Cyber PSYOP: Google vs. China

The recent “activity” surrounding Google’s China market search engine business and the Chinese government’s political, economic and technical actions to impose censorship on searches illustrates the critical nature of the cyber component of PSYOP and free information flow.

One of PSYOPs core principles is that truth is the best PSYOP weapon. The Chinese government goes to great lengths to insure that Chinese citizens only have access to truth that has been approved by the government and considered fit for consumption. Google has been an unparalleled success story and the wealth of its high tech founders is the stuff of legend. However, they have failed to learn by history.

I was quoted in Computerworld UK concerning the Google/China affair: “In Google's case, there are two aspects of why the Chinese government would pay special attention to Google: first of all open access to information is contra to the philosophy of the government of the People's Republic of China and secondly Google as a business offers lessons to be learned. Consequently it should be no surprise that Google has been attacked from inside and outside.” (http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/security/data-control/in-depth/index.cfm?articleId=3084; March 1, 2010)

From a strategic PSYOP perspective the Chinese of been able to: 1. harness their citizens to ‘protect’ the state, 2. muster significant technology resources and muscle to enforce their political will, 3. sacrifice short term economic gain for long term consistency, 4. Coordinate the disparate arms of government (foreign policy, economic development, military, and legal) to achieve an information objective that is part of their well understood governmental strategic communications strategy.

Taking the other tact for a moment, Google sought to evade China’s grip by redirecting searches from the Chinese Mainland to Hong Kong. Apparently they lost sight of the fact that in 1997 Hong Kong reverted back to the government of the People’s Republic. While Hong Kong retains traces of its former British governance and aspects of friendliness to the West, make no mistake it is part of China.

Google’s mantra of ‘do no evil’ smacks in some ways of the Star Trek Prime Directive (do not interfere with other cultures), however even this technological giant has met its match in the People’s Republic of China. The message for us is clear – we must develop an Influence Operations Strategy and President Obama must orchestrate its operations and tactics.

A small baby step in this direction would be to appoint a White House level coordinator along the lines of Howard Schmidt, the Cyber Coordinator. While Mr. Schmidt has no real authority he is a single point of contact and can act as a conductor to facilitate the performance of many players. Our global communications strategy deserves no less.

CyberWar is CyberPSYOP

Acts by governments against another government’s computers or private sector networks and systems within the critical infrastructure can be considered acts of war. Non-state actor attacks against these same targets can be viewed as terrorist or criminal acts. While the law may be unsettled, the psychological effect of any successful attack will be profound. For example see the Washington Post article of March 19, 2010 concerning attacking a Saudi Site (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805464.html)

Law makers and pundits alike are calling for a clear legal foundation that would facilitate apprehension and prosecution of anyone responsible for such acts. The recent calls for treaties or laws clarifying legal metes and bounds of the interaction of government (military and civilian government) organizations and commercial ones have mushroomed in March 2010.

But what of PSYOP? Clearly offensive Computer Network Attack (CNA) can have a significant psychological impact. However, due to the bifurcation of PSYOP and CNO responsibilities (SOCOM/STRATCOM) commonalities are hard to come by. Strangely enough, PSYOP and CNO share several things in common: 1. They are not mainstream warfighting tools , 2. They are ultimately commanded by 4* General Officers, 3. Doctrine is not widely circulated and 4. Many ‘ops’ are below the radar.

No future force is going to be single service and the overwhelming majority of future operations will involve more than one ally, both PSYOP and CNO will be have an increasing footprint in future conflicts. Given we like to ‘train as we fight’ the time has come to integrate both of these war fighter multipliers into exercises and training at all levels.

Just as FBI agents all need to be aware of the computer aspects of crimes, military forces must be adept at offensive and defensive PSYOP and CNO. Contingency planning must include counter propaganda and the full spectrum of CNO to include CNA and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). I say this with tongue in cheek because many organizations have trouble keeping their systems and networks up without having to deal with hostile intentions. I can remember in the ‘olden days’ when before we could help units learn how to deal with enemy jamming – we first had to help them understand how to operate their FM radios!

The implication is that every level of training from initial specialty granting to senior officer training must include components dealing with PSYOP and CNO. Furthermore, a good portion of this training must be open ended – free flow so that creativity can be engaged to optimize the training and the effectiveness of the operations being planned within it.

Today’s world mandates we do this with great haste or risk being taken down by a more savvy and agile enemy – one that places results ahead of rules.

Strategic PSYOP at the Tactical Level

While today's headline may seem like a contradiction in terms, I can assure you, that it is not. I’m back at the Defense Information School (March 2010) working my second iteration of the Joint Expeditionary Public Affairs Course (JEPAC) exercise. The exercise scenario is such that actions by the US military can have a positive impact on global US reputation. However, the PSYOP involved are very much tactical in scope. In fact this hypothetical situation is very similar to the actual situation on the ground in Haiti.

