Information Support Operations An Afterthought At Best for Homeland Security

On May 21 & 22, 2011 I was an evaluator for an exercise which took place in a major city. The city is the hub of an 8 city Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Federal government grant money paid most of the bills and sponsors took care of most of the rest.

The exercise involved 4 Emergency Operation Centers scattered over the area and was a series of ‘lanes’ designed to test Police SWAT (Special Weapons & Tactics), Fire, Urban Search & Rescue (USR), Emergency Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Each lane was coordinated by one agency and evaluators came from far and wide.

By design, the event is overall very low key, although there was an initial press conference attended by the city’s mayor and other dignitaries which resulted in some coverage prior to the event.

Media access was limited during the exercise and there were scant posters or other indications of locations or tactical lanes. In short it was akin to a military operation where the name of the game is to keep the public out of the way to minimize interference with the operation and maximize Operational Security (OPSEC).

While I can understand this posture in terms of external information support, I felt I was in a time warp when it came to the exercise play. There was absolutely no attention to the potential negative effect of information operations either intentional or accidental. Just as in my early Army exercise (PRC-6 anyone?) days, guidance was put out that communications are not to be interfered with because it was hard enough to communicate during the height of battle without someone messing with you.

More importantly the notions of misinformation, hostile crowds and pesky reporters were not considered at all. As for presence, there was only a single Public Affairs Officer at the central EOC with a few of the agency PAOs training their principals, but not actively involved in the exercise.

On the Command information side, EOC communications were via a chat like software package called WebEOC. No video and not very much contemporaneous reporting from other sources contributed to the CDR’s situational awareness.

Given the 24 hour news cycle, the persistence of paparazzi, and the ubiquity of cell phone video cameras – this is a mistake. Our enemies are clearly not stupid and are likely surveilling soft targets as you are reading this. The inability to provide information support operations in homeland security is a vulnerability that is open to exploitation by our enemies. DOD and DHS need to take the initiative and incorporate the informational aspects of homeland security into their efforts and as key elements in the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) and a key factor in determining if the government got its money’s worth for its grant funding.

After Afghanistan Where Does PSYOP Go Next And How Do You Train For It?

OBL is dead and Congress is clamoring for a re-evaluation of the strategy in Afghanistan. While I’m clearly not an expert on that theater, and once I again I disclose that I’ve never been there, it strikes me that killing one guy, even one very important guy, should not call for a re-make of a strategy if the strategy was any good in the first place. Having said that – what’s next after OBL and Afghanistan?

(Photo Source: http://www.trafficsign.us/w24.html)

I believe that demand for contractors can be seen as a leading edge intelligence indicator of US involvement. I picked a well known contractor at random and tallied the total of openings by location: Iraq 42, Afghanistan 39, Kuwait 10, Africa 9, Balkans 5, and Latin America 2. Let me stress that these are not PSYOP/MISO openings, but general openings.

What does all this mean? I believe it means a couple of things. First of all, even with the end of ‘conflict’ in Iraq there is still a great demand for American support. While the number of troops might decline overall, there will be a constant need for Military Information Support Operations to inform and influence the population. The numbers in Kuwait and Africa portend that, like the Balkans, any one of a number of countries can go to crap in a New York minute.

For one reason or another we don’t seem to be training foreign forces on PSYOP/MISO which means that “we” have to do it.

Given that Reserves will bear the brunt of any support effort to the Big Army, or General Purpose Force, it follows that a major US military commitment any where will more than likely call for Reserve PSYOP participation sooner or later.

Can you train as you fight if you have no idea where you are going? In certain things I believe you can. Personal conditioning, marksmanship, combat driving and survival skills are paramount. The nuances of climate may have to depend on best guess, but it wouldn’t be crazy to train for extreme heat or cold and high altitudes.

From a technical perspective, Internet PSYOP as well as TV will be employed in selected AOs and it is possible to train on editing, composing, etc. As for being ready to go anywhere at any time, given the amount of potential locations and the language/culture variations, I think this may be difficult. Having said that perhaps learning about historically disadvantaged locations such as Africa and keeping up to date on the latest regimes in Latin American and perhaps ‘the stans’ and their brethren may make good sense. Comments invited.

Military Efforts To Influence Foreign Media Wasted Says Washington Post

The April 25, 2011 Washington Post Slams DOD for “influencing media in a foreign country – particularly those where U.S. troops have fought – is not very good, and recent attempts by US military units have been even worse” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/for-us-managing-foreign-media-is-a-no-win-proposition/2011/04/23/AFhTRlkE_story.html) Also the photo source.

