityReview/)

Information technology (IT), especially as interconnected by the Internet, is the electronic lifeblood of developed countries. The critical IT infrastructure and key resources of nations are inviting targets because their damage or destruction would go to the nation’s very will to fight.

To say that doctrine with respect to cyber attacks is nascent would be kind. The fact is that the doctrine is either extremely highly classified or just plain doesn’t exist. Legal and political issues cloud a nation’s ability to respond in kind to a cyber attack. Notwithstanding a variety of computer ‘war games’, the US government’s use of cyber attack is not without precedent.

The NY Times article talks about hacking into Al Qaeda computers to alter “information that drove them into American gun sights”.

While I applaud the President’s efforts and can heartily concur that cyber attack and defense need to be placed under a single command – where does that leave PSYOP?

I have argued for several years that Computer Network Operations (CNO) can be an effective PSYOP weapon. It is also clear that the Internet has become a wide open medium for PSYOP messages whether websites, e-mail, SMS or even Twitters. However, there is no clarity nor comparable unity of command with regard to cyber PSYOP.

At the very least the new command should have a robust PSYOP element, likely headed by a Colonel. This element should be linked to the Joint Staff, SOCOM, ASOC and other service PSYOP Commands to insure that there is uniformity of messaging and that there is a mechanism in place to deconflict cyber and PSYOP activities for maximum reinforcing effect.

Another rub is the nature of cyber activities undertaken by the Combatant Commanders. Each is running their own website and perhaps other activities such as Blogs, Social networking pages, etc. Somehow there needs to be a central inventory of all these activities and a ‘Cyber PSYOP Operations Center’ (CPOC) that can provide a global view of these activities much as corporate marketing is responsible for providing a global picture of corporate marketing activities.

A Cyber Command is a good start, but let’s hope PSYOP is not left out in the cold.

PSYOP in Afghanistan: 1 Warlord At A Time

The Philadelphia Inquirer ran an article about Mr. Holbrooke’s visit to Afghanistan to craft President Obama’s ‘new’ strategy there. Having seen the results of Mr. Holbrooke’s efforts in Bosnia I’m sure he appreciates the order of magnitude of the challenge facing him – but even the fractious situation in Bosnia was neat and clean compared to Afghanistan. (http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20090213_Holbrooke_in_Kabul_to_revise_strategy.html)

Photo: USA Today (Chief Elders of the Korengal Valley, 30 Oct 08)

Training and equipping security forces is a necessary and key part of the equation to success, but it is not the whole equation. Bosnia, like Gaul was divided into three ethnic groups: Bosniac (Moslem), Croat (Catholic) and Serb (Russian Orthodox). While the exact number of tribes is not necessarily know, a USA Today article found in a Google Search pegged the number at 400. (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-11-06-afghantribes_N.htm)

Assuming that is the case, and assuming that there is a new initiative, not necessarily a new strategy, but a new plan and allocation of resources, we need to go beyond mere messaging. Here are the steps I believe we need to take:

1. Assess The Nature of Tribal Networks
Divide the tribes into ‘nations’ and assess what kinds of concrete actions will enhance the government in the mind of the population in those nations. Actions need to go beyond security (which is a given and the baseline) and include medical, economic and social. Social actions need to be viewed through the eyes of the local population.

2. Develop “Nation” and Tribal Action Plans
Bring to bear all the resources of the USG in a concerted effort to appeal to the needs developed in the assessment. These might include: medcaps, micro-financing projects, agricultural advice and assistance, school or other public infrastructure repair, etc. Earmark the collection of projects by nation and location. Consider using Native American sociology experts to help formulate an appropriately culturally sensitive action plan – rely on successful tribal government models – not local, state or federal as the basis.

3. Preselect and Train The Project Teams
Insure that the project teams are intimately familiar with the culture and geography of their destinations. Include basic language training and if possible immerse interpreters into the training as early as possible. Include security force training and international to give stage front exposure to the Afghan forces.

4. Prepare to Publicize Success
Determine which nations are ‘allied’ with each other. Publicize success through tribal leaders. If appropriate encourage visits among tribal leaders so that they can see successful environments. Once local success has been assured, consider national publicity and of course international. Special attention should be paid to Aljazeera or other regional/international media that can influence the Arab world.

5. Be Flexible
Semper Gumby – always flexible (Gumby was a character made out of clay for those of you not familiar with him). Each tribal project will run into bumps and it follows that the ‘nation’ program (the collection of similar tribes) might have its hiccups as well. The point is that long term solutions require long term commitments and history has shown Afghanistan is one of those places where the race is a marathon – not a sprint.

Georgia On My Mind

Blog Entry, 11 Aug 08, Georgia On My Mind
All of us have been watching the unfolding situation in Georgia. For some of us, we are reminded of untold exercises involving the Fulda Gap – or as I used to say “19 Russian Divisions - no waiting”. Russian forces have taken direct and violent action on the battlefield overwhelming their adversary.

They have also employed new weapons – Computer Network Attack (CNA). The UK based Telegraph reported that Russia is also conducting a “Cyber War” (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2539157/Georgia-Russia-conducting-cyber-war.html) where the target is official government websites.

I’d argue that it’s not really “Cyber War”, but a reasoned PSYACT designed more to show dominance rather than to orchestrate harm. Control of a government or individual’s ability to communicate is designed to invoke a feeling of helplessness on the part of the victim and to erode morale and will.

Attacking a government’s websites making them unavailable or redirecting the accessor to another website clearly under the control of the attacker would appear to be a good way to reduce confidence in the government. It would also seem to be a way to make the citizenry feel that their government is powerless.

The defender would have to turn to other means to counter this impression. This best alternative given the demographics would be TV. Government TV broadcasts could fill the void left by any Internet deficit, and employ visuals designed to bolster the confidence of the citizenry and unite them against the attacker.

Broadcasts of action on the front line could also be used as a means to induce other nations to come to the rescue of the victim by putting political pressure on the attacker, or perhaps even offering some military counter balance.

Interestingly enough this type of action was considered in the recently released National Defense Strategy as stated on page 4 of the strategic environment section: “All of these actions suggest a Russia exploring renewed influence, and seeking a greater international role.”

Given all the above, how confident are we that the USG could mount an effective response in this or a similar situation that would harness conventional military power, Computer Network Operations, PSYOP, PA, Department of State and other instruments of national power?

This most recent action should be a real wake up call. An efficient enemy such as the one posed by a totalitarian regime with strong and unchallenged leadership is a formidable foe. Especially since the USG lacks:

A cohesive and well thought out National Information Strategy.
A single designated Senior Government Leader in the Executive Branch to form and implement such a strategy across the USG.
Neither a strategy nor designated responsible individuals within the USG to mobilize or at least work with US civilian resources to assist in an information offensive.

It would seem that now is the time to finally put into place recommendations from the Defense Science Board’s 2007 Task Force on Strategic Communications, ideas from the IO Roadmap of 2003 and other moves designed to prepare the USG to more effectively deal with today’s environment and avoid disaster in tomorrow’s.

It also appears that DoD should increase its emphasis on NATO Doctrine to help insure smoother joint operations with NATO allies and would be NATO members should these be necessary in the future.