Afghan Drawdown: A Tough PSYOP Job Made Even Harder

At 2000 hours Eastern time on 22 June President Obama announced his plans to withdraw troops from Afghanistan (speech at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan). The ISAF Website indicated that the US had 90,000 troops in country. (Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/united-states/index.php). On June 23, 2011 Stratfor, often called the private CIA published its analysis (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110622-obamas-afghanistan-plan-realities-withdrawal?utm_source=SWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110623&utm_content=readmore&elq=0cef78dfc87745459b50e62cd1bb2eb8).

Photo Source: www.whitehouse.gov

Information engagement on any front in Afghanistan is hard, the job just got harder.

One of the durable key messages from the War is “NATO is here to help Afghanistan help itself.” For 10 years the progress has been glacial and there doesn’t seem to be any indication that the Afghani people seem any more anxious to change their world.

The Stratfor article rightly points out the security and logistical challenges the draw down will have to face. The Taliban have been used to waiting for foreign troops to leave – ask the Russians. The security equation hasn’t seemed to be altered very much either. The less US troops the better the odds for the enemy unless the Afghani people can get off the dime.

The Taliban have proven their marketing acumen, the no doubt will help spread the news that NATO is pulling out. The fact that the 2014 deadline given by President Obama may not be his problem at the time in the unlikely event he doesn’t get re-elected, or he can simply change his mind because he won’t be running for re-election.

As the shadow of American security pulls back from the country side and into the city the vacuum will no doubt be exploited by the Taliban. Frankly I ‘m not sure what kind of information engagement can compete with reality on the ground.

Something Different: IO and Terrorists

Today's posting is something a bit different. Following is a concept paper I drafted for a colleague. Essentially I took the IO capabilities of DoD and then provided analysis on Terrorist employment of those same capabilities.

Comments and input are welcome of course.

Photo Source: http://samsonblinded.org/blog/osama-too-good-to-be-true-part-1.htm

Terrorist Use of Information Operations (IO)

COL (R) Lawrence D. Dietz; General Counsel & Managing Director Cyber Security,
TAL Global Corporation

I Introduction
The US Department of Defense employs Information Operations to influence the course of battle and act as a combat multiplier. Terrorists are also very successfully employing IO and technology to their advantage. This short paper will give you an overview to assist you in future research.

II Department of Defense IO Capabilities

Reference: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dmspo/Publications/Information%20Operations%20Primer%20AY11%20Web%20Version.pdf; Accessed 15 Mar 11

A. Core Capabilities

1. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) now Military Information Support Operations (MISO) – operations designed to influence the behavior of the target in line with CDR’s Concept of the Operation (CONOP)

2. Military Deception (MILDEC) – actions taken to shield true capability from the enemy (e.g Patton’s fake Army in the UK as a decoy for the Normandy invasion.

3. Operations Security (OPSEC) – all measures taken to shield information from adversaries and enemies

4. Electronic Warfare (EW) – dominance of the electronic spectrum, actions can include jamming to deny the enemy is communication, actions taken to identify enemy electronic emitters to facilitate identification of their units, other order of battle information, targeting for interception or jamming.

5. Computer Network Operations (CNO)
a. Computer Network Attack (CNA) – denying the enemy the use of their IT networks.
b. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) – using the enemy’s network for friendly advantage, e.g. intelligence collection, communications medium, storage of hostile software code, etc.
c. Computer Network Defense (CND) – defending one’s own network

B. IO Supporting Capabilities

1. Counterintelligence
2. Combat Camera (Air Force Unit that provides still and video camera support)
3. Physical Attack
4. Physical Security
5. Information Assurance – protecting electronic information

C. IO Related Capabilities

1. Public Affairs = Public Relations; a conduit to the media and creator of print, and broadcast media.
2. Civil Military Operations – military forces employing civilian skills to improve the life and infrastructure of a local population.
3. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy – Department of Defense support to the Department of State’s Public Diplomacy Operations

II Terrorist Use of IO Capabilities

A. Core Capabilities

1. Propaganda – Terrorists are making exceptionally good use of the Internet as a means to inform, influence and recruit. They are also being supported by ‘friendly’ media such as Al Jazeera which tends to spin the news in a way that is favorably received by the Arab Street. Terrorist propaganda is especially effective due to the speed with which they capitalize on events that serve their purpose. This rapid response is indicative of a streamlined or de-centralized chain of command and abbreviated approval cycle.

