Monday, January 25, 2010

The Passing of COL (R) Jeff Jones – A Sad Day For PSYOP


COL (R) Jeffrey B. Jones passed away on Sunday evening 24 January. Jeff was the consummate PSYOP professional and an extraordinary gentleman. I first met COL Jones in 1993 was he was the Commander of the 4th POG and I was the S-3 of the 7th POG working for then COL Altshuler. It was obvious that the two CDR liked and respected each other. This feeling of camaraderie filtered down through the staffs in what I termed “The Golden Age of PSYOP” because the active and reserve components truly worked together as a single force.

(Photo is mine: from left to right, COL (R) Larry Dietz, Mrs. Jones, COL (R) Jeff Jones, Mrs. Boyd and COL Curt Boyd, then CDR, 4th POG)
We had frequent coordinating meetings where we shared the duties for support and addressed issues of importance to the entire PSYOP community. This was due in a large part to Jeff’s statesmanship and strategic insight.

COL Jones was more than an outstanding officer, he was a diplomat. He did a tour in the White House and his final military assignment was as Defense Attaché in the US Embassy Paris. I visited him there and his office was as palatial as his hospitality. At the time the PSYOP community was united in the hope that Jeff would be our first PSYOP flag officer, but this was not to be.

Jeff worked on national security issues after his retirement. He worked with the National Security Council and on various projects and assignments dealing with PSYOP and Strategic Communications.

In 2007 I had the good fortune to work with Jeff on a project for USSOCOM. I could see that the cancer was starting to take its toll, but it didn’t diminish Jeff’s talents or ability to contribute.

As the process for the McClure Medal moved along it was clear to me that it would be fitting to honor Jeff’s lifetime of service to PSYOP and I’m pleased that this came to pass last June.

PSYOP has lost one of its guiding light and many of us have lost a mentor and a good friend. My family and I extend our deepest sympathies to Jeff’s wife Pam and to all his family and friends.

Friday, January 22, 2010

Winning the Battle – Losing The War


You don’t often see simple and elegant statements that describe complex issues. I found one such statement in the January 22, 2010 edition of Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/01/winning-the-ground-battles-but/ ). I have commented about the lack of unity of effort for information engagement. While no one would argue that LTG Patton was always in charge, today as well stated by the Small Wars Journal: “Our enemies are winning in the information environment, while we continue to discuss and debate how to operate in this environment. Our adversaries are using simple, cost-effective means to close the physical battle space gap by taking control of the narrative and effectively subverting with their radical ideology and propaganda. It is absolutely critical for every government agency within the U.S. government to participate, coordinate, cooperate, and arrive at a final, integrated and definitive standard of Strategic Communications against terrorists.”

Photo Courtesy of: http://www.americaslibrary.gov/aa/patton/aa_patton_subj_e.html
The authors are all senior deployed practitioners with extensive experience and the article concentrates on Cyberspace. I’d like to do the authors one better by saying isn’t this the case for all communications both verbal and nonverbal?
As the January 2010 earthquake relief assembled and poured into Haiti a unity of purpose seemed apparent. While there were disparate actions in terms of search and rescue, food and water distribution and medical care, you just got the feeling that each of the pieces were moving forward, albeit slowly.

The Iraqi ‘battlefield’ may no longer be fraught with daily small arms fire and may have moved into cyberspace. However, Afghanistan is just ramping up. PSYOP soldiers on the ground are at the center of a maelstrom of Afghani political jockeying, Taliban insurgent activity, combat troops moving around attempting to secure ground and people while the citizens wonder when all the interlopers will leave.

It would appear that the State Department needs to concede information coordination to the military command responsible for a regional AO. Each region needs to adapt them to the local environment. This means understanding all the aid efforts and using concrete achievements and testimonials as a means of informing the local population and as a way to shape positive influence. This presupposed that the State Department or the military command knows what is going on to include activities by Non Governmental Organizations (NGO).

The regional effort in turn would be translated into village programs that ultimately become a two way flow of information from national down and from local up. The local information can consist of success stories, testimonials in video and other formats which could in turn be harnessed by other regions and local campaigns. At the national level the programs and input could be consolidated with access granted to other information programs globally.

However, all this implies a unity of effort that we have yet to see. Perhaps this Small War Journal article can be one small step to information dominance.

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Attacking The Terrorist Mind


The January 10, 2010 NY Times features an article entitled: “The Terrorist Mind: An Update” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/weekinreview/10kershaw.html?scp=1&sq=terrorist%20mind&st=cse)

The author analyzes works by a number of academicians who have studied the terrorist mind. According to the article, Dr. John Horgan of International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State is credited with leading “much of the research into what is known as disengagement – a terrorist’s departure from the organization”. Dr. Horgan claims that there are a couple of key reasons why terrorists leave the movement. This is not to say they abandon their radical views, but rather they have left the group and renounced violence.

Leading reasons include: the small groups they are in “are rife with jealousies and personal competition; life is boring; pressure of maintaining a double life is too exhausting. Others include “aging out” where the member has grown to the point of wanting more stability and perhaps starting a family. Some may sense that the group’s goals are unattainable and/or they have reached their moral limit. Others are dismayed to find elderly and children engaged in battles.

