Cyber PSYOP

There is a veritable frenzy of cyber command activity. The New York Times reported that the President will constitute a new Command, likely to be headed by LTG Alexander, Director of NSA. The new Command will have responsibility for “attack and defense strategies in Cyberspace warfare” according to the Times. (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html?_r=1&hp)


Formation of the command is part of an extensive effort orchestrated by President Obama. By forming the command the President hopes to consolidate all cyber military efforts. This military consolidation is complementary to the new direction on civilian side created as a result of the “60 Day Review” completed for the White House on 17 April by acting Senior Director of Cybersecurity for the NSC, Melissa Hathaway (see http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/AdvisorsToConductImmediateCyberSecurityReview/)

Information technology (IT), especially as interconnected by the Internet, is the electronic lifeblood of developed countries. The critical IT infrastructure and key resources of nations are inviting targets because their damage or destruction would go to the nation’s very will to fight.

To say that doctrine with respect to cyber attacks is nascent would be kind. The fact is that the doctrine is either extremely highly classified or just plain doesn’t exist. Legal and political issues cloud a nation’s ability to respond in kind to a cyber attack. Notwithstanding a variety of computer ‘war games’, the US government’s use of cyber attack is not without precedent.

The NY Times article talks about hacking into Al Qaeda computers to alter “information that drove them into American gun sights”.

While I applaud the President’s efforts and can heartily concur that cyber attack and defense need to be placed under a single command – where does that leave PSYOP?

I have argued for several years that Computer Network Operations (CNO) can be an effective PSYOP weapon. It is also clear that the Internet has become a wide open medium for PSYOP messages whether websites, e-mail, SMS or even Twitters. However, there is no clarity nor comparable unity of command with regard to cyber PSYOP.

At the very least the new command should have a robust PSYOP element, likely headed by a Colonel. This element should be linked to the Joint Staff, SOCOM, ASOC and other service PSYOP Commands to insure that there is uniformity of messaging and that there is a mechanism in place to deconflict cyber and PSYOP activities for maximum reinforcing effect.

Another rub is the nature of cyber activities undertaken by the Combatant Commanders. Each is running their own website and perhaps other activities such as Blogs, Social networking pages, etc. Somehow there needs to be a central inventory of all these activities and a ‘Cyber PSYOP Operations Center’ (CPOC) that can provide a global view of these activities much as corporate marketing is responsible for providing a global picture of corporate marketing activities.

A Cyber Command is a good start, but let’s hope PSYOP is not left out in the cold.

Jamming The Taliban: A Good First Step?

The Wall Street Journal reported that US Forces are jamming Taliban FM radios and attempting to deny the Taliban use of Internet chat rooms. (See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124001042575330715.html) The 18 April 09 article describes the use of jamming, more properly Electronic Counter Measures or ECM as PSYOP.

Photo of Army Tactical Jammer AN MLQ-24: http://www.emersons.net/worth-remembering-the-anmlq-34-tacjam.html

Technically speaking the use of Electronic Warfare (EW) to deny an adversary their communications is a PSYACT , an act designed to have a psychological impact. In the case of jamming, it is sometimes argued that the act of jamming confirms the success of the target’s efforts. In this case CENTCOM believes that denying the enemy their ability to communicate through FM broadcasting outweighs indirectly telling them that they have been successful.

This certainly makes sense since as we say in the law biz – res ipsa locquitir – the fact speaks for itself. The Taliban have been very successful in securing local support through thuggery. The use of village based FM radio is certainly a force multiplier from an information engagement perspective.

The geography of Afghanistan, like the geography of Bosnia is daunting. Mountains and valleys separate the country like the nooks and crannies of a Thomas’ English muffin. Independent FM radio stations are the ways that villages often hear the news and have given the Taliban a very cost effective medium for their messages.

Normally coalition forces seek their own influence by setting up their own FM radio stations. These stations generally offer a mix of music and messages and are designed to blend into the local radio spectrum. In Bosnia there was a NATO radio station in Sarajevo that covered that area with FM broadcasts. This station was manned and supervised by the HQ of the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF). This was proper in Bosnia since Sarajevo was not only the national capital, but a sort of city-state in its own right.

