PSYOP/MISO: Battlefield Wild Card

I have just finished my 4^th iteration of being the PSYOP/MISO SME for an exercise for Public Affairs Officers. The scenario is that a Joint Task Force (JTF) is deployed in a semi-permissive tactical environment to provide Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) at the invitation of the government of a nation stricken by an earthquake.

(Photo source: http://www.uhsda.com/)

While the actual tactical situation is merely the backdrop for the real purpose of the exercise – exposing junior PAOs to life on a Joint Staff commanded by a 2*, I was able to give some thought to how MISO would support an actual operation of this kind especially if the tactical environment turned ugly.

As long as the environment is permissive, meaning no one is shooting at us, MISO functions primarily as an information channel. Loudspeaker teams with appropriate speakers or recorded messages would broadcast locations and schedules for aid distribution. Host nation and JTF print resources could be used to print with signs directing people to the aid resources and educational messages designed to teach people how to reduce their susceptibility to water borne diseases like Cholera and Typhus. Loudspeakers could also be used to broadcast into a collapsed building to assure the victims that help was there.

What happens when the bad guys start shooting? There is a great deal of doctrine and precedent on how Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT) support the CDR in a traditional force on force situation. There’s a lot less out there on how TPT would be involved against insurgents in localized firefights – or if they would be at all.

Given that many insurgent operations are ‘hit and run’ – it strikes me that the MISO emphasis must be more on the long-term campaign, the one designed to convince adversaries to join the good guys. Perhaps there is a place for deception in making the bad guys think we have more resources than we do, or to induce them to direct their firepower at the wrong targets.

In some situations MISO could give way to EW and CNO under the right circumstances and for the proper targets. These IO options can generate the positive psychological effects as direct PSYOP/MISO.

Reader comment invited.

Gen X Taliban – No Easy Target for PSYOP

“Taliban X: The next generation of terrorists” appeared in the August 10, 2010 edition of the Washington Examiner (http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/world/Taliban-X_-The-next-generation-of-terrorists-1008566-100291009.html) talks about the up and coming teenagers and 20 somethings who are turning to martyrdom over conventional insurgency activities. This is a troubling, but not surprising development.

Photo source: http://baneofyourresistance.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/85856406.jpg
Baby elephants are staked down at an early age to train them not to wander. Even when they are fully grown and can easily pull out the stake, they still adhere to their childhood experiences. The ‘generation gap’ has been around as long as there have been parents and children. These children, like many Palestinians, have had the personalities forged by the cauldron if a hard life growing up in the squalor of refugee camps. Their idea of ‘normal’ has been the result of their environment and perception formed of their tormentors and enemies.

Their reference frame is a function of this desperation and they become relatively easy marks for recruiters who offer an escape path and can appeal to emotion via an intellectual and spiritual path. According to the article, “Terrorist groups from Pakistan and foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia, Palestine and elsewhere have sown a form of jihad that resonates among the younger generation, officials told The Washington Examiner.”

The article quotes unnamed officials as saying that the jihadist creed espoused by foreign fighters is more appealing. I have a different take, I think the Xers are seeking paths that are different from their parents because they have built up frustration and disdain during the lives and are seeking a way out.

The depth of commitment and the lack of suitable alternative reference frames and alternatives makes this new force a very difficult influence target. A target that, IMHO, is not susceptible to third party messages, but must be worked with by charismatic figures that are close to their age, have experienced the same early life, but have found other paths out of it.

Credibility is key here and the new champion must have the ethnic street credibility of the target otherwise any messages or efforts to redirect the individual messages will fail.

Having described a potential counter measure, the issue becomes who is responsible? The proper answer would be the Afghan government. However, as a practical matter that should doesn’t seem to fly. Are there ‘warlords’ who are current or potential allies? If so, this alternative can be a good one because they have the credibility and access.

While the issue is an important one, I am not of the opinion that it can be addressed by either ISAF or the Department of State.
Alternatively I wonder how or if the Israeli government has addressed this issue and if they have had any experiences, positive or negative, that they are sharing with appropriate authorities.

No matter what is happening on the ground, we must be certain that SWC is integrating this challenge into the curriculum so that our soldiers can recognize the phenomena in the field and deal with it as best they can employing the trademark ingenuity of American soldiers.

Taliban Ought to Teach at SWC and the State Department

In the past week I received tips on two interesting articles on how the Taliban are wining the influence war (notice how I cleverly avoided using either PSYOP or MISO). One was a May 3, 2010 Article from Time (Why the Taliban Are Winning the Propaganda War @ http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1895496,00.html) and the other an August 2, 2010 article from All Voices (Taliban use of psychological warfare techniques in Afghanistan @ http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/6441710-night-letters-taliban-psyops-campaign-appeals-to-afghan-sense-of-pride-and-patriotism-wikileaks). Photo Source: Time Magazine

Both articles are pretty good and point to some reasons why the Taliban are indeed winning. The more recent article is especially important because it claims to be based on a review of the recent documents leaked by Wikileaks and given the report number citations appears well documented. Here are my thoughts on why the Taliban are winning.

First of all they have a streamlined approval cycle and a unified chain of command for influence operations. This means they can get their messages out sooner.

Secondly, the Karzai Administration is even worse than the Obama Administration when it comes to influence war strategy and operations.

Third – the Taliban is far more credible and can be more locally focused through their shadow governments and local warlords who are able to back up their threats of violence with the promised horrific results.

Fourth – they seem to know their target audience better than we do as evidenced by their appeals to nationalism and patriotism.

Fifth – they employ a wide range of media designed for maximum reach to their various target audiences.

Sixth – they appear to beat the Western media at its own game by skillfully manipulating events and perceptions in their favor.

While they lack iPads and the latest technology, the Taliban have proven that are a formidable opponent who also has the weapon of time on their side. Perhaps we need to consider ‘out of the box’ ways to thwart their efforts and the US and Afghan government influence agents need to get on the same page – now!