Walter Pincus essentially feels DOD is wasting tax paper money with extensive contractor and military efforts to impact foreign media especially in areas where the US has extensive combat forces He blasts activities in Iraq and quotes a source (a writer from the New Yorker) describing how US efforts have established Afghanistani media moguls (Saad Mohseni, chairman of the Moby Group and his brothers).

According to the New Yorker source (Kenneth Auletta) a USAID (State Department Agency) grant jump started their business which has blossomed to produce a variety of “reality” TV programs. Auletta wrote that the programming has a more profound impact on the Afghan people then would a newscast.

Much of this is of course déjà doo – doo meaning I’ve seen this sh*t before. First of all TV is entertainment even the news is entertainment. Most TV, reality shows in particular are not intended to appeal to the Harvard Business School (or Yale as in the case of Mr. Pincus) crowd. In some countries TV is among the few escape vehicles that the people have. For example in Bosnia during my 1997-98 tour there Venezuelan soap operas were among the most popular shows.

I guess I didn’t get what problem Mr. Pincus was trying to highlight. There are certainly quite a few: contractors and media enterprises require heavy funding that could perhaps be used elsewhere; citizens are naturally pre-disposed to regard foreign troops on their soil as a bad thing; should governments have the power to influence media in the first place?

All of those seem to be profound topics worthy of discussion, but to me, throwing the military under the bus in a couple of dismissive sentences is shoddy journalism. Did Mr. Pincus mean ISAF? Did he mean DOD or did he mean the actions of PSYOP/MISO teams on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan. Perhaps he was actually criticizing President Obama for the lack of an overarching information engagement strategy. No matter, the opinion piece falls short on several counts.

Unfortunately PSYOP lacks the clout to counter this rhetoric as it bounces around Capitol Hill. Our challenge is to insure that the accomplishments of our PSYOP forces receives at least as much ink as their alleged failures.

Al Jazeera – A True Strategic Communicator!

The Doha, Qatar based Al Jazeera has received gushing reviews of its coverage of the Egyptian demonstrations that began on January 25, 2011. Main stream media such as the NY Times with its 7 February article: Televising the Revolution (see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/business/media/07aljazeera.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Televising%20the%20revolution&st=cse) are also noting that Al Jazeera is seeking to raise its global profile by being permitted on US television. US English speakers interested in viewing Al Jazeera have to use the Internet (http://english.aljazeera.net/). (Photo Source is the AJ website shown)

The Doha, Qatar based Al Jazeera has received gushing reviews of its coverage of the Egyptian demonstrations that began on January 25, 2011. Main stream media such as the NY Times with its 7 February article: Televising the Revolution (see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/business/media/07aljazeera.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Televising%20the%20revolution&st=cse) are also noting that Al Jazeera is seeking to raise its global profile by being permitted on US television. US English speakers interested in viewing Al Jazeera have to use the Internet (http://english.aljazeera.net/).

The network has often been criticized for its biased reporting and negative rhetoric aimed at the US and Israel. Arab supporters on the other hand claim that Al Jazeera offers one of the few unvarnished views of events in the Middle East - - untainted by Western influence.

There is no doubt that the network wants a US presence and wants it badly. They tried to push their case even further by taking out a full page ad in the NY Times which, for its part reported that the Network has a meeting scheduled with Comcast.

There are several potential reasons why the network wants into the US market. First of all there’s the money, the US is a large lucrative market for advertising and its viewers represent what may be an under served market.

There are potentially more nefarious reasons. Once the network gets on the US airwaves they will have the protection of free speech and freedom of the press. Protection not afforded to them in certain quarters of the Arab world.

They will also have a means to reach an impressionable American public that tends to believe what it sees on TV rather than the facts behind the events. This is a bully pulpit from which to broadcast slanted and biased news heavily laced with provocative imagery. This kind of influence on public opinion has altered political actions in the course of history more than once.

Lastly, the US market might prove to be a fertile ground to recruit disaffected youth to become international or domestic terrorists.

Consequently it is not clear what the network’s true motives are at this point. However, it is clear that they have taken the strategic step of recognizing the opportunity presented to them by the Egyptian events. This opportunity allowed them to put aside some of their traditional viewpoints and objectives in favor of tactics designed to establish their journalistic bona fides in order to achieve a more long term set of strategic objectives to be gained by entry into the US broadcasting arena.