In both situations the US military is engaged in what appears to be highly successful humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. The Joint Task Force executing the operations were both literally cobbled together out of available resources to address their respective missions. This likely means that the emphasis on PSYOP forces would be tactical in nature and they would be tasked to perform missions associated with keeping the population informed, reducing interference with the operation and generally promoting the government’s actions.

These types of altruistic operations, borne out of a tragedy, can be very much ‘good news’ stories because they show how the United States is helping others without any sort of ulterior motive. Images of medical assistance, survivor rescues and of the resumption of normal life all reinforce a positive image of the US and our actions.

The challenge becomes to serve two PSYOP/Communications masters. On the one hand, the PSYOP force on the ground needs to focus on executing tactical PSYOP in support of the CDR’s objectives. On the other hand, there needs to be attention to the Strategic Communications messages which can be derived from the operation. From a PSYOP perspective the units on the ground supporting the task force are collecting the imagery and in some cases generating (or causing to be generated) stories in the local media and Public Service Announcements that showcase critical US messages.
The implication is that the PSYOP Task Force (POTF) must coordinate with the Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) out of SOCOM to provide them the input/feeds they need to harness this valuable content for Strategic Communications. It is further implied that the JMISC has open lines of communication with the Department of State so that the content can be employed in their Public Diplomacy efforts as well.

The Haiti operation may be an over simplified case in point because of its geographic proximity to the US. Hopefully the SOP exists to achieve this objectives in spite of the location of the operation whether Asia or Africa where the supply chain would not be as easy to establish and maintain.

The fragile nature of our global reputation demands that we are able to capitalize on our positive efforts whenever we can.

Shared Frequencies Can Lead To Interesting Dialogue

Back in the olden days of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)(circa 1982) I commanded the 519th Army Security Agency Company. In those days Army Intelligence consisted of ASA which was the SIGINT/Electronic Warfare/Cryptographic arm and separate branch which dealt with Human Intelligence, Image Intelligence and Counter Intelligence. The ASA patch appears in this entry. It was sometimes referred to as either the “lightening fast chicken flicker” or the “Massachusetts Power & Light Company” (due to the ASA Training Center location at Fort Devens, MA)

During one of our Annual Training (AT) periods we took part in Exercise Celtic Cross held at Fort Hunter Liggett, CA. Our company was tasked to provide SIGINT support to the Marine Task Force which was the Red (Enemy) Force ‘fighting’ the Blue (Friendly) Force, the 7th Infantry Division.

As the CO I was based with the Regimental Task Force CDR, commanded by COL Henry C. “Hank” Stackpole III, USMC (who ultimately retired as a Lieutenant General). Marine officers are the hardest working of all services IMHO. As a part of the HQ I was actively engaged in the Command Operation Center’s (COC) operations. While visiting with the Radio Operators a number of them told me that they could overhear what the Army was saying on their radios because we all shared a limited frequency spectrum.
Marines are hard charging innovators; these radio operators became SIGINT operatives in a heartbeat and provided valuable information that helped us plan our operations against the Blue Force.

Fast forward to 2010 to an ABC article on February 25, 2010 entitled: Trash Talking the Taliban During Fights (http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/trust-politics-religion-afghan-war/story?id=9935912). It seems that the Afghan national Army and the Taliban often find themselves on the same frequency. This strange turn of events offers a venue where debate, argument and old fashioned trash talking can occur.
It strikes me that this is a golden opportunity, an opportunity that needs to be exploited systematically as a credible and powerful means of influencing the Taliban. If it were my mission, I would recruit a select number of Afghan soldiers and have them specially trained by SF and PSYOP personnel. I would engage them in dialogue prior to the training to determine the nature of previous engagements and to ascertain what messages, appeals and arguments seem to have the most traction. I would then compile the best practices and most effective messages into a training program and perhaps into some audio or video CDs that could be studied at the student’s convenience. I might offer up the incentive of an iPod with MP3 files and videos as a means of encouraging Afghan personnel to take part in the trash talk offensive.

This is a cost effective and high impact program that needs to be implemented ASAP. Furthermore, research needs to be undertaken to see if there are any other current or potential areas of operation where similar influence offensives could be executed or planned for.

Family PSYOP

As a creature of Silicon Valley I’m often immersed in complex and sophisticated issues such as intellectual property theft, and teaching military intelligence subjects on-line. I’ve commented on rural PSYOP and urban PSYOP not to mention Cyber-PSYOP.

Over the past few weeks three deaths have hit my world. First there was the death of a fellow Red Cross volunteer with whom I had worked with occasionally, but who always set an outstanding example and could always be relied on to be a learned voice of reason. As a member of the Public Affairs team I was asked to write his obituary. I have written many pieces in my career but this was among the hardest. The task was to capture a life and a spirit in a few paragraphs that would be read by those who knew him and those who did not. It was a challenge, but I’m pleased to say that the result has received quite a bit of favorable comments.

