Social Media MISO – Tactical, Strategic, Hybrid or Wave of The Future?

We’ve all heard the phrase “The Strategic Corporal”. We’ve taken it to mean that a comparably junior soldier can perform an act that has a global strategic impact. Perhaps the same can be said for Social Media.

The NY Times 28 June 14 article, “Iraq’s Sunni Militants Take to Social media to Advance Their Cause and Intimidate” (see: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/world/middleeast/iraqs-sunni-militants-take-to-social-media-to-advance-their-cause-and-intimidate.html?_r=0)  was a follow-up to a conference call I attended on Friday.

The topic was not the importance of Social Media as a MISO tool, but the issues of how these campaigns should be planned an implemented. On one hand, anyone, anywhere can access and engage in social media. Many of us are somewhat addicted to Facebook to let everyone else know what we are doing and to vicariously experience what are friends are doing.

Access is ubiquitous. Smart phones, tablets, kiosks and, of course, computers all are portals into social media. Does this mean that social media operations can be run in ‘reach-back’ mode where a centralized resource can globally execute social media MISO?

Or is it more prudent to have the forward deployed MISO CDR orchestrate the campaign employing local and reach-back resources?

Given the far-flung and fast moving nature of actions across the spectrum of conflict, perhaps the right answer is ‘none of the above’. Perhaps the right answer is to develop an evolving and dynamic doctrine and set of social media ROE that recognizes the need and resources required for social media MISO and apportions them up and down the chain of command.

We should also recognize that there might be times where our enemies will deny Internet access into their territory, but will actively employ social media operations internally. For example, if ISIS should be able to extend their control to include the ability to turn off outside world access, it would follow that they would do this for their areas. They would continue to provide this access for their own PSYOP as a core tenet of their influence strategy.

Social media MISO are also indicative of the shotgun wedding that is occurring between CNO and influence operations. The blending of these two disciplines is accelerating so that any future operations will more than likely require both in the assessment and execution phases.

Force providers and doctrine developers need to appreciate this and move with haste to develop the framework for future ops – because the future is already here.

The PSYOP of ISIS

There has been no shortage of military excitement lately with much of it centered on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The map appearing at right is from the Washington Post (see: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-beginning-to-consider-conflicts-in-syria-and-iraq-as-single-challenge/2014/06/19/b14bd8b4-f7ac-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html?wpisrc=nl_hdtop)

I think it does a nice job of putting much of the current state in the Middle East into perspective. While it doesn’t break down the ethnic borders separating Kurds, Sunni and Shia, it shows that Syria border’s Iraq and that Iraq serves as a buffer between Syria and Iran.

The map also shows the logical sense behind considering the actions in Syria and Iraq as one AO.

President Obama is still mulling over what major actions to take.

As I stated in my last post, my money was on UAVs because they can be targeted precisely with good intelligence (hence the recent order for deploying Special Operations). Foreign Policy noted “Obama said – (special forces) will work alongside Iraqi military forces in special intelligence centers, using drone video feeds and spy satellite photographs to track and attack ISIS fighters. They'll also be in a prime position to help carry out U.S. airstrikes the moment Obama orders them”

Where does that leave MISO?

Well – for one thing cyber influence should be under way and likely there should be ample mobile phone targets in the AO as well. They key question is what do you want the target to do? What is the desired effect?

My goal would be to try and put the enemy off their game. Not necessarily waste my time or bandwidth trying to get them to surrender, but for them to constantly look over their shoulder for that Predator or for more accurate fire from the Iraqi military because they have better intelligence and more confidence.

Have we gone so far as to provide the Iraqi force with some rudimentary MISO capabilities and training? If so, how is it working out?

I’ll leave you with this parting thought:

Shifting gears a bit, assuming for the moment that the active MISO force is not starting to get stretched by new commitments in Africa, Asia and Latin America, have we, as a community, been smart enough to figure out how to harness the power of the Reserve MISO force to bolster the overall capability posture?

Iraq - Deja Doo Doo!