Tunisa: TV is Still King Of The Airwaves

I believe that TV is the uber information weapon. While TV is not everywhere, it is certainly more pervasive than the Internet. A TV needs power and an antenna while the Internet requires some sort of smart phone or computer and a connection. The Internet seems to be for those who can afford the devices and the access while TV continues to be for the masses.

Photo: Author's photo of Mount Trebevic SRT Repeating Tower, Bosnia

The NY Times article “Tunisia Shuts Down Private TV Channel” which was dated 23 Jan 11 and appeared in the 24 Jan print edition (see: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/world/africa/24tunis.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper) reported that Tunisian government had shut the TV Station down.

Government sources claimed justifiable reasons for the shutdown. However, the action was alleged to have fanned the current flames of discontent even higher. There were also comments about the station owner and the wealth that the owner and family had gained.

The shutdown was reportedly short lived with station coming back on the air Monday local time.

Some of my loyal readers may recall my earlier postings about TV. For those new to the Blog, I’ve often said that TV is a far better info weapon than the Internet. While I was in Bosnia during October 1997, the Republika Srpska and NATO got into, as the Brits might say, a bit of a sticky wicket. Seems NATO alleged that the Serb Radio and TV (SRT ) was inciting the local population against NATO forces.

The 1st Infantry Division under the command of MG David Grange mounted an attack against one of the TV repeater/transmitters in the network antenna stream and effectively halted TV broadcasts. The NATO press release can be found at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25555.htm?selectedLocale=en.
The population was dependent on TV for their entertainment. The fact that the State may have controlled the new content was not nearly as important as the daily dose of pirated Venezuelan soap operas. The Serb government was compelled to negotiate with NATO in order to regain their broadcasting capability and thereby assuage the population.

The lesson for MISO personnel is clear. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, know your AO’s TV channels and their executives like you know yourself. Part of your information preparation of the battlefield is to draw overlays of broadcast and print media to determine their effective footprints. It also makes sense to analyze the programming to determine if the medium is controlled by a particular political faction and to get a feeling for their audience demographics. It is also worthwhile to try and determine where the medium derives its revenue.

MISO forces can and do utilize a variety of media for paid advertising so that one way to get your message out can sometimes be to simply pay for the service. Care must be taken in working with media from a business as well as a cultural perspective so that media management is positively disposed to you and your efforts.
Sometimes the media can provide or point you to credible local spokespeople which can be invaluable.

Bottom line: never underestimate the power of an irate TV viewer!

Iraq: Post War Proves More Difficult Than The War

The US has already downsized its efforts and removed ‘combat’ forces from Iraq. Conceptually the departure of US combat forces was supposed to signal a new era of self-sufficiency, security and prosperity for Iraq and is people. The new era part may be true, but the rest of it is clearly in doubt.
Photo Source: http://iraq.usembassy.gov/

While the world watches new hot spots like Korea, continually festering ones like Afghanistan while trying to digest supposed revelations over Wikileaks , US forces are still preparing to deploy to Iraq where the number of troops hovers around 50,000 -- PSYOP (Military Information Support) personnel are among them.

I believe the MISO job in Iraq will be more difficult that it was support tactical combat operations and I believe it will be even more nuanced that the Afghanistan mission. MISO works best when it is based on truth and where there is some leverage in the mind of the intended audience. Information support of any kind cannot fix underlying problems. It can help to highlight achievements and can accentuate positive while reducing the negative, but it cannot alleviate underlying problems.
There are four critical problems that need to be addressed by the US and our allies so that the Iraqi people at least have a fair chance to establish a stable and prosperous environment. Here are the issues as I seem them (not necessarily in order).

1. Dreadful Economy
Unemployment in Iraq is reportedly high and there has been no influx of new opportunities to give Iraqi’s jobs. Unemployment is exacerbated by the fact that many Iraqi’s were dependent on US forces or contractors to US forces for their jobs and these sources have dried up as well.

2. Governmental Impotence
The Iraqi federal government is still in political tatters and appears unable to address the needs of the population (electrical power likely still being a big issue). Regional and local governments are likely to be no better off.

3. Increased Secular Conflict
Sunni, Shia and others seem to be in a state of turmoil fanned by insiders and outsiders.

4. Outside Influence
There appears to be undue influence by outsiders, especially Iran who delights in seeing a weak government. The security vacuum has also reopened the door for foreign ‘fighters’ to return and foster havoc as well.