The case of Afghanistan is far more complex than Bosnia since there are few population centers and so many isolated villages. Conceptually each village requires special attention. The article talks about Chamkani, (readers interested in a 2007 first person account of Firebase Chamkani can check out: http://www.house.gov/marshall/Chamkani_Codel-pamphlet2007.pdf) and the voice of Chamkani a radio station covering the local area. Special Operations Forces have devoted significant attention to this are as documented in Special Operations magazine (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/09Jan.pdf)

The bottom line here is, if you are going to deny the enemy the radio (or television airwaves) then you need to fill in the vacuum you have created by harnessing them yourself.

Closing down the Internet communications is another matter. Somewhat akin to the game “Whack a Mole”, this requires more than content, it requires technical acumen and resources. Whereas FM radio operations can be delegated down to the PSYOP Platoon Level in many cases, this is not so with the Internet. Higher echelon capabilities will need to be employed to effectively deal with Internet communications such as websites and chat rooms. Further, since the Internet is borderless, there may be legal complications resulting from websites or chat rooms based in countries with strict laws regulating interference with computers and networks.

Arggh! PSYOP and Pirates

Somehow it seems fitting to Blog about PSYOP and piracy on the day that US taxes are due. The Pirates and the Navy’s recent rescue of a Merchant Marine Skipper have been all over the media. The pirates, however, undaunted by the sniper induced deaths of the colleagues, continue to ply their trade at sea capturing several more ships.

Sooner or later the subject of information engagement, especially PSYOP, will come to the fore. In a 4 hour drive today I pondered to say about the subject and while I don’t have an immediate or short term fixes I have some observations and recommendations. Since I’m not actively involved in today’s operations I have no personal knowledge of what is already going on, so here’s my two cents. It is important for me to point out early on that I don’t see the “Pirates” as a top down formal hierarchy, but as a loosely configured nest of criminal gangs where they have likely taken formal or informal steps to divide territories and potential targets among them.

1. Put The Navy In Charge

First of all the Navy is the lead and the Naval Special Warfare Command (http://www.navsoc.navy.mil/default.htm) should be the designated proponent for information engagement doctrine and TTP concerning pirates. Information engagement against this form of enemy must include the full range of options: PSYOP, CNO, Deception, EW, and deception. Furthermore, the Navy should immediately commission a study of pirate activity over the past 5 years to be able to dissect past attacks to develop taxonomy of the enemy TTP and a range of courses of action to employ against them.

Pirate operations should be included in any upcoming reviews and enhancement of maritime strategy for littoral areas as well as traditional ‘blue water’ operations.

2. Training

Naval officer and NCO training, especially surface warfare, electronic warfare, intelligence, and communications Navy Occupational Standards (NOS) should all receive cross training in the form of a mandatory information engagement module with a variety of case studies designed to challenge the students and incorporate a wide range of possibilities.

3. Numbered Fleet Ramp Up

Each numbered fleet should have a reinforced Information Engagement section headed by a Commander (05) with experience in the full range of information engagement operations. If the Navy is unable to fill these billets, then consideration should be given to rotating tours for Army PSYOP personnel, and in the event neither is available, retired personnel or contractors could be employed if necessary.

When necessary consider augmenting specific information engagement resources with other personnel who may be qualified by NOS, civilian expertise, cultural knowledge and/or other factors.

Numbered fleets should prepare information engagement contingency plans and should carefully consider who communications with media (especially non-US media) and what messages concerning the current action should be transmitted. This recommendation means that PAO is a critical element in dealing with the pirate enemy and must be given as much consideration as when to deploy snipers.

4. Include the Marines

In addition to Navy actions, Marines stationed on board vessels should be qualified in Marine Corps PSYOP TTP (which is the same as the Army’s).

As always, reader comments are invited.

