Information Support Operations An Afterthought At Best for Homeland Security

On May 21 & 22, 2011 I was an evaluator for an exercise which took place in a major city. The city is the hub of an 8 city Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Federal government grant money paid most of the bills and sponsors took care of most of the rest.

The exercise involved 4 Emergency Operation Centers scattered over the area and was a series of ‘lanes’ designed to test Police SWAT (Special Weapons & Tactics), Fire, Urban Search & Rescue (USR), Emergency Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Each lane was coordinated by one agency and evaluators came from far and wide.

By design, the event is overall very low key, although there was an initial press conference attended by the city’s mayor and other dignitaries which resulted in some coverage prior to the event.

Media access was limited during the exercise and there were scant posters or other indications of locations or tactical lanes. In short it was akin to a military operation where the name of the game is to keep the public out of the way to minimize interference with the operation and maximize Operational Security (OPSEC).

While I can understand this posture in terms of external information support, I felt I was in a time warp when it came to the exercise play. There was absolutely no attention to the potential negative effect of information operations either intentional or accidental. Just as in my early Army exercise (PRC-6 anyone?) days, guidance was put out that communications are not to be interfered with because it was hard enough to communicate during the height of battle without someone messing with you.

More importantly the notions of misinformation, hostile crowds and pesky reporters were not considered at all. As for presence, there was only a single Public Affairs Officer at the central EOC with a few of the agency PAOs training their principals, but not actively involved in the exercise.

On the Command information side, EOC communications were via a chat like software package called WebEOC. No video and not very much contemporaneous reporting from other sources contributed to the CDR’s situational awareness.

Given the 24 hour news cycle, the persistence of paparazzi, and the ubiquity of cell phone video cameras – this is a mistake. Our enemies are clearly not stupid and are likely surveilling soft targets as you are reading this. The inability to provide information support operations in homeland security is a vulnerability that is open to exploitation by our enemies. DOD and DHS need to take the initiative and incorporate the informational aspects of homeland security into their efforts and as key elements in the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) and a key factor in determining if the government got its money’s worth for its grant funding.

PSYOP and Iraq: It Ain’t Over Yet

Notwithstanding declarations touting the end of combat operations in Iraqi, the influence war is far from over. Seemingly coordinated attacks across the country are sending forceful and graphic messages to Iraqis that their lives remain perilous. (Photo: NY Times)

With the withdrawal of the Warfighter, influence operations must take on a new flavor and tempo. Unlike Afghanistan which is mostly tribal and rural, Iraq has significant urban centers. These centers are served by local and regional media to include TV. In many quarters of these cities there are even likely (I haven’t been there so I can’t say for sure) Internet cafes and ISPs serving a growing body of Internet and smart phone users.

Iraq serves as a laboratory for future conflict. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) must now TRULY be in support – but this time of diplomatic efforts to thwart the insurgency and raise the conscious of Iraqis. Security is no longer just the problem of government. Citizens need to be more vigilant and supportive of their fledgling police and security forces. Aggressive influence operations are needed to mobilize the support of the population.

The people of Iraq need to dry up the sea of support that allows the insurgents to move freely. The government should help the process by maintaining truly anonymous channels of communications to allow citizens to provide tips on the enemy without fear of retribution.

DOD information support can and ought to come in several ways: First, PSYOP personnel can augment and assist State Department through the embassy and its outreach efforts. PAO personnel can facilitate the Iraqi media and in concert with the State Department, aid in the maturing of a potent and objective media that can inform and help the Iraqis defeat their insurgent. Other avenues could include training Iraqi MISO and PAO personnel and facilitating working arrangements between these Iraqi government personnel with local and regional media.

In addition to these programs, Strategic Communications efforts aimed at the Region should be undertaken via the Internet and other channels designed to ‘reach the street’.

The bottom line is that the influence war needs to ramp up even more than during combat and that all government instrumentalities need to be brought to bear under a clearly articulated strategy and with a mindset to learning on the fly. Lessons learned over the next few years should not have to be relearned in new influence battlefields where ever they may be.

MISO: Is it soup yet?