From a PSYOP perspective we want to stimulate and reinforce these views. The Internet is likely the ideal medium to transmit dramatizations and perhaps ‘testimonials’ form former terrorists (to include Taliban) that underscore the feelings noted above.

The Internet has been cited as a key medium for recruitment for Al Qadea and Others (see NY Times, December 31, 2009, “Focus on Internet Imams As Recruiters for Al Qaeda” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01imam.html?scp=1&sq=Focus%20on%20Internet%20Imams&st=cse)) Consequently it is logical to assume that the same medium would be the way to reach the terrorist member and transmit messages reinforcing the desire to leave the movement.

Chatrooms and other virtual meeting places need to be designed that can attract terrorist recruits and members and that offer messages stimulating disengagement. In my view it makes sense to post messages from various sources on websites known to espouse terrorism. I am a believer of using the Internet like the ocean. Taking down offending websites is like playing Whack A Mole because new ones will pop as quickly as others are taken down.

It seems to me that these kinds of operations need to be joint (more than one service) and ideally combined (more than 1 nation). Furthermore the best work product is likely to come from a combination of military, diplomatic and civilian minds – groups designed to think like the customer with the native linguistic ability to carry the creativity and disengagement messages forward in multiple directions on the Internet and elsewhere.

Wednesday, January 6, 2010

Not All Good News Stories Are Good PSYOP


The Washington Times ran an article about Afghani girls flourishing in school. The Jan 6, 2010 article touts how the Marines have helped build the school and that the students are looking forward to bright futures (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/06/afghan-girls-flourish-in-new-school/).

Photo: Washington Times

This ‘feel good’ story concludes with “According to a report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, an estimated 63 percent of rural Afghan men and 90 percent of rural Afghan women are illiterate. In Now Zad, those illiterates are sending their children to school in defiance of threats from Taliban operatives.”

The story would have a positive influence on many audiences, especially Western minded audiences who hold the principle of gender equality in high esteem. However, this doesn’t mean that the story, pictures or excerpts would be appropriate for all audiences.

There is no question that education especially in the context of gender equality is a key American value. The issue is this the kind of value held by the target audience? If the target audience is male dominated and historically prone to control all aspects of female life in their society, then the story and its images and messages are not appropriate.

Having said that the story is not appropriate PSYOP, is it appropriate for the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) of the unit? That answer would have to be clearly “yes it is”. Marine support of core American values with happy smiling faces as testimonials is the kind of story that is likely to help bolster support for US forces and instill local pride in the deployed unit.

Perhaps a take away here is that PSYOP personnel need to be on the lookout for stories and images that, while they don’t necessarily apply to PSYOP, can be effectively used by our PAO colleagues.

Best to all of you for the New Year!


Thursday, December 24, 2009

Yemen: The Next Afghanistan?


I was thinking of giving the Blog two weeks off. After all, it’s Xmas Eve when the pace of government and business slows to almost a halt in the week between Christmas and New Year’s. Well – that was my plan until I came across an article in the December 24, 2009 Arizona Sun: “Airstrike illustrates ballooning US involvement in Yemen” (http://www.azstarnet.com/news/322562)


Map Source: University of Missouri – St. Louis: http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2007/maps/ym-map.gif
The article talks about increased US military activity in Yemen to bolster the effort of the Yemeni government against Al Qaeda. Yemen is nestled to the south of Saudi Arabia and across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia and Djibouti. Little bells should be going off in your head about the volatility of this situation and the particularly interesting nuances in dealing with the neighbors.

First of all whenever there are ‘drones’ there are ‘accidents’ and civilian casualties or at least the allegation of them cannot be far behind. Failure to deal with the backlash will result in negative opinions of the US and the Yemeni government and a decrement of US status in world opinion in general.

In today’s world there are few secrets, US military involvement is not one of them. This is clearly a case where PSYOP needs to be involved. Drones and military action means PSYOP plans, programs and materials need to be in play BEFORE the eventual accident or allegation.
This particular part of the world has gotten it share of notoriety from US involvement in Somalia, pirate activity and even an episode of the adult cartoon series, South Park. The economic clout of Saudi Arabia and their deep connections to Al Qaeda are well known; consequently US actions in this area cannot be successfully accomplished without some type of coordination with the Saudi’s.

Rounding out the mix is Djibouti which has long been under the influence of the French and is considered a strategic bulwark in the area. Actions which poison a potential ally in the region must be considered with caution and long range strategy in mind.
So we find ourselves coming in to the movie theater in the middle of the feature. This playing feature is “US in Yemen” although it seems strangely like the movie we just saw: “US in Afghanistan” and we didn’t much care for that one.

My best wishes to my brothers and sisters in the PSYOP Community and a special thank you to those of you who are serving in harm’s way at this time of year. May 2010 be a breakthrough year that sees a trend to calmness in the world and a reduction in PSYOP Optempo.

Look for the next PSYOP Regimental Blog entry after the 4th of January 2010.

