PSYOP and the Starfish

One of the regular contributors to the Blog recommended that I read “The Starfish and the Spider” by Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom. (You can find a good summary at: http://ugnchicago.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/Starfish-and-Spider-Ori-Brafman-Summary.pdf)

The premise of the book is that decentralized organizations have neither head nor formal infrastructure – just like the starfish is able to regenerate from a severed leg. One of the beginning vignettes is on how the Spanish Army could easily conquer the Aztecs, but the Apaches got the best of them for 200 years.

The messages for MISO/PSYOP professionals are actually pretty clear. Historically major conflicts have been force on force. Formal military organizations faced each other and the MISO battle was fairly straight forward. It was as I like to call it the “Surrender now and avoid the rush.” Campaign centered on getting the opposing force to surrender. This is no longer the case and the traditional, centralized, military Command and Control of influence operations needs to evolve to deal with ‘starfish’ type enemies.

When Al Qaeda surfaced as a principle enemy after 9/11 the influence war was turned on its head. While we had dealt with non-traditional forces such as the Viet Cong, the notion of a global, decentralized enemy was a new one. While military leaders are ensconced in a formal hierarchy, terrorist organizations such as AQ were a mass of amorphous decentralized cells.

The book proposes three strategies for defeating starfish:

1. Changing Ideology

Life is hopeless vs. there is hope, I can make my life better

2. Centralize them

Change from no hierarchy to some form of top down. Provides resources to the formerly resource poor leaders so that they become more fixated on using the resources for reward, etc.

3. Decentralize yourself – if you can’t beat’em join’em

Just how relevant are these suggestions to PSYOP/MISO?

For one thing PSYOP must work hand in glove with the Embassy Team and Civil Affairs to help eliminate or minimize the root causes that are stimulating the opposing force. By eliminating or reducing the root causes, the effect is to change the environment and with it the ideology driving the starfish.

Secondly, I believe MISO needs to be as decentralized as possible to be able to tailor the influence approach to the target at hand. However, we need to empower MISO soldiers with the resources needed to do the job whether this is a robust ‘reachback’ or cultural and linguistic resources or support of local credible spokespeople.

As we ponder which organization will be the Branch Proponent we need to take a serious look a doctrine and learn how to deal with the starfish and what other creatures come up.

PSYOP/MISO: Battlefield Wild Card

I have just finished my 4^th iteration of being the PSYOP/MISO SME for an exercise for Public Affairs Officers. The scenario is that a Joint Task Force (JTF) is deployed in a semi-permissive tactical environment to provide Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) at the invitation of the government of a nation stricken by an earthquake.

(Photo source: http://www.uhsda.com/)

While the actual tactical situation is merely the backdrop for the real purpose of the exercise – exposing junior PAOs to life on a Joint Staff commanded by a 2*, I was able to give some thought to how MISO would support an actual operation of this kind especially if the tactical environment turned ugly.

As long as the environment is permissive, meaning no one is shooting at us, MISO functions primarily as an information channel. Loudspeaker teams with appropriate speakers or recorded messages would broadcast locations and schedules for aid distribution. Host nation and JTF print resources could be used to print with signs directing people to the aid resources and educational messages designed to teach people how to reduce their susceptibility to water borne diseases like Cholera and Typhus. Loudspeakers could also be used to broadcast into a collapsed building to assure the victims that help was there.

What happens when the bad guys start shooting? There is a great deal of doctrine and precedent on how Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT) support the CDR in a traditional force on force situation. There’s a lot less out there on how TPT would be involved against insurgents in localized firefights – or if they would be at all.

Given that many insurgent operations are ‘hit and run’ – it strikes me that the MISO emphasis must be more on the long-term campaign, the one designed to convince adversaries to join the good guys. Perhaps there is a place for deception in making the bad guys think we have more resources than we do, or to induce them to direct their firepower at the wrong targets.

In some situations MISO could give way to EW and CNO under the right circumstances and for the proper targets. These IO options can generate the positive psychological effects as direct PSYOP/MISO.

Reader comment invited.

After Afghanistan Where Does PSYOP Go Next And How Do You Train For It?

