Information Engagement Is Fine – But Sometimes Kinetic Works Better

The Middle East is among the most complex of all information engagement battlefields. Religious and historical overtones often over shadow political realities and generations of conflict lead to an inbred sort of hatred that is generally hard to overcome with reason and/or economic incentives.

The BBC of 19 August 2011 reported “Israel strikes Gaza after Palestinian rockets in Ashdod” (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14587101). Violent attacks were also reported against Israelis near Eilat. Israel blames Hamas who in turn claims it cannot control everyone in its territory and that Israel killed children. (Photo source: Getty Images from the cited website)

Media in Gaza continue to show anti-Israeli programs to audiences of all ages and Israel for its part tries to bolster its position on the world stage while attempting to assuage its own population.

Rockets from Gaza are met with air strikes. Groups claiming responsibility for attacks on Israel find themselves targets.

The Israeli government, unlike the US government is more than willing to quickly commit lethal force when it feels that commitment is justified and in its best interests. From a MISO/PSYOP perspective, one would expect that these kinetic actions are complemented by cyber attacks aimed at high value targets via their mobile phones, e-mail, etc.

While militants put on a tough face in public, they cannot change how they feel inside when it appears that the bell is indeed tolling for them.

Al Jazeera – A True Strategic Communicator!

The Doha, Qatar based Al Jazeera has received gushing reviews of its coverage of the Egyptian demonstrations that began on January 25, 2011. Main stream media such as the NY Times with its 7 February article: Televising the Revolution (see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/business/media/07aljazeera.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Televising%20the%20revolution&st=cse) are also noting that Al Jazeera is seeking to raise its global profile by being permitted on US television. US English speakers interested in viewing Al Jazeera have to use the Internet (http://english.aljazeera.net/). (Photo Source is the AJ website shown)

The Doha, Qatar based Al Jazeera has received gushing reviews of its coverage of the Egyptian demonstrations that began on January 25, 2011. Main stream media such as the NY Times with its 7 February article: Televising the Revolution (see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/business/media/07aljazeera.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Televising%20the%20revolution&st=cse) are also noting that Al Jazeera is seeking to raise its global profile by being permitted on US television. US English speakers interested in viewing Al Jazeera have to use the Internet (http://english.aljazeera.net/).

The network has often been criticized for its biased reporting and negative rhetoric aimed at the US and Israel. Arab supporters on the other hand claim that Al Jazeera offers one of the few unvarnished views of events in the Middle East - - untainted by Western influence.

There is no doubt that the network wants a US presence and wants it badly. They tried to push their case even further by taking out a full page ad in the NY Times which, for its part reported that the Network has a meeting scheduled with Comcast.

There are several potential reasons why the network wants into the US market. First of all there’s the money, the US is a large lucrative market for advertising and its viewers represent what may be an under served market.

There are potentially more nefarious reasons. Once the network gets on the US airwaves they will have the protection of free speech and freedom of the press. Protection not afforded to them in certain quarters of the Arab world.

They will also have a means to reach an impressionable American public that tends to believe what it sees on TV rather than the facts behind the events. This is a bully pulpit from which to broadcast slanted and biased news heavily laced with provocative imagery. This kind of influence on public opinion has altered political actions in the course of history more than once.

Lastly, the US market might prove to be a fertile ground to recruit disaffected youth to become international or domestic terrorists.

Consequently it is not clear what the network’s true motives are at this point. However, it is clear that they have taken the strategic step of recognizing the opportunity presented to them by the Egyptian events. This opportunity allowed them to put aside some of their traditional viewpoints and objectives in favor of tactics designed to establish their journalistic bona fides in order to achieve a more long term set of strategic objectives to be gained by entry into the US broadcasting arena.

Israeli Flotilla Raid: Military Victory – International Disaster

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/middleeast/01flotilla.html?scp=7&sq=Mavi%20Marmara&st=cse

On May 31, 2010 the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) boarded the Mavi Marmara Turkish vessel carrying aid and people to the Gaza Strip. Israel has been enforcing a blockade to restrict access to the Hamas ruled Gaza strip. During the raid 9 activists were killed. The IDF gained control of the flotilla and the attempt to run the blockade was thwarted.

In the aftermath of the raid Egypt at least temporarily lifted the blockade on its borders, Turkey – Israel’s most critical Moslem ally, has threatened to cut off diplomatic relations, the UN Security Council is in a dither and world opinion of Israel declined again. (NY Times article on 1 June 2010: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/world/middleeast/02flotilla.html?scp=2&sq=Mavi%20Marmara&st=cse)

On the surface you have to ask yourself “What was the Commander of the IDF naval commandos thinking and what was his mission?” The tactical answer would likely be that the mission was to stop the flotilla and to do so with a minimum loss of life on both sides.