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

Palestinian Polarity: Implications for Afghanistan and Beyond


The December 14, 2009 Washington Post featured an article: “The Palestinians' opposite poles.” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/14/AR2009121403728.html?wpisrc=newsletter)



The article describes how two men grew up in the same refugee camp in Gaza. One ended up moving to the West Bank while the other remained in Gaza. The article goes on to describe how the man in the West Bank was able to begin a business and how his son will be going to college in Cyprus to study film making while the other’s son is studying in al-Quds University and has no idea as to his future.


It would seem that the purpose of the article was to show how these two men and their children were affected by the move and to highlight the growing dichotomy between the two Palestinian factions and areas.


To me there are some interesting lessons to be learned here. First of all, age old conflicts can take generations before there is even the slightest amount of movement towards resolution. Secondly, the soundest way to strengthen a society is from the bottom up starting with the family unit. The basis of the strength comes from insuring the basics of being able to live a life where there is security and stability, but more importantly, where there are bright possibilities in the future.


The ability for the children of the original Gaza refugees to seek out and obtain education beyond their own country where they are able to learn skills and nurture their talents to benefit their people is a key differentiator. Where squalor and hopelessness prevail, there is an incentive to lash out against real or perceived oppressors.


The parallel to Afghanistan is clear. The Taliban have succeeded in permeating the society and supplanting the government. They have done this on a village by village basis and they have done so over many years.


The ‘new’ US strategy is aimed at dislodging the Taliban because the Taliban provide safe haven to Al Qaeda and our other enemies. Given the number of villages and the time and treasure needed to establish their security and stability – I’m not optimistic.


In the meanwhile it will be up to the tactical PSYOP soldier, buttressed by efforts of local, regional and high level PAOs to constantly paint the positive picture envisioned under a non-Taliban (but not necessarily purely democratic) government. PSYOP and its allied disciplines must constantly strive to publicize ‘good examples’.


PSYOP will also have to be ever watchful for inevitable screw up where injuries or deaths to the civilian population are attributed to the International Security Assistance Force, (ISAF) so as to minimize the negative impact of these incidents and enemy propaganda. Neither of these are easy tasks nor will they be made easier by the surge. President Obama and his key leaders need to be ready to re-evaluate their ‘new’ approach early in the game and often to properly respond as the situation evolves.

Thursday, December 10, 2009

The Reality of an Influence Strategy in Afghanistan



The more I read about the situation in Afghanistan, the more I stand by my previous analysis of the bottoms up rural nature of the country. The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) the ‘trade association’ for the Signal Corps and IT in general has an electronic newsletter called NightWatch. Their December 8 edition had a particularly good analysis of Afghanistan which I commend to your reading at: http://nightwatch.afcea.org/NightWatch_20091208.htm

Photo by Bruce Hoffman and Seth G. Jones, NationalInterest.org (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.nationalinterest.org/uploadedImages/Public_Articles/2008_-_May_-_June/Hoffman/hoff10small.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx%3Fid%3D17916&usg=__JgGIPj5yXf7Z3U4xDyL1gh5WqgI=&h=315&w=420&sz=82&hl=en&start=7&itbs=1&tbnid=RcOK5E1PX87cpM:&tbnh=94&tbnw=125&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dafghanistan%2Bvillage%26gbv%3D2%26hl%3Den

“Winning” in Afghanistan needs to be defined as establishing a secure enough environment that the country would no longer be a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other enemies of the United States. Our goal is not and should not be for Afghanistan to become a modern, democratic state. That being said, the key mission is to bolster local governments at the village level to the point that the Taliban are no longer to establish their dominance nor are Al Qaeda or other foreign enemies be able to exploit the country or its people.


We must recognize that a Taliban lead insurgency is a chronic condition much like a disease. However, the major of Taliban are not militants and are probably not ‘anti-American’ by nature as much as they are anti- stranger and anti-occupier. Consequently there are a number of key messages that must be transmitted:


1. Local Governments Have The Integrity & Wisdom Needed to Govern and Provide Honest Justice
This mission means key villages must be identified and local governments installed that can offer a viable alternative to the Taliban shadow governments. It means that these governments must be corruption free (in a relative sense because a certain level of corruption seems endemic to Afghanistan) and able to provide the quick justice Afghans have found so appealing in the Taliban shadow governments.


2. The Taliban Way is Not the Afghani Way
This would reassert the need for a people oriented justice system rather than the Sharia law or law based on the Quran. History has shown that the people of Afghanistan are fiercely independent and have no taste for these draconian legal systems.


3. NATO and the US are Not Occupiers
The ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) is there to help the people of Afghanistan restore security and peace. The mission of ISAF is to train Afghani’s to handle their own security and law enforcement and will leave once the mission is accomplished.


These messages need to be transmitted at the local level more than any other. This will require the entire force to be cognizant of how to work with the local villages and require the Department of State to cajole or catalyze the Karzai government into the same mode. It is clearer than ever before that the only way to succeed in Afghanistan is from the Bottom Up. As a former precinct organizer, let’s hope that President Obama insures that this philosophy is core to our strategy and operations.