The second death was that of COL (R) Jeff Jones. I had worked with COL Jones when he was the 4th PSYOP Group CDR and I was the 7th PSYOP Group S3 and stayed in touch with him over the ensuing years (see my previous posting). I reflected that it was indeed satisfying to see COL Jones presented with one of the first gold McClure awards for PSYOP excellence in June 2009 at PSYOP Regimental Week.

As close as I may have been with these men, it would be unexpected death of my brother in law, who I hardly ever spoke to that would cause the most direct involvement in my life. My wife and her brother had never been close and they hadn’t spoken to each other for the past two years when the call came in.

It was a Thursday night during February 2010 where snow storms had plagued the northeast and even Delta was forced to cancel 1,100 flights mostly due to weather at their Atlanta Hub. It was also President’s Weekend and the beginning of winter vacation for many schools. Flights were hard to come by and they were expensive – even the red eyes! Nevertheless we had to go and go we did.

The point is that, while it is all well and good to assess PSYOP on the strategic and operational level, we must address the audience with the most powerful direct influencer – and family is one of the strongest. The attachment to family and tribe as a superset of family is one that must be considered in each and every PSYOP work product and campaign. The temptation to go global must always be foregone to maintain local relevance and power.

One Aw Poo Wipes Out 100 Attaboys and Provides Great Fodder for Enemy PSYOP

As aid workers flocked to Haiti in January 2010, the US military swung into full and prompt action. Public opinion was very heavily in favor of the US and efforts resulting in a much needed burnishing of US reputation in Latin America.
Regrettably actions by a Twin Falls, ID Baptist religious group (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/08/world/americas/08haiti.html?scp=1&sq=Haiti%20kidnapping&st=cse) have resulted in their arrest and being charged with kidnapping. The group claims that their only motive was to help the children. It should be noted that one of the attorneys for the Group is apparently Jewish since his Kippa is prominently visible. The nature of the charges and the inclusion of an individual who is or could likely be interpreted to be a Jew makes the incident ripe for exploitation.

Islamist fundamental groups should be salivating over the opportunity of getting a PSYOP “twofer”. They can hit two targets for the price of one. Not only can they strike out at American desires to wrest children from their parents and indoctrinate them in the Christian faith, but they can point to the ever-present ‘Jew ‘ orchestrating evil behind the scenes.

While I’m not suggesting that there is much that can be done to prevent exploitation of this unfortunate situation, some counter propaganda needs to be developed so that it can be used to circumvent, deflect and otherwise diminish the effect of likely enemy PSYOP attacks.

No PSYOP Dimension to 2010 QDR – A Bad Sign

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was released on January 26, 2010 (http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf). For those of you unfamiliar with the QDR its purpose is described as “This QDR report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, to establish the Department’s key priority objectives, providing context and recommendations regarding capability development and investment portfolios; and second, to communicate the Secretary’s intent for the next several years of the Department’s work.”

In essence the QDR becomes a roadmap for DOD. It serves as standing guidance on all matters relating to the execution of DOD missions from force development, to training priorities to logistics and procurement. It also reveals the personality of the DOD and strongly suggests where resources and emphasis will go in the coming year.

Unfortunately a word search of the 128 page document did not reveal any presence of either “psychological operations” or “strategic communications”. The 2009 QDR, as I noted in February 2009, mentioned PSYOP and strategic communications once each. While it may be a stretch to read into the lack of emphasis this year, it is worthwhile to consider what is actually in the document.

The QDR analysis strongly suggested that the Department must further rebalance its policy, doctrine, and capabilities to better support the following six key missions:
• Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;
• Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;
• Build the security capacity of partner states;
• Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;
• Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and
• Operate effectively in cyberspace.

Highlights included:
The QDR directs the following enhancements:
• Expand future long-range strike capabilities;
• Exploit advantages in subsurface operations;
• Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure;
• Assure access to space and the use of space assets;
• Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities;
• Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems; and
• Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.
And:
Through the QDR, the Secretary of Defense directs the following:
• Establish a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to plan, train, and execute WMD elimination operations;
• Research countermeasures and defense to nontraditional agents;
• Enhance nuclear forensics;
• Secure vulnerable nuclear materials;
• Expand the biological threat reduction program; and
• Develop new verification technologies.

The ability to operate effectively in cyberspace was noted as an important area for attention. Cyberspace is already part of the terrorist Battlespace as our enemies continue to use the Internet for communications and recruiting. Our abilities and resources in this arena must be expanded and elevated to a ‘second to none’ position if we ever hope to stem the tide of terrorist recruitment.

It is also comforting to note that DOD has recognized that they need to improve a holistic governmental approach which includes “improving our partnership with the Department of State in conflict zones” given the state of this relationship and the compelling need to integrate influence operations across the strategic, operational and tactical levels this is a blinding flash of the obvious.

Overall this year’s document is disappointing and may signal a step backwards in the face of escalating threats requiring effective PSYOP and Strategic Communications.