The Best PSYOP Requires Innovative People

The working group for the PSYOP Branch Medal, now dubbed the McClure Medal, heard a number of suggestions as to who should be the honor’s namesake. One of the name’s that came up was new to me – Arthur T. Hadley. Seems Hadley was responsible for putting loud speakers on tanks in WWII as a means to get the Germans to surrender. (See his book Heads or Tails and/or a 2006 article in the New York Times where he worked (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/25hadley.html?_r=1). Also check out “Combat Loudspeakers”, an excellent article by LTC (R) Dennis Bartow, President of the PSYOP Organization at www.psywarrior.com/combatloudspeakers.html

Photo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rS8nqBuvrBo
Dubbed the “talking tank”, the weapon’s principle was a simple one: bring the information weapon into the battle. It seems logical enough -- an enemy’s motivation to surrender is in the heat of battle when the danger is greatest. Hadley employed the appeal of the Geneva Convention’s protection as his key message.

One of PSYOP’s greatest challenges today appears to be applying information power against the terrorist strongholds along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. These are denied areas and the exact location of a target at any one time is likely to be elusive. If NATO forces could regularly ‘attack’ the hostiles with information in these highly elusive lairs, the impact is likely to be profound.

The headlines are filled with comments concerning drone killing attacks (for example see: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9903E4D9153BF936A15751C0A96F9C8B63&scp=6&sq=pakistan%20remotely%20civilians%20protest&st=cse). Even successful kinetic attacks can go wrong because the enemy is perceived to have an information advantage and able to turn most attacks into offenses against civilians raising the hackles of the population and negating some of the positive impact.
Going to back to Hadley for a moment, the first article I cited contains this description: “Our broadcasts, then, took on the following structure: first, we’d outline what we knew about the German position; second, we’d describe the weight of artillery and air power that was about to fall on them; finally, we’d end with assurances that those troops who surrendered would be well treated under the Geneva Conventions.”

Desert Storm showed the success of a ‘direct mail campaign’ where ordnance and leaflets were mixed in a dramatic application of Hadley’s WWII formula. Suppose we could do the same in the Afghani theater, except we mix up the payloads so that the enemy isn’t really sure whether they will be hit by explosives or leaflets or electronic messages or ‘greeting cards’ with pre-recorded messages.

Of course there are some caveats. First of all the campaign must have a desired call to action - we want the bad guys to do something. Can we give potential sympathizers a way out? Can fighters defect from these camps without being shot? Developing an exit strategy for our potential targets is perhaps one of the more difficult aspects of this idea – but it is certainly worthy of thought as is the modification of airborne EW platforms for tactical PSYOP purposes such as this one.

Comments invited.

Afghan Poppy PSYOP

The Associated Press ran a story on 30 March “US launches new fight against Afghan drug trade”,




Photo Source: Daily Mail, October 13, 2008

see(http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hCUxKbunroDLpz-QKfiKnqI0iAWQD978J8OG0).

The latest approach to negating the flow of money to the Taliban and Al Qaida is much like the DEA’s similar campaigns in Latin America. In addition to attacking the supply of opium and driving up its price, the strategy will also concentrate on drug dealer money laundering.

At first glance this appears to be a win – win situation. Not only do you reduce the amount of drugs in circulation, but you strangle the money faucet to terrorist organizations. Success in Latin America is cited as the model outcome.

I’m not convinced it is as cut and dry as it appears. The crux of my discontent is my continuing crusade for a bottom up information engagement campaign. In this case the bottom of the pile is the farmer. The AP story begs the question of the farmer and concentrates on the Obama Administration’s strategy’s emphasizing the supply and money chains.

Long term problems with drugs will persist as long as there is big money to be paid for drugs and the culture and economic well being of the farmer are dependent on opium. The Department of Agriculture needs to be energized to develop a systematic crop replacement for opium. This replacement needs to be cognizant of the growing environment in Afghanistan and the world demand for whatever the replacement crop needs to be. In addition the crop should mirror growing seasons and be highly adaptive to the climate and soil conditions where poppies are currently cultivated.