One of my esteemed MI colleagues, a former FAA Air Marshall, Green Beret/MI Colonel and collector of Pierce Arrow antique cars used to say “Deja Doo Doo” which means I have seen this sh*t before.

And so it goes with Iraq. The crack Iraqi military, after years of training, blood, sweat and treasure seems to be no better off than they were at the start of OIF. President Obama is now in a position he doesn’t like to be – making a quick decision that might involve military force.

Historically the President first reaches for airstrikes. The theory is that this avoids ‘boots on the ground’ and today’s very smart weapons can theoretically pinpoint enemy targets with great accuracy and minimal prospects for collateral damage.

Unfortunately the decision will not be so simple this time. My impression is that we have a roving asymmetric, insurgency like force in an urban AO who is easily able to blend in with the population. Key will be their ability to avoid SIGINT vulnerabilities and sufficient deception operations to avoid UAS and smart bombs.

Where does that leave MISO?

If it were me, I’d pick some specific targets, annihilate the crap out of them and then mount a ‘you can run, but you cannot hide’ campaign. While I’m clearly not on the ground, it seems to me that the fighters in Iraq are seasoned WRT to the Syrian theater. The use of overwhelming high tech American weaponry may be enough to motivate them to retreat across the border.

This may also be a time to leverage mobile phone MISO, EW and other technological means that would disrupt the enemy’s chain of command.

Looking forward to reader input.

Photo Source: http://blogs.dallasobserver.com/unfairpark/2012/11/company_wants_dallas_to_dna_te.php

Anatomy of An Election

Anatomy of An Election

Yesterday, 2 June 2014 was a Gubernatorial Primary here in California. For reasons that I don’t quite remember, I decided to be an election volunteer. I was designed as a Substitute Clerk and was assigned to a small precinct co-located in a church with another precinct.

The polls were open from 0600 to 2000. During that time we processed a grand total of 57 live voters. All used two page ballots each about 11” by 17” long. Not one person (even in Silicon Valley) used the voter machine. We also collected over 100 absentee ballots.

The whole experience harkened me back to Sarajevo in 1997 when the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF) had to re-print ballots for Bosnian election because the local contract printer had printed the ballots just as the samples looked. Meaning each line had a placeholder like “AAAAA” or “BBBBB” rather than the actual candidate names.

In reflecting on the two elections and recent events in Afghanistan, I thought it appropriate to offer some observations from an organizational perspective.

First – a bit about my day yesterday.

Starting at the bottom.

Clerks and a Precinct Inspector (PI) are the two levels of individuals at a polling place. The PI reports to a Field Inspector (FI) who manages between 8 and 12 precincts. All of these people are volunteers. Clerks are paid $95 for their service and inspectors receive stipends of $150 to $180. If you’re interested you can check out: http://www.sccgov.org/sites/rov/Volunteer/Pages/Officer.aspx)

The polls are totally manned by volunteers. Judging from my personal experience, there are no qualifications or test to be the PI. This is a big mistake, as you’ll see as I continue on.

I was a Substitute Clerk. I took a 3 hour Election Training Class which was well done because it was mostly hands on. The Election Officer’s Manual (in my photo) is very much by the numbers and easy to follow.

Assigned Clerks and PIs report to their polling places on Monday night at a designated time to set up the polls. Controlled items such as the ballots, official forms and voting machines are not set up at this point and are still secured until Election Day Morning. These teams report to their polling places at 0600 on election day.

All substitutes report to the Registrar of Voters (ROV) office at 0600 on Election Day.  It took the ROV over 3 hours to get me an assignment and there had to be over 100 people still to be assigned when I left at about 0905.

My precinct had 1 PI who was in her first election. Her line of work was that she was a home health aide. She couldn’t even figure out how to work the official precinct cell phone. There were two other works with 5 years or more experience, one other new guy and me.

The day went by slowly but we were able to process all 57 voters without incident. Close-up was a bit of a fire drill. All of the forms, machines and supplies came in either cases or bags or cases. Each container had a label indicating what went where. Some had to be sealed, others did not.