OBL is dead and Congress is clamoring for a re-evaluation of the strategy in Afghanistan. While I’m clearly not an expert on that theater, and once I again I disclose that I’ve never been there, it strikes me that killing one guy, even one very important guy, should not call for a re-make of a strategy if the strategy was any good in the first place. Having said that – what’s next after OBL and Afghanistan?

(Photo Source: http://www.trafficsign.us/w24.html)

I believe that demand for contractors can be seen as a leading edge intelligence indicator of US involvement. I picked a well known contractor at random and tallied the total of openings by location: Iraq 42, Afghanistan 39, Kuwait 10, Africa 9, Balkans 5, and Latin America 2. Let me stress that these are not PSYOP/MISO openings, but general openings.

What does all this mean? I believe it means a couple of things. First of all, even with the end of ‘conflict’ in Iraq there is still a great demand for American support. While the number of troops might decline overall, there will be a constant need for Military Information Support Operations to inform and influence the population. The numbers in Kuwait and Africa portend that, like the Balkans, any one of a number of countries can go to crap in a New York minute.

For one reason or another we don’t seem to be training foreign forces on PSYOP/MISO which means that “we” have to do it.

Given that Reserves will bear the brunt of any support effort to the Big Army, or General Purpose Force, it follows that a major US military commitment any where will more than likely call for Reserve PSYOP participation sooner or later.

Can you train as you fight if you have no idea where you are going? In certain things I believe you can. Personal conditioning, marksmanship, combat driving and survival skills are paramount. The nuances of climate may have to depend on best guess, but it wouldn’t be crazy to train for extreme heat or cold and high altitudes.

From a technical perspective, Internet PSYOP as well as TV will be employed in selected AOs and it is possible to train on editing, composing, etc. As for being ready to go anywhere at any time, given the amount of potential locations and the language/culture variations, I think this may be difficult. Having said that perhaps learning about historically disadvantaged locations such as Africa and keeping up to date on the latest regimes in Latin American and perhaps ‘the stans’ and their brethren may make good sense. Comments invited.

Bin Laden and PSYOP: Now What?

The successful raid in Pakistan conveyed several key messages: the US has a very long memory, the US will use time and treasure to hunt down their enemies, it is only a matter of time and or money before anyone can be successfully targeted and the President knows how to capitalize on military successes for the country’s and his own benefit.

Photo Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/30227225@N05/with/5362216438/

The Bin Laden raid can clearly be used as evidence in campaigns against other high profile targets. Campaigns like these would work best with frequency over a number of media. Individuals who rely on electronic communications, especially smart phones would be really good targets of this kind of campaign.

Models for this type of campaign include the recent examples of cyber bullying that have taken place in various parts of the country where teenagers have been subjected to a relentless barrage of messages and perhaps videos. Social networking sites of the target can be likewise exploited.

On a more global level, OBL has been elevated to martyr in various circles and his death the latest cause celeb as to why the West and all it stands for should be destroyed with no mercy. This Blog doesn’t usually deal with kinetic operations, but I would like to note that I believe that it is reasonable to assume that there will be independent, mini-Mumbai like attacks against soft targets in the West sooner rather than later.

Tactical PSYOP/MISO communicators should consider using the OBL raid when appropriate – I suspect this would be most effective in face to face communications.

Half-Hearted White House Poses PSYOP Problem

The US “strategy” in Libya can best be termed bizarre. The Obama White House dawdled at the prospect of military support to the rebels (perhaps with good reason since nobody really seems to know who they are), then committed US air power before bowing out of the lead and now plans on engaging Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) (see http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15024270,00.html which is also the photo source).

This kind of wishy washy approach plays havoc with PSYOP/MISO. A core PSYOP principle is that effective PSYOP is based on truth. This leads to the parenting principle about threats and punishment. Don’t threaten a punishment unless you can and are willing to carry it out. As the Obama administration tries to convince the world, itself and the American public that Iraq is over and Afghanistan is turning the corner, they now need to justify another Billion or two in the face of one of the worst budget crises in our history.

Should the President decided to commit ground troops (which is not very prudent in my opinion at this point), Senator McCain notwithstanding), will AFRICOM have the resources to orchestrate a credible influence campaign? Where will the MISO troops come from and how long can they support the operation? Is the country prepared for another min-Iraq or worse yet a hybrid of Afghanistan and Somalia should the Qadaffi government crumble?