Allied information support operations tend to be much more cumbersome due to the heavy ROE and complex approval schema which can often include both military and civilian command cycles.

2. Military Deception (MILDEC) – In my view terrorist operations tend to be decentralized although they employ deception to shield their true intentions and make very effective use of ‘cover’ identities.

3. Operations Security (OPSEC) – Terrorist cells are generally quite secure due to their decentralized nature. Most terrorist organizations appear to have a very healthy respect for Signals Intelligence and will avoid electronic means of communications such as mobile phones to avoid detection. Trade craft to include steganography (the concealment of messages in pictures) is also employed along with other measures such as compartmentalized chat rooms, common password schemas, etc.

4. Electronic Warfare (EW) – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are often remotely detonated via mobile phones, garage door openers, etc. I am unaware of any large scale terrorist jamming efforts to date.

5. Computer Network Operations (CNO)

a. Computer Network Attack (CNA) – Experts believe that terrorists will employ cyber attacks in conjunction with a kinetic or physical attack. CNA may be employed prior to or subsequent to the kinetic attack depending on the type of operation.

b. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) – Terrorists, and nation states for that matter are routinely probing networks of interest. Terrorists are likely to employ a combination of human agents to infiltrate target organizations to be in a better position to exploit networks directly or to insert malicious code (such as the Stuxnet reported planted to damage the Iranian Nuclear Research program) for later execution.

Exploitation can also include gathering intelligence from the network. Terrorist cells must be self-financing. Harvesting data (personally identifiable information or PII) that allows them to steal identities which in turn allows monetization through theft of funds, goods or services is very effective.

Terrorist cells can also exploit networks by gathering information that may be of use to the movement in some way such as to identify potential funding sources or gather target information.

Terrorists are employing the Internet as a cost effective and for the most part, relatively secure communications channel. Their global operations lend themselves to Internet communications for availability, cost and security reasons.

c. Computer Network Defense (CND) – Unable to comment.

B. IO Supporting Capabilities

1. Counterintelligence – No comments

2. Combat Camera – Terrorist organizations make effective use of still and video cameras. They also exploit images captured by other sources such as the media.

3. Physical Attack – Mumbai type attacks are very likely to increase. They require a small footprint, are relatively low in cost and very difficult to defend against. They are very effective at exploiting soft targets which in turns results in dramatic chaos which is then exploited through the media and by the Terrorists’ own sources.

4. Physical Security – No Comment

5. Information Assurance – See Opsec Above

C. IO Related Capabilities

1. Public Affairs = Public Relations; Terrorists are exceptional PR professionals. They understand the value of publicity, especially the emotional appeal of images. They are able to appeal to ‘friendly’ media to a very great extent.
2. Civil Military Operations – Hezbollah and the Taliban have been quite successful at using social welfare as a means to ingratiate themselves with local populations.
3. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy – Governments tend to hide their association with terrorist organizations.

Rolling Stone As A Military Authority

I must confess that I don’t think of Rolling Stone Magazine as an authority on military matters. True, while in college I did regard Playboy as a source of good interviews, but that was a long time ago. The February 23, 2011 Rolling Stone article, “Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators” (see http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/another-runaway-general-army-deploys-psy-ops-on-u-s-senators-20110223?page=1)

Unlike Michael Hastings, the author of the article, I am an attorney and I don’t agree with his characterization of “illegal”. While it is indeed true that PSYOP (now Military Information Support Operations or MISO) cannot be employed against US forces, the incidents portrayed in the article don’t even come close to being illegal. They may seem inappropriate – but implying that a group of soldiers could “manipulate visiting American senators” is nonsense.

Information Operations (IO) teams are often multi-disciplined, but they are certainly not endowed with mystical powers that give the ability to control people’s minds. LTC Holmes, the IO officer quoted in the article is either confused, misquoted, unaware of what PSYOP should or should not do, incapable of dealing with the media or all of the above.

Labeling all PSYOP personnel as “propaganda people” is not only unfair and untruthful but also borders on slander. This type of quote surely reveals how little the Rolling Stone really knows about PSYOP in the first place and that they are more interested in readership and web clicks (which of course lead to more advertising money – duh) than in reporting actual news.