The two experienced workers counted the ballots and filled out the forms related to that paperwork. The other guy and I tallied and shut down the voter machine, which we then packed. We also dismantled the polling booths/tables. In all it took about an hour and 20 minutes to pack things up.

The PI took a two-hour lunch without apology while the workers only got an hour. She was also overwhelmed by the sheer mass of materials and the multiple steps involved in closing the polls. She essentially stood by bewildered while the rest of us did the work.

I loaded the PI’s car with the ballots, cartridge from the voting machine and other controlled items that had to be returned. IAW protocol followed her car with the ballots to the drop off point where ROV people would unload the car.

Here are my thoughts as far as MISO operations. These are some key things that MISO personnel need to bear in mind:

1.     Impressions are everything. Elections and the people running them have to come across as competent, transparent and honest.

2.     Polling places must be run in a consistent and nonpartisan manner. Polling station managers must be able to work with other people of all kinds and have the management skills to orchestrate the logistical issues with trust and aplomb.

3.     Polls are open and must be secure.

4.     Observers or poll watchers are allowed to observe and observe. In the case of the State of California there is a Roster Index which shows who has voted. The purpose would appear to be to allow poll watchers to call those who have not voted and encouraging them to vote for their candidate.

5.     There may also be Election Observers who are from nongovernmental or community based agencies who are there to observe that the election process is running IAW State and Federal Laws.

6.     Observers and watchers are not allowed to interfere with the election process, permanently remove any posted Indexes, handle any ballots or act as replacements for the Election Officers (Clerks and PI).

7.     Languages are key. Ballots and instructions need to be clear and that they need to take into account the languages of the population. We had ballots in English, Spanish, Tagalog, Chinese and Vietnamese. Next year California will add Hindi, Khmer, Korean and Japanese.

8.     Processing can be cumbersome as long as it is easy to follow, transparent and embodies multiple checks and balances.

9.     Ballots must be printed in plenty of time before the election so that any issues can be dealt with prior to Election Day.

10. Chain of custody and security of ballots as well as the sanctity of the election process must be maintained at all times.

11. The counting and reporting function must also be similarly transparent, trusted and reliable as well.

Hopefully this will provide some useful perspective and since nothing ever goes away on the Internet – it will always be there if you need it.

Reader input invited as always.

The Whitehouse As A Propaganda Source

OK, so I had a bit of writer’s block this week and my on-line teaching kept me busier than normal, so I didn’t make this week’s post on time.

I’m on a variety of lists and sometimes I reflect on their relationship to PSYOP. Of course, I’m one of those heretics that believes PSYOP is a form of marketing and sales – not the same as selling toothpaste and iPads, but related nevertheless.

The page at the right is from www.whitehouse.gov. I recognize that Tuesday’s (3 June 14) elections are pretty much small potatoes and the Secretary Clinton is about to embark on a book tour which many regard as ‘coming attractions’ to her likely presidential campaign. I’m also aware the President Obama is in the last laps of his presidency and his thoughts are likely turning to life after the White House.

Nevertheless the graphic is worth a closer look for its influence value, not necessarily its content.

The graph may be totally accurate, but as we lawyers might say “it’s not being offered to prove the truth of the matter, it’s being offered to prove that the President kept his promise”. Quote is acutally “See this infographic to find out how President Obama is keeping his promise and bringing our troops home. The link itself is: http://www.whitehouse.gov/share/look-back-bringing-troops-home?utm_expid=24505866-29.4LXulRTVQ9abc7McEWUX4g.2&utm_source=email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=email337-text1&utm_campaign=afghanistan&utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fmail.aol.com%2F38571-111%2Faol-6%2Fen-us%2FSuite.aspx

From an influence perspective – simple easy to read graphics are good tools. By carefully designing the graphic and the scale you can pretty much get the graph to say virtually anything you would like the reader to infer.

This one is a particularly good example of that technique. All of us in the Community know there is more to the ‘war’ in Afghanistan that the number of boots on the ground. Even if the numbers are accurate, there is certainly more to the story and to interpreting whether or not this particular ‘promise’ has been kept.