We are always accused of being ready to fight the last war. Libya appears to be the next one, and perhaps the model for one or two thereafter – let’s consider all the effects and be ready ahead of time for just once!

Libya: Who is in charge of the attack? An important PSYOP/MISO Issue.

My time in Bosnia during 1997 – 1998 taught me quite a bit about the practical aspects of running an alliance. In some respects an alliance is like a family and not everyone gets an equal vote all the time. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) had the advantage of being a NATO entity. While this wasn’t a perfect construct, at least there were some basic rules over who did what, how the force was organized, funding mechanisms and doctrine.

Photo Source: Wired; URL below

According to President Obama: “First of all, I think it’s very easy to square our military actions and our stated policies. Our military action is in support of an international mandate from the Security Council that specifically focuses on the humanitarian threat posed by Colonel Qaddafi to his people. Not only was he carrying out murders of civilians but he threatened more. He said very specifically, we will show no mercy to people who lived in Benghazi.

And in the face of that, the international community rallied and said we have to stop any potential atrocities inside of Libya, and provided a broad mandate to accomplish that specific task. As part of that international coalition, I authorized the United States military to work with our international partners to fulfill that mandate.” (source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/21/president-obama-answers-questions-libya-testament-men-and-women-uniform; accessed 22 March 2011).

Let’s take a look at a couple of key phrases here: “an international mandate from the Security Council”, “international coalition”; and “work with our international partners”. Does this mean that the Secretary General of the UN is the “Commander” of the Libyan mission? Do all of our international partners get to task our aircraft and prioritize targets?

The NY Times reported that the US is moving swiftly to hand command over to our allies (see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/22libya.html?_r=1; accessed 22 March 2011). Does this mean a French or British flag officer will have opcon (operational control) over US forces in the Med?

Does this ersatz coalition have a formal HQ with a combined, joint Military Information Support task force? Are the influence operational objectives clear? Has the coalition taken the necessary time and effort to craft a coordinated information operations effort to include Computer Network Operations, Public Affairs and EW to maximize the effectiveness of the fighting force and minimize the danger to friendly forces?

Frankly I believe many of these questions remained unanswered as our planes streak over Libyan skies. At first blush it would appear that the President has moved swiftly to answer the political mail, and is now trying to minimize his and our collective exposure.

As with any operation, plans don’t often survive first contact and there is already fog in the media. The President implied that the US took the lead because “Our ability to take out, for example, Qaddafi’s air defense systems are much more significant than some of our other partners.” (same source as above) and that fine military authority, “Wired” reported on secret PSYOPs and Commando Solo (see http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/secret-libya-psyops/).

If there’s a formidable air defense system, you wouldn’t be seeing Commando Solo flying around. And, by the way, where is the funding for this operation coming from as the defense budget continues to get pruned.

Overall it would appear that we are potentially on the precipice of yet another military mission in a Muslim nation with the potential of fanning the flames of other conflicts and perhaps offering an excuse to jump start fundamentalist efforts in other parts of the globe.

I applaud President Obama for his nimbleness, but let’s hope we don’t get burned jumping over the latest candlestick.

Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy and PSYOP

The last week in May 2010 is a particularly complex time. Headlines included the sending of 1,200 National Guard troops to the Mexican Border and continued angst over the alleged North Korean sinking of a South Korean Naval Vessel.

However, from a long term perspective, the quiet White House release of the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United Stations. The NSS is the mother ship of security strategies from which all others such as the Defense Strategy, the Military Strategy, the Counter Terrorist Strategy, et al will be developed and with which they must conform. (See http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf)

There were some key themes that will have a significant impact on PSYOP and PSYOP forces during Obama’s administration tenure and perhaps beyond.


1. Alliances and Partnerships
While the President reserved the right to act unilaterally when necessary, he made it very clear that it was intent to capitalize on old alliances and new partnerships. His goal of strengthening and modernizing old ones while building new and deeper partnerships is complemented by stated tasks of training and assisting security systems (and forces) in at-risk states.