In the commercial sector many companies employ government relations as an information conduit between the company and the government. They may also employ lobbyists, who are paid and generally must register themselves to influence legislation. These two functions are related but different. The military possesses no such stated capability.

In my view, LTG Caldwell was only being prudent by preparing for a visit by a senior Congressional Delegation (CODEL). Executives prepare for visits by elected officials all the time and elected officials go out of their way to provide bios and other information through their web sites and other means.

Notwithstanding the fact that Caldwell is a 3 star LTG, he doesn’t have a government relations staff. People with the skills to prepare him for the visit would like sit in a number of places throughout his HQ such as Public Affairs, PSYOP (MISO), Intelligence and perhaps even Personnel or Operations. He could conceivably turn to any or all of these sections to provide people for this additional duty.

Clearly LTC Homes was a poor choice. To imply that PSYOP is the Voldemort of the military able to apply magical powers is, in the words of BG Anthony McAuliffe: “Nuts!”

Combat Mission Over Declares PSYOPer-in-Chief

President Obama, the PSYOPer –in-Chief declared that combat operations are over in a White House speech delivered at 8 PM Eastern time on August 31, 2010 and which can be found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq

(Photo Source: The White House)

He is of course the second US President to declare a “mission accomplished” of sorts, but what did the President really say and what does it mean to the influence operations community?

First, the departure of ‘combat’ units was chronicled far and wide and the President was kind to recognize the achievements of service personnel in executing whatever tasks they were given – “At every turn, America’s men and women in uniform have served with courage and resolve. As Commander-in-Chief, I am incredibly proud of their service. And like all Americans, I’m awed by their sacrifice, and by the sacrifices of their families.”

The President also noted that he kept his campaign promise, he too has to be re-elected of course. He went on to add that “This completes a transition to Iraqi responsibility for their own security”. The speech goes on to say that there is a transition force and that the military draw down will be paralleled by a ramp up of “dedicated civilians”.

A bit over half way through the direction turned to the sorry state of the US economy and the need to more or less stop spending on war and spend on ourselves, or so it seemed to me.
Various sources peg the number of troops in Iraq at around 50,000, not a trivial number by any means.
Where does that leave MISO forces?

First of all the absence of a warfighter means that influence operations must shift gears dramatically to shore up US Department of State and other efforts and to document and publicize successes in a credible and forceful way to help the Iraqi population appreciate the efforts of the US and our allies.

Most importantly “someone” must work with local and regional media to help them upgrade their efforts and to insure that standards of fair and impartial journalism govern the media. This may require out of the box thinking. Lack of warfighters may also mean a lack of PAO resources and since the PAO is the CDR’s representative to foreign media this means that the Department of State must step up to the plate.
Having said that, select MISO NCOs and officers may be just the right candidates to help mentor journalists as long as those journalists are not tarred by the brush of working with the US military.

The post-combat MISO mission promises to be more complex , challenging and probably more dangerous. Hopefully the chain of command understands that in the real world campaign promises don’t count for much.

On The Firing Line

The smoke is still swirling around the MISOing of PSYOP. Rather than being able to sit back and analyze it all, I find myself on the front line (so to speak) as I undertake my role as the “PSYOP” Subject Matter Expert (SME) for an exercise at a major DoD School.

This is my third performance in this role, so I’m familiar with the scenario, the nature of the students and of course the faculty involved. The past two exercises have been pretty smooth in terms of information support to the hypothetical task force. Annex H for PSYOP was developed and there was significant interaction with Public Affairs and Strategic Communications under an Information Operations (IO) aegis as the exercise evovled.

The current mission is quite a bit different. First of all I had to update the Faculty on the details of the name change and provide them with the appropriate phraseology to convey to the students. This also meant answering a lot of questions for which there are frankly no answers.

Fortunately I have a few knowledgeable resources who came to my rescue so that I could put the best face forward for MISO possible under the circumstances. Since the exercise is predicated on a natural disaster and is less than a week long, my level of response should prove adequate.

But I candidly worry for my brothers and sisters in the PSYOP/MISO (forgive me the legacy usage) community who will have to devote their precious time to explaining the rationale for the name change, divine what other changes can be expected when and otherwise tap dance until the chain of command responds with some definitive answers.

I’m not so much worried about how SWC will adjust unit names or Branch descriptions, I’m frankly worried about the big picture. Will anything other than the name change? Will DOD decide that IO is a function or an overarching branch that should include MISO, EW, PAO and CNO. In either event, what new doctrine, organization or resources will be applied to elevate the information Battlefield Operating System to the level of kinetic warfare across the spectrum of conflict?