In my view there are a couple of keys to success that must be explored even in the face of these four significant challenges. First of all, the US needs to insure dominance over the TV airwaves inside Iraq. This means developing on-going and mutually beneficial relationships with local and regional TV broadcasters. These relationships might include sharing of advanced journalistic techniques and technology (which ought to be spear headed by the Public Affairs Office) and spreading around of advertising dollars.

Secondly, credible spokes people need to be recruited and nurtured. There is no shortage of physical danger in Iraq, but there always seems to be a small core of people willing to stand-up for their beliefs. These are valuable resources and must be guarded and protected.

Third, if ever there was a time for the other Cabinet Departments to pitch in, it is now. State needs to insure that there is no shortage of coordinated public diplomacy, while Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture along with DHS need to provide their expertise to help Iraq regain its national strength.

NATO and other allies should be doing their fair share. Fair share here can mean economic support as well as military boots on the ground.

Finally the President and his advisers need to afford the Iraqi AO the priority it deserves to preserve the hard hardened gains and investment in blood and treasure we have already made.

Pondering PSYOP and Papiamento

The Blog has been silent for a few weeks because my wife and I have been on a 2 week cruise through the Panama Canal. We made a pact and turned the iPhones off and locked them in the room safe from the time we got on the boat until we disembarked at San Juan on Monday, 11 October 2010. We were also off the grid so if I didn’t know something or wanted to learn more I had to go about it in the old fashioned way.

We left San Diego made 3 stops in Mexico and 1 stop in Cost Rica before transiting the Panama Canal. Our last two ports of call were Aruba and Curacao. Our visit coincided with Curacao’s last day as a part of the Netherlands Antilles; on 10/10/10 they would become an independent country within the kingdom of the Netherlands.
As we drove around I thought about this unique island as a PSYOP venue.

In some respects it would be an ideal PSYOP venue as it is not very big, but has a literate population that has access to mass media including Internet (free Wifi is a selling point for restaurants) and of course TV and radio. Curacao radio has some interesting aspects including the first use of solar power by Radio Hoyer.

From a cultural perspective there is an affinity for the Netherlands of course, and a sibling relationship with Aruba, Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius and Saint Maarten sister islands from the former Netherlands Antilles.

While seemingly idyllic, the island also has its own language, Papiamento which is described as ”a mixture of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, English, French, and it also has some Arawak Indian and African influence.” (see http://www.papiamentu.com/).
It struck me that a Curacao like construct might be an innovative PSYOP practical exercise because it would involve a variety of key ingredients: unique language and culture, connection to a European nation, modern communications, variety of ethnicities and proximity to a significant Communist nation – Venezuela. In fact the floating market in Curacao consists of Venezuelan products sold by Venezuelan citizens.

While I recognize the need to focus on today’s conflicts, case studies and hypothetical situations such as might be symbolized by Curacao are worthy of consideration as teaching tools to help foster creative thinking and build skills without the constraints of today’s battlefields. Creative thinking is the way that PSYOPers have fought in the past and will do so in the future. Being able to apply a variety of tools and techniques in an unstructured environment is often the key to success.

PSYOP and Iraq: It Ain’t Over Yet

Notwithstanding declarations touting the end of combat operations in Iraqi, the influence war is far from over. Seemingly coordinated attacks across the country are sending forceful and graphic messages to Iraqis that their lives remain perilous. (Photo: NY Times)

With the withdrawal of the Warfighter, influence operations must take on a new flavor and tempo. Unlike Afghanistan which is mostly tribal and rural, Iraq has significant urban centers. These centers are served by local and regional media to include TV. In many quarters of these cities there are even likely (I haven’t been there so I can’t say for sure) Internet cafes and ISPs serving a growing body of Internet and smart phone users.

Iraq serves as a laboratory for future conflict. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) must now TRULY be in support – but this time of diplomatic efforts to thwart the insurgency and raise the conscious of Iraqis. Security is no longer just the problem of government. Citizens need to be more vigilant and supportive of their fledgling police and security forces. Aggressive influence operations are needed to mobilize the support of the population.

The people of Iraq need to dry up the sea of support that allows the insurgents to move freely. The government should help the process by maintaining truly anonymous channels of communications to allow citizens to provide tips on the enemy without fear of retribution.