With lightning and a clap of thunder from the Pentagon, PSYOP is to be stricken from the Defense system just as the name Moses was removed from the legacy of Egypt. The Secretary of Defense has approved the recommendation to change PSYOP to Military Information Support and/to Operations (MISO). The Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, Jr. has directed his staff to develop and orchestrate a plan designed to replace “PSYOP” with MISO in the Army (and presumably DOD) lexicon and branches.
Photo source: http://www.ecosalon.com/simple-miso-soup/

The name change follows the recommendation of the DSLC or Defense Senior Leader’s Conference. This is a conference co-hosted by SecDef (Secretary of Defense) and the CJCS (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Attendees typically include the Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs and elements of the Strategic Planning Council. The meetings are held three times a year (Jan, May and Sep) and are executed by the Director, Joint Staff. For some key bullet points on DSLC see: http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/dmcs/Routine%20Reports%20&%20Meetings/DSLC.htm.
The name change has been an emotional topic and has been bandied about for years. On the one hand, “PSYOP” has a long and distinguished history with traditions and a nascent branch espirit de corps. On the other, demand for PSYOP forces is escalating and the optempo is breathtaking.
Lack of emphasis of influence operations by senior combat CDR and the bifurcation of PSYOP forces between SOF and Reserve chains of command continues to hobble efforts to optimize and standardize PSYOP training and operations. Key challenges are: elevate the status and importance of information support (PSYOP/PAO) to the force; optimize force development, command and control to deal with burgeoning demand, provide for future conflicts where cyber influence – especially on non-state actors is critical.

Perhaps the name change signals a renaissance of the influence profession and missions.

It is past time for the influence aspect of military operations to assume its rightful role as a leading element in today’s force. This implies strong senior leadership support in terms of resourcing and fast tracking the policy and doctrinal changes that are needed in today’s world.

The name change is a perfect reason for renewed efforts to ‘educate’ Congress on what we do why MISO is an important instrument of government power. As a non-lethal battlefield multiplier MISO can more positively impact world opinion of US efforts than kinetic operations.

As good soldiers we have been given a lawful order and must execute it. We need to put aside any personal feelings we might have about the loss of tradition, and consider how we can leverage the name change and the massive activity that is needed to revise ‘the system’ across personnel, operations, training and logistics required to effect the change.

This is also an opportune time for the re-design of the Information Operations (IO) playing and career fields. In particular the need to integrate PAO and MISO as synergistic tools for the CDR is critical. Renaming and repositioning MISO can be a catalytic process to help foster this process.

All of us in the community need to embrace the change regardless of our personal feelings and use this window of opportunity to strengthen the community – perhaps not so much for ourselves, but for those who will come after us.

Yemen: The Next Afghanistan?

I was thinking of giving the Blog two weeks off. After all, it’s Xmas Eve when the pace of government and business slows to almost a halt in the week between Christmas and New Year’s. Well – that was my plan until I came across an article in the December 24, 2009 Arizona Sun: “Airstrike illustrates ballooning US involvement in Yemen” (http://www.azstarnet.com/news/322562)

Map Source: University of Missouri – St. Louis: http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2007/maps/ym-map.gif

The article talks about increased US military activity in Yemen to bolster the effort of the Yemeni government against Al Qaeda. Yemen is nestled to the south of Saudi Arabia and across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia and Djibouti. Little bells should be going off in your head about the volatility of this situation and the particularly interesting nuances in dealing with the neighbors.

First of all whenever there are ‘drones’ there are ‘accidents’ and civilian casualties or at least the allegation of them cannot be far behind. Failure to deal with the backlash will result in negative opinions of the US and the Yemeni government and a decrement of US status in world opinion in general.

In today’s world there are few secrets, US military involvement is not one of them. This is clearly a case where PSYOP needs to be involved. Drones and military action means PSYOP plans, programs and materials need to be in play BEFORE the eventual accident or allegation.

This particular part of the world has gotten it share of notoriety from US involvement in Somalia, pirate activity and even an episode of the adult cartoon series, South Park. The economic clout of Saudi Arabia and their deep connections to Al Qaeda are well known; consequently US actions in this area cannot be successfully accomplished without some type of coordination with the Saudi’s.

Rounding out the mix is Djibouti which has long been under the influence of the French and is considered a strategic bulwark in the area. Actions which poison a potential ally in the region must be considered with caution and long range strategy in mind.
So we find ourselves coming in to the movie theater in the middle of the feature. This playing feature is “US in Yemen” although it seems strangely like the movie we just saw: “US in Afghanistan” and we didn’t much care for that one.