I’m also concerned that the recently touted ‘new’ Army strategy scheduled to be published in August 2010 was created in the kinetic world with little attention to the information battlefield and in spite of the growing specter of irregular warfare and the quagmires we find ourselves in with our forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and who knows where else.

Let’s hope I’m just being a little paranoid, which is in my nature being an MI type who grew up in Brooklyn and that the powers that be have actually given the big picture some uncharacteristic deep thought.

No PSYOP Dimension to 2010 QDR – A Bad Sign

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was released on January 26, 2010 (http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf). For those of you unfamiliar with the QDR its purpose is described as “This QDR report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, to establish the Department’s key priority objectives, providing context and recommendations regarding capability development and investment portfolios; and second, to communicate the Secretary’s intent for the next several years of the Department’s work.”

In essence the QDR becomes a roadmap for DOD. It serves as standing guidance on all matters relating to the execution of DOD missions from force development, to training priorities to logistics and procurement. It also reveals the personality of the DOD and strongly suggests where resources and emphasis will go in the coming year.

Unfortunately a word search of the 128 page document did not reveal any presence of either “psychological operations” or “strategic communications”. The 2009 QDR, as I noted in February 2009, mentioned PSYOP and strategic communications once each. While it may be a stretch to read into the lack of emphasis this year, it is worthwhile to consider what is actually in the document.

The QDR analysis strongly suggested that the Department must further rebalance its policy, doctrine, and capabilities to better support the following six key missions:
• Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;
• Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;
• Build the security capacity of partner states;
• Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;
• Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and
• Operate effectively in cyberspace.

Highlights included:
The QDR directs the following enhancements:
• Expand future long-range strike capabilities;
• Exploit advantages in subsurface operations;
• Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure;
• Assure access to space and the use of space assets;
• Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities;
• Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems; and
• Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.
And:
Through the QDR, the Secretary of Defense directs the following:
• Establish a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to plan, train, and execute WMD elimination operations;
• Research countermeasures and defense to nontraditional agents;
• Enhance nuclear forensics;
• Secure vulnerable nuclear materials;
• Expand the biological threat reduction program; and
• Develop new verification technologies.

The ability to operate effectively in cyberspace was noted as an important area for attention. Cyberspace is already part of the terrorist Battlespace as our enemies continue to use the Internet for communications and recruiting. Our abilities and resources in this arena must be expanded and elevated to a ‘second to none’ position if we ever hope to stem the tide of terrorist recruitment.

It is also comforting to note that DOD has recognized that they need to improve a holistic governmental approach which includes “improving our partnership with the Department of State in conflict zones” given the state of this relationship and the compelling need to integrate influence operations across the strategic, operational and tactical levels this is a blinding flash of the obvious.

Overall this year’s document is disappointing and may signal a step backwards in the face of escalating threats requiring effective PSYOP and Strategic Communications.

Blog Entry, 30 June 09 – PSYOP Skating to the Puck

I’m generally much of a sports fan, but I do follow, rodeo, football and hockey. And while I don’t often employ sports analogies, ‘skating to the puck’ is a good one. It implies that the player must anticipate where the puck is going and be at the right place at the right time to make the winning play.



Countries with the largest Muslim population as of 2008:
Indonesia 204 Million
Pakistan 164 Million
India 154 Million
Bangladesh 128 Million
Turkey 76 Million
Egypt 74 Million
Nigeria 73 Million
Iran 65 Million
Morocco 34 Million
Algeria 33 Million
Afghanistan 32 Million
Saudi Arabia 28 Million
Sudan 28 Million
China 27 Million
Egypt 27 Million
Iraq 27 Million
Ethiopia 27 Million

Source: http://islam.about.com/od/muslimcountries/a/population.htm
In my view skating to the puck means employing Strategic PSYOP to addre
ss audiences in Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria because while only Algeria has been in the news with respect to Al Qaeda (e.g. Washington Post @ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052901967.html) the other nations are critical to global long term peace and prosperity.

