While I don’t often quote the “Washington Times”, not to be at all confused with the Washington Post or the NY Times, there was an article in their March 29, 2012 edition, “Afghan Local Police key to success against Taliban” (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/29/afghans-whom-taliban-fear/).
According to the article: “The Afghan Local Police is unlike the Afghan National Police, which uses volunteers from various regions to patrol and protect areas far from home. The local force is dedicated to one village and is made up of men chosen by anti-Taliban village elders for their loyalty.”
Not unlike our Lexington and Concord brethren, these individuals are dedicated to their local turf. This very likely means that they are more highly motivated to defend their own villages, but they are less likely to be Taliban sleepers and less vulnerable to Taliban recruiting efforts.
While this is not necessarily PSYOP or MISO per se. It would certainly seem like a great campaign theme where others are inspired to do the same, even perhaps motivating the National Police who may be on the political fence. The units may have credible spokes people who can help support themes and messages that bolster the security of the Afghanistan a piece at a time.
I would be remiss if I didn’t mention that there is a passionate on-going debate on Linkedin concerning the Regiment. Both AC and RC MISO soldiers are involved and the exchange is lively and unfettered. While I will leave the substance of the conversation for the Linkedin Group. I’m hopeful that the exchange itself will have the second and third order effects of helping to reopen and keep open the lines of dialogue within the Regiment.
3 comments:
There are several problems with the ALP, and in the end the primary one is one of strategic communication.
First, the ALP stemmed from a no-brainer back-to-basics approach from SOF, the Village Stability Operations effort.
http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403VillageStabilityOperations_MoreThanVillageDefense.html
The problem is that the conventional forces saw what SOF did in a sustained and sophisticated effort over a year, with heavy vetting and dedicated attention, and said, literally, 'ok, you conventional infantry and armor units out here, do it in two weeks'. So ground commanders complied, and threw some things together, exerted enormous pressure on locals to comply, and took whatever dregs were willing to stand up.
Many times rural villagers are just doing whatever it takes to get ISAF off their backs, and create space between them and the intimidation and harassment of the TB. The idea that local villagers are not TB is wishful thinking. The myth of the foreign Pakistani TB has been fabricated because its what we want to believe, and its what the locals want us to believe. When you actually go live in the villages, and develop relationships with the people, you learn, from quiet discussions, talks with the kids, family photo albums, etc, that just about every village has a hometown hero TB, who everyone knows about, is a cousin of half the villagers, and that there's usually some sort of spy network keeping those guys informed of what's going on.
So back to strategic communication - the Afghans are survivalists. They comply with whomever has the guns at that moment in time. In the summer of 2010, the number one reason people were being maimed and killed was that the locals lost faith in our ability to protect them, long term, because politicians were talking about leaving. I promise you, nothing has changed. 11 years of constant concern that we will abandon those who have allied with us has forced the Afghan local to hedge his bets, and play both sides of the fence, for survival's sake. And I for one, simply can not blame them.
Concur whole-heartedly with your perception of the ALP program. However, the program does face some challenges. First its association with “Arbiki”, local and warlord militia, which cause significant destruction during the civil war and second, the ghosts of past programs (e.g. AP3) that were poorly planned and/or executed often impact the populaces perception of the current program. However, even with these challenges CFSOCC-A and CJSOTF-A are doing an amazing job implementing a well-planned and implemented program. Additionally, it is clear from numerous sources that it terrifies insurgent leadership at all levels. An indicator of this in open source is Mullah Omar’s Eid messages. In those messages he tends to address those issues that concern the Taliban the most. Since its implementation ALP has been one of the first issues addressed.
Furthermore there are significant MISO implications connected to ALP. The concept of a “hometown” defense force as part of a national internal security structure, with ANA and ANP, resonates well in Afghanistan. Additionally, the very notion of a fighting force that can strip the veil of anonymity from insurgents strikes at a critical capability of the insurgents; we can use this in the influence fight. Lastly, this is a force to which 2014 just another year in their village. These forces, and others, present the insurgents a reality they had not banked on, a competent capable ANSF in 2014. Forces like the ALP set the groundwork for a new line of persuasion, “waiting out ISAF may not work, negotiations may be the only way they can come home to Afghanistan”.
Concur whole-heartedly with your perception of the ALP program. However, the program does face some challenges. First its association with “Arbiki”, local and warlord militia, which cause significant destruction during the civil war and second, the ghosts of past programs (e.g. AP3) that were poorly planned and/or executed often impact the populaces perception of the current program. However, even with these challenges CFSOCC-A and CJSOTF-A are doing an amazing job implementing a well-planned and implemented program. Additionally, it is clear from numerous sources that it terrifies insurgent leadership at all levels. An indicator of this in open source is Mullah Omar’s Eid messages. In those messages he tends to address those issues that concern the Taliban the most. Since its implementation ALP has been one of the first issues addressed.
Furthermore there are significant MISO implications connected to ALP. The concept of a “hometown” defense force as part of a national internal security structure, with ANA and ANP, resonates well in Afghanistan. Additionally, the very notion of a fighting force that can strip the veil of anonymity from insurgents strikes at a critical capability of the insurgents; we can use this in the influence fight. Lastly, this is a force to which 2014 just another year in their village. These forces, and others, present the insurgents a reality they had not banked on, a competent capable ANSF in 2014. Forces like the ALP set the groundwork for a new line of persuasion, “waiting out ISAF may not work, negotiations may be the only way they can come home to Afghanistan”.
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