These notions combined with increased military to military contacts will no doubt put pressure on PSYOP to operate more frequently in a combined (multi-national) environment and to provide training, advice and assistance to forces of other nations that the President deems are important to US interests, values and international order.

2. Holistic Governmental Actions
The President made it very clear that he wants the Executive branch t to develop integrated plans and approaches. This includes more aggressive diplomacy where diplomats complement military forces no matter where they are needed and the ability to harness experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity (via development efforts).

The NSS also plans to employ economic and financial transactions as means to advancing US interests and promoting US values.
The bottom line here is a greater demand for Civil Affairs (CA) capability and a critical need for CA and PSYOP to work together seamlessly in a variety of environments.

3. Engagement Across the Spectrum of Conflict
The NSS points out other goals the cut across the spectrum of conflict:
- Disrupt, dismantle and defeat AQ and its violent extremist affiliates in AF, Pak.
- Pursue sustainable and responsible security systems in at risk stakes
- Prevent the emergence of conflict
- Counter violent extremism and insurgency
- Foster security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict
- Stop the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials
- Resolve and prevent conflicts and heal their wounds.

PSYOP is a non-lethal battlefield multiplier. It is also a critical means by which the USG can communicate messages designed to catalyst behavior in conformance with the goals of the NSS. PSYOP is the means by which civilian populations are informed of CA activities and is a critical capability in gaining and holding information dominance which is a prerequisite success on the global state in the 21st Century.
Unfortunately the PSYOP community has not shown the ability to influence law makers and senior members of the Executive Branch of its importance. The need to influence has been overshadowed by the specter of cyber this and cyber that. While CA enjoys the benefits of a cadre of retired flag officers and a resourced association, PSYOP does not.

The ill timed split of PSYOP across two general officer commands (USSOCOM and USARC) needs to be unwound immediately and SWC needs to step up to the plate, as Regimental Home Base Commander and act as a catalyst to strengthen PSYOP’s clout inside the military and position a robust association to ‘educate’ the Executive and Legislative branches.

Attacking The Terrorist Mind

The January 10, 2010 NY Times features an article entitled: “The Terrorist Mind: An Update” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/weekinreview/10kershaw.html?scp=1&sq=terrorist%20mind&st=cse)

The author analyzes works by a number of academicians who have studied the terrorist mind. According to the article, Dr. John Horgan of International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State is credited with leading “much of the research into what is known as disengagement – a terrorist’s departure from the organization”. Dr. Horgan claims that there are a couple of key reasons why terrorists leave the movement. This is not to say they abandon their radical views, but rather they have left the group and renounced violence.

Leading reasons include: the small groups they are in “are rife with jealousies and personal competition; life is boring; pressure of maintaining a double life is too exhausting. Others include “aging out” where the member has grown to the point of wanting more stability and perhaps starting a family. Some may sense that the group’s goals are unattainable and/or they have reached their moral limit. Others are dismayed to find elderly and children engaged in battles.

From a PSYOP perspective we want to stimulate and reinforce these views. The Internet is likely the ideal medium to transmit dramatizations and perhaps ‘testimonials’ form former terrorists (to include Taliban) that underscore the feelings noted above.

The Internet has been cited as a key medium for recruitment for Al Qadea and Others (see NY Times, December 31, 2009, “Focus on Internet Imams As Recruiters for Al Qaeda” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01imam.html?scp=1&sq=Focus%20on%20Internet%20Imams&st=cse)) Consequently it is logical to assume that the same medium would be the way to reach the terrorist member and transmit messages reinforcing the desire to leave the movement.

Chatrooms and other virtual meeting places need to be designed that can attract terrorist recruits and members and that offer messages stimulating disengagement. In my view it makes sense to post messages from various sources on websites known to espouse terrorism. I am a believer of using the Internet like the ocean. Taking down offending websites is like playing Whack A Mole because new ones will pop as quickly as others are taken down.

It seems to me that these kinds of operations need to be joint (more than one service) and ideally combined (more than 1 nation). Furthermore the best work product is likely to come from a combination of military, diplomatic and civilian minds – groups designed to think like the customer with the native linguistic ability to carry the creativity and disengagement messages forward in multiple directions on the Internet and elsewhere.