My best wishes to my brothers and sisters in the PSYOP Community and a special thank you to those of you who are serving in harm’s way at this time of year. May 2010 be a breakthrough year that sees a trend to calmness in the world and a reduction in PSYOP Optempo.

Look for the next PSYOP Regimental Blog entry after the 4th of January 2010.

Crucial Time for PSYOP in Afghanistan

The September 3, 2009 Wall Street Journal ran the editorial “The Afghanistan Panic
We can still win a counterinsurgency, but not on the cheap” (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204731804574388483528948634.html) and on the same day, the Washington Post ran a similar editorial: “Setback in Afghanistan: The right response is not a retreat.” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/02/AR2009090203083.html). Other articles include the NY Times of September 7, 2009 “Crux of Afghan Debate: Will More Troops Curb Terror?” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/world/asia/08terror.html?_r=1) and the September 7, 2009 Miami Herald “Clear mission in Afghanistan eludes Obama” (http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/1222430.html)

Photo from the Associated Press (Wall Street Journal) U.S. soldiers secure the site of a suicide attack in Mehterlam, the capital of Laghman province, east of Kabul, Afghanistan on Wednesday, Sept. 2, 2009.

All of these address the need for more ‘boots on the ground’ as a means to implement General McChrystal’s latest strategy which is expected to center on protecting the Afghans against the insurgents.

There is a tendency to compare the current situation in Afghanistan with Iraq before the surge or with the quicksand like conflict known as Viet Nam. Resisting the urge for such comparisons, at least for the moment, let’s start out with what we do know:

1. Combat activity in Afghanistan is higher and more dangerous today than ever before.

2. The Afghan government is viewed as illegitimate and corrupt with the recent election serving more to degrade the government’s reputation with its people rather than bolster it.

3. Afghanistan is a combination of many different localities, each with its own tribal environment, level of security against the insurgent dejure, economic base and perspective on the Americans as the latest military force in the country.

4. The adversaries in Afghanistan have a primitive yet effective Information Operations campaign whereby they can quickly turn incidents such as air strikes and rumors into propaganda vilifying the Americans and reinforcing their high ground positions. Good example is the alleged hospital raid conducted by Americans (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/world/asia/08kabul.html?hpw)

5. Internet and media based messages (good or bad) don’t reach the average Afghan.

Given the above, there are a few things that ought to be done:

1. President Obama has to make it very clear that we are committed for the long haul and that our commitment must be matched by the wholesale cleansing and rededication of the Afghani government.

2. The nature of the mission and strategy in Afghanistan must be clear to everyone, especially to those on the ground so that an aggressive and responsive information engagement strategy and operational plans can be developed to support Commanders on the ground and up the chain of command.

3. DOD should consider fielding more Combat Camera units to capture video on the ground which can be used to confirm actual events and for training/lessons learned.

4. PSYOP needs to be integrated within a real time information engagement operating command section at the highest levels within Afghanistan (military and civilian). This section would have full has media reach via the with PAO. A dimension of the section’s responsibilities ought to be Pan-Regional and include access to all major Arab language outlets to include Aljazeera.

5. Bear in mind that only local relationships and credibility will impact the local village, orchestrate the tools of statecraft at the local level to reinforce the position of local leaders and influencers who are or can be induced to support the Afghani government and US efforts.

6. Should additional troops be assigned, insure that their PSYOP support is increased proportionally as well.

7. Focus on simplicity and attainable objectives at the local level.

Congress and Strategic Communications – Are They On The Right Track?

Today’s Washington Post covered comments made by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees concerning Strategic Communications. Rather than point to failings of the military I believe it shows that President Obama – one of the great info warriors of our time – is paying more attention to communicating with the American Voter than to the world audience. (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701896.html)
(Pictured are Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Representative Ike Skelton, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee)

There were several key points raised by Congress in the article:

1. Strategic Communications Programs are too big, have grown too fast to allow effective oversight, it is impossible to determine whether the efforts are integrated within DOD or with the broader US government” and Pentagon planning “is insufficient compared to the needs.”

2. The military is producing propaganda and other materials that mask US government sponsorship and focus beyond traditional military IO – they are “alarmingly non-military propaganda, public relations and behavioral modification messaging.”

3. There needs to be a new legal review of the law prohibiting strategic communications (or PSYOP) accessible by American audiences.