Indonesia should be at the top of the list because it has the largest Islamic population and because it is a keystone of Asia and a symbol to the rest of the world. According to the CIA Factbook “Indonesia's first free parliamentary election after decades of repressive rule took place in 1999. Indonesia is now the world's third-largest democracy, …. and home to the world's largest Muslim population. Current issues include: alleviating poverty, improving education, preventing terrorism, consolidating democracy after four decades of authoritarianism, implementing economic and financial reforms, stemming corruption, holding the military and police accountable for past human rights violations, addressing climate change, and controlling avian influenza.” (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ID.html)

Indonesia faces a myriad of issues and the USG clearly should have messaging that addresses many of them. Furthermore Indonesia’s role in Asia will become more pivotal as China’s political, economic and military influence continues to grow. Indonesia must receive significant strategic communications attention as a prophylaxis to alleviate potentially serious issues in the future.

USG strategic communications will of necessity combine Department of State and Department of Defense information engagement efforts. As a core principle of democracy, the Executive Branch’s civilians drive Strategic Communications under the direction of the Ambassador in line with guidance from the President and Secretary of State Clinton.

Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command has a number of informational resources at his disposal as does the Commander of the US Special Operations Command. These DOD resources ought to be ‘de-conflicted’ so that they are additive in effect. After all marketing is cumulative. These efforts will likely include traditional media and the Internet. Given the burgeoning growth of mobile phones in Asia, campaigns employing Text Messages, e-mails and social networking are also appropriate especially to reach the young adult population which is a very large chunk of the overall population.

Time in the posting does not permit an analysis of other countries and their potential for strategic communications. Suffice it to say that Turkey is critical the US and global security so that it should be singled out for special attention as well.

Bad News And Commanders

Getting hit in the media can sometimes have more long term negative effects than physical casualties. The recent credibility debacle arising from airstrikes in Afghanistan is disturbing on many levels and a very good – bad example.

First of all CDR, especially senior ones, should know that, unlike wine or chicken soup – bad news does not get better with age. CDR should also know that sooner or later the ‘truth’ will come out. Consequently it makes sense to know where your bombs are landing and to be ready to admit when things going awry.

Commercial Public Relations (PR) experts will advise to get out in front of the event and take the moral high ground. Admit what happened, take responsibility, describe how you will help to set things right and then detail the steps you are taking to make sure it won’t happen again.

Of course this has to be in the context of not giving the enemy the feeling that you are abandoning the weapons systems and conveying that you won’t hesitate to bring air power to the fight whenever necessary.

PSYOP And The Next Phase In Afghanistan

From the latest news it would appear that the conflict in Afghanistan is moving into a new and more deadly phase.
On October 16, 2008 SecDef remarked ““Afghanistan is the test, on the grandest scale, of what we are trying to achieve when it comes to integrating the military and the civilian, the public and private, the national and international,” at the U.S. Institute of Peace’s first Dean Acheson lecture. (more details at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=51524)

The DoD story notes that: “Gates called Afghanistan “the laboratory” for U.S. efforts to apply and fully integrate the full range of its national power and international cooperation to protect its security and vital interests.

SecDef Gates described the scope of the effort there, as 42 nations, hundreds of nongovernmental organizations, universities, development banks, the United Nations, the European Union and NATO all working together to help Afghanistan rise above the challenges it faces. These range from crushing poverty to a bumper opium crop to a ruthless and resilient insurgency and al-Qaida and other violent extremists.

“Afghanistan has tested America ’s capacity – and the capacity of our allies and partners – to adapt institutions, policies and approaches that in many cases were formed in a different era for a different set of challenges,” Gates said.”

Gates concluded that there were two key ingredients needed for success in Afghanistan:
“To be successful, the entirety of the NATO alliance, the European Union, NGOs and other groups – the full panoply of military and civilian elements – must better integrate and coordinate with one another and also with the Afghan government,” he said. “These efforts today, however well-intentioned and even heroic, add up to less than the sum of the parts.”
“A big factor in Afghanistan ’s success rests in the effort to rapidly train, equip and advise its army and police force”, Gates said. He noted that until recently, few Western governments and militaries had this capability outside their Special Forces.

After my personal experience of working alongside my NATO colleagues in Sarajevo, and switching to ‘civilian mode’ when walking the halls of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), I can attest to the fact that once again the SecDef has hit the nail on the head. The synergy of the Coalition, NGOs and other organizations is the weapon needed to defeat extremism. The application of resources to address the social, economic and infrastructure needs of the country is the mode of attack for nation building.