Surely Israel intelligence knew or should have known that the vessels in the flotilla were armed with video cameras and that activists are called activists for a reason. Hamas and other terrorist groups are masters at orchestrating information dominance. This latest action is yet another example of their uncanny ability to out fox the craftiest of foxes.

Israel is a small country and their military has the luxury of smallness and closer ties to their Executive Branch than most other nations. However, it would appear that either they don’t have an integrated information engagement strategy or just don’t give a shit.

Assuming for the moment that the latter is true, then Israel is willing to concede the public opinion card to Hamas and has back door means for smoothing out their apparent diplomatic crisis with Turkey. Interestingly enough the death of the 9 activists has captivated media attention more than the deaths of 46 sailors on board the Republic of Korea ship Cheonan.

What are the lessons for US PSYOP:
1. Mission assessments and operations orders MUST include an information operations assessment to include likely enemy information engagement via the media and Internet.
2. PSYOP and PAO plans and annexes need to be flexible and adaptable.
3. Friendly alternative Courses of Action (COA) need to be developed that minimize the positive impact of enemy information operations.
4. Where possible involve forces from more than one nation in the action.
5. If possible, and in line with security considerations, embed a respected international journalist who can tell the story. Of course this is a calculated risk.
6. Make certain that the diplomatic chain of command is pre-briefed on the alternative COA and that their Public Affairs Officers (PAO) have prepared story lines.
7. If video is taken: the chronology must be visible, details highlight the storyline need to be emphasized.
8. If things go south – act quickly to minimize the negative media responses. Remember unlike chicken soup and wine – bad news does not get better with age.

PSYOP Lessons Learned From Gaza

There have been a couple of very good articles on PSYOP in Gaza published in the last few weeks. USA Today ran “Cellphones Put to 'Unnerving' Use in Gaza” (http://www.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/2009-01-13-gazaphones_N.htm) The photo is by Abdalrahem Khateb, AP . The article addressed how both sides were employing cell phones, SMS and land lines in an effort to influence their opposition. A similar article, “The unreported battle with Hamas: psychological warfare” was published by Haaretz (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1054916.html).

The third article the Economist, “A war of words and images” (http://www.economist.com/world/mideastafrica/displaystory.cfm?STORY_ID=12953839) claims that Israel had lost the propaganda war at the time of its publishing, 15 January 2009.

What can US PSYOP forces learn from the Gaza conflict that might serve them well in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond?

Lesson 1 – Be Realistic On Expectations – At least in your own mind.

I don’t have any inside knowledge as to the goals of Israeli PSYOP in Gaza. However I think It is it fair to say that the Israeli PSYOP target was as much the popular opinion in the West as the residents of Gaza. I frankly don’t believe it is reasonable to assume that a cell phone call or a text message will convince anyone to betray their neighbor. In fact I’m doubtful that tactical PSYOP campaigns aimed at civilians during kinetic actions will serve any purpose except to provide information for civilians on how to avoid being killed or injured. The horrific nature of urban close combat and the disruption of the civilian infrastructure are likely to be too big of an obstacle to overcome. Furthermore, the vehemence of beliefs was cemented long before the IDF rolled into Gaza.

Lesson 2 – Technology to Suit The Target

A useful lesson is that media must be varied to suit the target. While I don’t recall if any of the articles mentioned the age of the PSYOP targets, I suspect that the most fruitful target would be those engaged in active combat, smuggling, rocket firing or other acts of or in support of terrorism. This is likely to mean an audience between the ages of 13 and 40. Mobile phones and texting is the medium of choice and must be exploited. However, the product must be credible and appear to be correct in terms of jargon, style and content. Failure to understand the linguistic and local cultural nuances of the messages will instantly destroy their effectiveness.

Lesson 3 – There Are No Secrets

Sooner or later the true sources of all PSYOP will come out. PSYOP planners need to understand this principle up front. Exposure of sources can be OK if the time value of that source has expired, if the source and the medium in question are destined for long term use, than a very prudent perspective – should be employed. The arguments here will likely mirror the arguments used in the intelligence community where one side wants to employ the intelligence and the other does not because it would expose the source and render it useless in the future.

Every conflict yields lessons, let’s hope we learn some of them.