DOD information support can and ought to come in several ways: First, PSYOP personnel can augment and assist State Department through the embassy and its outreach efforts. PAO personnel can facilitate the Iraqi media and in concert with the State Department, aid in the maturing of a potent and objective media that can inform and help the Iraqis defeat their insurgent. Other avenues could include training Iraqi MISO and PAO personnel and facilitating working arrangements between these Iraqi government personnel with local and regional media.

In addition to these programs, Strategic Communications efforts aimed at the Region should be undertaken via the Internet and other channels designed to ‘reach the street’.

The bottom line is that the influence war needs to ramp up even more than during combat and that all government instrumentalities need to be brought to bear under a clearly articulated strategy and with a mindset to learning on the fly. Lessons learned over the next few years should not have to be relearned in new influence battlefields where ever they may be.

In Afghanistan The Coffee Klatch is Mightier Than the Sword

As a native Brooklynite I have had a long standing affection for coffee. I enjoy everything from latte’s to Turkish Coffee (medium sweet just like Mr. Bond). More importantly I recognize the importance of social gatherings around one’s favorite beverage be it coffee, chai, tea, or beer. Social gatherings foster support and tribal elder support is the key to success in Afghanistan as pointed out in the USA Today Article on March 30, 2010 (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/2010-03-29-Afghan-elders_N.htm).

While I applaud President Obama’s first visit as Commander-in-Chief, my marketing sense tells me that his visit was most likely more effective to the audience outside Afghanistan than it. First of all Afghanistan isn’t exactly a TV focal mecca so that the majority of the population is not glued to their TV sets watching the world stage. If they get their information over the airwaves it is more likely to come through the FM radio being filtered and polarized by the station’s management.

From an influence perspective this type of market means that the local officer or NCO in charge is going to be the key to success. It is my belief that all officers and NCOs should receive some form of sales training. When we deployed to Bosnia in 1997 I gave every soldier a copy of Zig Ziglar’s book Secret’s of Closing the Sale. An alternative is Willie Gayle’s book on Power Selling.

Afghanistan is the classic example of “all politics is local” and personal selling is the most effective form of PSYOP at the local level. The nature of the beast is that PSYOP personnel cannot be everywhere and the ‘winning of hearts and minds’ starts with the simple premise that people must like you as a person before they will listen to anything you have to say. Consequently the senior person on the ground must establish a rapport with the key local leader who, more than likely, will be the tribal elder or imam.

Unfortunately there is no easy way to do this, nor is there a simple, magic formula to train everyone to be able to relate to foreign audiences. I have found that Marines and Special Forces in general are far more adaptive than other service personnel and are able to adjust their behavior and approach more easily.

Success will come after the Afghans people feel like they are secure in their homes. Whether this feeling is a direct result of villages pushing out the Taliban, the Afghan government actually becoming an effecting governing force, or a combination of these and external forces, it is the feeling of security which will be a self-fulfilling prophecy that make the American effort in Afghanistan a success and differentiate it from past efforts.

Strategic Communications: Funding Little Old Grannies Who Wear Veils

It’s very hard to find something positive to say about Strategic Communications these days. Afghanistan and Iraq dominate the headlines and make the world appear to be a very bleak place.However, there are a couple of bright spots for those in Strategic Communications willing to think out of the box and take a longer range view than tomorrow’s headline. The September 3, 2009 Arts Section of the NY Times featured an article entitled: Dubai Superheros: Little Old Grannies Who Wear Veils (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/arts/television/03animated.html?scp=1&sq=Dubai%20Superheros&st=cse) Photo: NY Times

Mohammed Saeed Harib nor Freej, the United Arab Emirate’s (UAE) and therefore very likely the Middle East’s first 3-D animated series may not be as well known as the Simpsons or South Park, but the potential for the Grannie Superheros is worthy of note because it indicates a societal maturation. Societies that have a means to look at themselves and raise issues through ‘characters’ are better able to deal with issues and inequities thwarting the appeal of fundamentalism.

During my service in Bosnia it was clear to me that a free and credible media was a fundamental cornerstone of any nation. Citizens need to be informed and be able to dialog about their societies.

The next level of sophistication is another way for society’s to view themselves and that’s entertainment as a vehicle to address social issues. Freej cannot attack issues head on like The Simpsons or South Park and must of necessity is an indirect approach.

Supporting an entertainment venture like Freej might not seem like Strategic Communication – but it clearly is because as Freej and other forms of entertainment open up issues for discussion and perhaps potential action they can facilitate the positive transformation of a society.