However, doing the work is only part of the solution. The Afghani people must understand that the Coalition is working together for their common good. This is where PSYOP comes in. working in tandem with PAO, and Strategic Communications, PSYOP must be employed to make certain that the people know the source of their new resources.

Herein lies the challenge, under the current stove pipe organization each element within the USG answers to its own master as to the corresponding components from other nations and other organizations. There is a critical need to form as SecDef calls it, “a laboratory” to orchestrate the information engagement in an unprecedented way and in a commercial flavored manner. This organization would likely report to Department of State, but would be a hybrid of US, other nations and NGOs, etc. The leadership would be a respected civilian, ideally one with credible backgrounds in the military and commercial sectors and with the diplomatic skills required to ‘herd the cats’.

As example, there was a September Medical Assistance Mission in Arghandab district of Afghanistan’s Kandahar province. According to one of the officers on that mission: “We were expecting roughly 400 people to come through, but approximately 850 showed up, 500 of which were kids,” the officer said. “We had to go back to the firebase to get more supplies to hand out to meet the overwhelming demand. Everyone that came in walked away with something that they needed. I’m just glad we could do something to make their lives a little better.” (More details at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=51528).

It’s great to read about such a heartwarming story on the official DoD website, but how would Afghanis down the road or across the street know this happened? How would the best practices and lessons learned from this mission and the publicity surrounding it be spider webbed to other similar missions in Afghanistan or even Iraq? These are the questions that need to be answered in the next phase of this conflict.

Can You “PSYOP” An Individual?

PSYOP is generally employed by a military force against a group target in a defined geographic AO. The use of PSYOP against individuals is rare and reserved only for very high value targets where the stakes are quite high. The world of fiction has portrayed PSYOP against individuals in a number of ways. Among my favorites was the original Mission Impossible TV series which employed specially selected people with particular talents, not to mention disguises, drugs, theater, electronics and whatever else was required to alter the perception and decision making of the target.

In some ways it worked like CSI in reverse. Instead of starting with a dead body and figuring out what happened prior to the victim’s death, the Team started with the desired results in mind and performed the backwards planning to orchestrate the scenario to get to the desired results.

There was one episode where the evil doer de jure was convinced that a nuclear holocaust had just occurred. The MI Team built a mock-up of a wasteland around the periscope that the target used to observe what was going on outside. While I don’t exactly remember the outcome, I do remember thinking that was pretty cool.

Moving into the 21st Century – is it possible to “PSYOP” an individual by altering his perception of his environment and events around him to the point where his behavior moves in the desired direction or his decision making capability is severely hampered?

In thinking about the problem, one would have to consider the information and influence environment around the target, as much as the target itself. Given that the target’s actions are a function of the sum of all influences, it is important to determine what influences can be realistically altered or influenced and those that cannot.

For example, it would be difficult to subvert a target in a rural environment where communication is strictly via trusted messenger.

Alternatively, urban targets are typically inundated by information – face to face, television, radio, Internet, news papers, magazines, etc. PSYOP could be performed by controlling what is received by altering the genuine or providing false broadcasts or publications. However, would it be possible to exert enough control to get the desired results?

Another dimension of individual PSYOP in today’s world is the cyber dimension. In this case cyber means the information technology (IT) infrastructure used by the target as well as the Internet itself. CNO might prove effective in altering the effectiveness of decisions by changing the nature of ‘facts’ and information available to the target. CNE operations could be designed to employ computer crime techniques such as salami slicing to alter data in such a way to change the framework upon which decisions would be made. Drastic CNO could be employed perhaps in conjunction with EW to denigrate the information technology (IT) used by the target to the point where it is useless.

Regardless of the target it should be obvious from even this short posting that “PSYOPing” individuals require meticulous planning and significant resources. It also requires an in depth understanding of the target and its environment and an opera

PSYOP and Video Journalism – Inevitable Linkage

There has been quite a bit of media turmoil here in Silicon Valley and, while I guess I never paid much attention to it, my recent training as a Red Cross PAO has made me more sensitive. While the plight of newspapers in the US is not necessarily important to the PSYOP community, there are some aspects of the current trends that are worthy of examination.