The program should also include short term financial support and/or supply of food and other items that would be needed by the farmers while the new crop is growing and the system to harvest and market it matures.

From an information view point a classic marketing ‘teaser’ campaign where pictures of a future secure and prosperous life without the terrorists, Taliban or even unwelcome outsiders of any kind controlling the farmer’s destiny. The messages would stress the increased welfare of the farmers and the positives attributes of the new crop such as positive growing characteristics and a higher income potential.

Unless there is research needs to confirm that there is value to messages concerning the reduction of suffering by elimination of the drug trade, I would not employ these messages, not even in passing.

In short the combination of agricultural insight, micro-financing and tribally tuned information engagement is the right way to deal with the Afghan opium supply and a strategy that has a far better chance of long term success.

Good News Can Be Good PSYOP When Properly Employed

The Honolulu Star reported on some recent comments by the Brigade CDR of 3rd BCT of the 2th Infantry. (see http://www.starbulletin.com/news/20090322_progress_in_Iraq_pleases_schofield_brigade_leader.html) in its March 22 edition. (Photo: http://www.arcent.army.mil/cflcc_today/2009/february/images/feb03_06/06_03.jpg)


The Bde CDR, COL Walter Piatt, proclaimed good news based on his experience in his current and previous tours in Iraq. The positive news includes increased oil production and exporting from the Baiji oil refinery benefiting the province and the country. Piatt also noted construction efforts on al-Askari, or the Golden Mosque. The Mosque, one of the holiest shrines in Iraq was attacked several times in 2006 (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/gallery/070613/GAL-07Jun13-77880/index.html) so that rebuilding the Mosque points to much progress according to COL Piatt.

While I am not now, nor have I ever been to Iraq, I wonder how much of this progress is documented by Iraqi media and how much, if any, is covered in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Surely the progress noted here as well as market openings, school building and other hallmarks of positive movement are being observed elsewhere. They could serve as evidence of the country’s growing stabilization and could also offer hope and inspiration for those in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

However, while COL Piatt and the Honolulu Star are credible in Hawaii, different sources would need to be leveraged to make the most of the good news to other audiences beyond the Aloha State. These sources would be those that are relied upon by the various target audiences.
Ideally those sources would be a complementary mix that could include several broadcast and print media. Furthermore, it would be ideal if local peer leaders could espouse the praises of the progress and exhort their local population to follow the examples of the Iraqis.

A less powerful, but workable alternative is to present the progress examples in a neutral light, documenting the success with pictures and quotes from those in the province, or respected international leaders commenting on the specific items of progress.

Perhaps it would also be useful for educational purposes if COL Piatt were interviewed and the interviews forwarded through the Army Office of Congressional Liaison or perhaps through private entities such as the PSYOP Regiment or PSYOP Associations. The success stories would serve to reinforce Congressional understanding of the role of PSYOP subsequent to combat and could help to positively influence funding and organizational decisions. SWC has provided similar educational materials such as their recent video on “Why We Fight” which documents efforts surrounding the GWOT.

In any event, good news, especially good news that could be documented represents good PSYOP when used judiciously through appropriate credible sources.

President Plans Diplomatic Surge in Afghanistan

The March 18 edition of the Washington Post reported that “A civilian "surge" of hundreds of additional U.S. officials in Afghanistan would accompany the already approved increase in U.S. troop levels” (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/18/AR2009031802313.html)

If this comes to pass it will be a giant step forward in Afghanistan, and, in my view, much needed shift in emphasis for much of the USG strategy in troubled nations. Key of course will be security and coordination between DoS and DoD personnel.

While the article states that a heavy concentration of these diplomats will remain at the Embassy in Kabul, there is also mention of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), a concept which is generally regarded as successful in Iraq. Given the nature of Afghanistan as noted in my previous posts – the more that are out in the villages – the merrier and the more likely USG objectives are to be obtained.

Since I’ve commented on negative aspect’s of USG efforts, I felt it was important to point out this positive step.