Over time sociological entertainment from the UAE would likely be exported to other areas of the region and perhaps even spawn copy cat programs that would have a local spin, yet still have the positive effect of expanding societal expression.

I should also point out that Mr. Harib attended Northeastern University in Boston which has itself evolved from a commuter based university built on balancing work experience and academic study to one of the top 100 universities in the US, and oh yes, my Alma Mater!

PSYOP in Georgia

Fox news has reported that President Bush has ordered the military to spearhead the humanitarian aid missions to Georgia. (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,402982,00.html).

Given the lack of overt USG action on the world stage up to this point and the suffering of the Georgian population it is incumbent on the USG to accompany aid with some strong PSYOP. Large military aircraft are indeed a PSYACT and the sight of a modern day “Berlin Airlift” is likely to be viewed positively, but there has to be more. The USG must orchestrate a multi-pronged information offensive designed to restore the confidence in the US by the Georgian people and the rest of world.

Not only should the aid packages have prominent display of appropriate messages, but media coverage, in particular TV should be encouraged. Viral marketing employing UTube should be aggressively employed. Consideration should be giving to encouraging and authorizing as individuals taking part in the operation to document their personal humanitarian efforts. Putting a face on those being helped is a positive idea.

Logistical and PA support should be provided to the appropriate NGOs. It might also be a good idea to send in a limited number of Civil Affairs teams to do damage assessment and see how the infrastructure of the region has been impacted.

In short the USG needs to get in front of the traditional and new media ASAP. This particular crisis also underscores the need to have properly vetted and prepared contingency PSYOP forces (perhaps consisting of retired and/or civilian personnel) ready to be employed as surge personnel when needed.

Image Courtesy of the RAF (because it was easier to find an appropriate shot from them based on a Google Image Search)

Al Jazeera English: Good Business or Real Strategic Communications

The New York Times Financial Section ran a 19 May story “Al Jazeera English Tries to Extend Its Reach to the US” (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/19/business/media/19jazeera.html?scp=1&sq=Al%20Jazeera%20English&st=cse)

Tony Burman the new Managing Director did his best to paint a picture of a media start up seeking to serve the US market by providing credible journalism and a BBC like perspective on the news.

Al Jazeera English (AJE) has found breaking into the potentially lucrative US TV market difficult. Limiting factors on their success have been the taint of their “Arabic sibling” and the crowded and competitive nature of cable systems according to the article. Interestingly no mention was made of satellite TV networks at all.

You can watch AJE in the USA on: GlobeCast World TV; Buckeye Cable, Ohio; Washington Cable (Washington, DC); Islamicity (Broadband); and JumpTV (Broadband). (source: http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ACF18F3D-8CC0-4C40-902A-54D152837F57.htm)

AJE announced distribution agreements in Portugal, Ukraine, and Vietnam – not exactly your mainstream TV markets. Most TV stations that I’m familiar with are after one thing: advertising dollars. Their goal is to broadcast shows that attract desirable demographics to attract the most lucrative advertisers. The only exception to this is the Public Broadcasting System (PBS).

So what is AJE after? What are its strategic goals? I’m inclined to accept the premise that they are trying to attract an English speaking audience or perhaps an Arabic one that is trying to learn how to speak English. Say what they will, their center of gravity remains their Arabic Big Brother and their Qatar based ownership’s strategic interests are most likely to be served by broadening their exposure to audiences that are or should be influenced by the editorial strain that has marked AJ since its inception.

Critics of AJE have indicated that their home office in Doha, Qatar was becoming more directive in terms of coverage rather than news hubs in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), London or DC. Departures of Western Journalists to include law suits by some, are characterized as normal growing pains or indicative of the climate the “Home Office” establishes depending on your point of view.

My feeling is that AJE is an extension of the corporate family and their ultimate, buy perhaps not their immediate mission, is to expand the reach of the core messaging and perspectives advocated by AJ ownership. The small distribution agreements combined with what appears to be a well funded, yet long term, patient approach to expansion shows a well thought out strategic communications direction in my opinion. But as they say, a picture is worth a thousand words.

The cartoons above came from the AJE website (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F391F101-723E-4156-96D3-10EAEC0226C0.htm) today, I’ll leave it to you to decided if this is good, BBC like credible journalism, or intelligence indicators of the true nature of their strategic direction.