On is the expansion of the role of Video Journalist. This surfaced in a recent announcement by Young Broadcasting, owner of about 10 stations including one here in the San Francisco Bay Area. In and amongst comments on their profitability was this one:
“Increase use of the video journalist approach to expanding news gathering capabilities and introduction of server based systems to efficiently produce newscasts.” Which was extracted from a news release dated February 21, 2008. (http://www.youngbroadcasting.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=76078&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1111110&highlight=)

There can be no question that imagery is powerful, perhaps even more powerful than words. PSYOP needs to harness high impact means to get our messages across and increasingly video images are the weapon of choice. Images convey emotion and emotion is the currency of behavior.

PSYOP needs images to incorporate at all levels from local to global. Some local situations may benefit from the use of local images, but not all. Under the wrong circumstances local images would serve to inflame already overheated passions. At other times local images might serve as graphic and tangible proof of the truth and validity of the messages that the PSYOP campaign is delivering.

Local images may also be powerful demonstrative evidence for regional or international use. If the images aren’t needed immediately or in the short term, they can be categorized and stored for later use. In some cases the images might be used to draft materials for release upon a certain event. For example images of a massacre might be employed as a part of the campaign used after the capture or prosecution of an individual for war crimes or terrorist activities. Critical events such as the capture of major enemy players are time sensitive and must be capitalized on quickly in order to have the most impact.

In some of my previous work I’ve strongly argued for the cross training PSYOP personnel with Public Affairs. The skills of a video journalist are just as important in PSYOP as they are for the PAO. I believe we should integrate these skills into PSYOP AIT using COTS technology and training materials. It is likely that there are some very good materials available on the Internet (e.g. the Apple Digital Campus at: http://ali.apple.com/ali_sites/adccvj/index.shtml)

It also strikes me that there ought to be some doctrine development to provide general guidance for Tactical Teams especially in AOs like Afghanistan so that they can effectively harness the power of local images and to insure that they are sensitized as to the need of capturing appropriate images and forwarding them up the chain of command. It would also be appropriate to issue guidance concerning the sharing of images between the PSYOP Groups and the JMISC.

Can Disinformation be Credible PSYOP?

Today’s Asian Times on line is featuring an article: “Disinformation flies as US raises Iran bar” (http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB21Ak01.html). The article talks about the informational tug of war between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the US efforts to insure that Iran is the target of a new round of UN Sanctions. According to the author of the article: “a source close to the IAEA has called the US media reports "misleading". The source said: "Without going into the intelligence we may or may not have received, I can say that in my view, these news reports were misleading.”

At issue in today’s post is to offer a bit of analysis methodology to assess effect this ‘exposure’ of the alleged misleading nature of information provided will impact the battle for mindshare over the issue.

I’ve been often been accused of being a funny person, one who if life’s path were different, might have been a professional comedian. As a result, over time I have told people that “the best stuff is never made up”. This principle holds just as true in PSYOP as in comedy because the most effective PSYOP is the truth.

Another truth is that people believe what they want to believe. They tend to give more credibility to statements that prove their position than to efforts to discredit their position or change their mind. Consequently when information comes out that has in tainted in a credible way, that information is more likely to be disbelieved than it is to be considered by people holding opinions contra to that position.

The article author’s position is that Iran is within its rights to engage in nuclear ‘research’ and that the “IAEA must insulate itself from the disinformation campaign against Iran that has by all indications gone into a higher gear as we draw closer to the upcoming meeting of the IAEA’s board of governors, and it must ignore the intensifying American lobbying efforts and those of its junior partners such as France (at a recent meeting of France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy and the IAEA chief, Mohammad ElBaradei, the IAEA was urged to "stay firm" on Iran).”

Let’s look at the PSYOP/IO problem here. The article quotes an alleged source within the IAEA. The source is never named. The main thrust of the article is to reinforce the pro-Iranian position of the author. The messages are:
1. The US and its allies are trying to improperly influence the IAEA.
2. They are employing bad data (intelligence purportedly obtained from an unreliable source – stolen laptop) to do so.
3. The IAEA must remain above this sort of chicanery.
4. Iran is within its rights.

Some questions arise:
1. How credible/important is the Asia Times on-line in the information picture?
2. Who reads the Asia Times?
a. Direct Audience
b. Media that would parrot their position
c. Infuencers
3. What efforts (if any) should be made to counter this article?
I’m not going to offer responses here, but will strongly suggest that analysis like this is an important mission and that a “corporate” repository of the analysis, along with the responses and a tracking of their effects needs to be as much a part of the PSYOP arsenal as the loudspeaker.