Presidential Action Need to Command and Control Strategic Communications

Given that funding for Strategic Communications is rapidly approaching $1Billion and that there is no central control or coordination of these efforts across the USG it seems to me Congress is right on. There are other critical issues here though. First of all it appears that the President has not focused any attention on strategic communication. His information advisors are concentrating on making sure the Health Care Agenda goes forward and are paying scant attention to foreign audiences.

The President or his designated Information Leader needs to be the focal point for Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy because our efforts worldwide are moving to information engagement over kinetic operations and this trend is likely to accelerate over time. The President needs to be mindful of the previous criticism of USG information management and the disaster experienced by the Pentagon Office that sought to address this issue.

There needs to be an approved overall USG information engagement strategy and a designated leader for it reporting to the President. Only be applying the principle of unity of Command will the USG be able to effectively manage its information engagement efforts and determine the adequacy of planning and resourcing for the task.

Information Engagement Must Be More Than Military

Congress has missed the boat on the ‘military nature’ of strategic communications. DOD is the critical resource serving as a conduit of information to civilian audiences. US forces abroad are faced with the need to effectively communicate to foreign audiences on their own soil. This messaging is inherently non-military in nature. The so called ‘winning of hearts and mind’ is no longer the leaflet urging surrender. Rather the messages are support your government, help defeat the insurgents, explore possibilities for a more stable economy – the stuff of nation building and bolstering governments rather than the traditional messages associated with combat.

Information Laws Are Obsolete

The Internet Age has brought the world to smart phones, the notion of ideas being bound by traditional national borders is nonsense and the time has come to amend the laws restricting information engagement even if American audiences can receive the messages.

PSYOP and PT Barnum

This week’s lead posting was supposed to be a thoughtful perspective about PSYOP Regimental Week last week at Fort Bragg. However, there is just too good of a target of opportunity to pass up.

Sunday’s (8 June 09) Washington Post featured an article entitled: “A High-Priced Media Campaign That Iraqis Aren't Buying” (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/06/AR2009060602144.html)

The article leads off by describing Baghdad Now, a newspaper that according to the article “has no publicly known editor, no bylines and no ads”. The article continues by saying that the paper is free and distributed by soldiers.

Is this a giant waste of money or not? It should be obvious that Baghdad Now is not a ‘real’ paper because it doesn’t cost anything and doesn’t have any ads, but does that mean the entire effort is a waste of money?

At the risk of sounding like an attorney, it depends. On the one hand there would appear to be a real credibility gap, but on the other, even if only a limited numbers of Iraqi’s read the paper hasn’t it accomplished something? Actually I think the money and energy could be better spent in other ways.

There is a big difference between tactical PSYOP support to a particular operation or set of operations. For example, PSYOP in support of a cordon and search operation has a finite beginning and a clear end point. PSYOP support to induce an enemy force to surrender or to convince insurgents to leave the area also has concrete metes and bounds. These assignments are clearly the meat and potatoes of tactical PSYOP in general and US Army PSYOP in particular.

However, these missions are in stark contrast to the loftier, more strategic goals of supporting the USG’s goals of bolstering the Iraqi government and insuring a secure environment as US troops withdraw.

Publishing a newspaper even for an audience you know well is not easy. The financial woes of the US printed newspaper industry are not exclusively a US problem and attest to the difficulties facing this medium.

Newspapers must give their readers a reason to pick them up. Local papers in particular are succeeding by providing local news that the regional or national media just can’t provide. Local politics, local social events, local religious celebrations and news of one’s neighbors are the stuff of well read local papers. Local papers also prominently publish obituaries because they are important to the community. A newspaper that only published fluff and generalities would quickly find itself out of business.

Of course the Washington Post may not be presenting the full picture, after all their job is also to sell papers and stories about USG efforts that are going well or can’t be connected to the Abu Ghraib debacle won’t sell nearly as well as those that do. Having said, it seems to me that US influence efforts would be better spent in partnership efforts with existing credible media. The resulting product won’t be the everything is rosy approach of Baghdad Now, but the interaction with credible local journalists can ultimately develop into the relationships and journalistic philosophy necessary for an impartial reporting of the news or at least a less judgmental view that doesn’t tar all the actions of the Iraqi government or the US forces trying to support it.

Bad News And Commanders

Getting hit in the media can sometimes have more long term negative effects than physical casualties. The recent credibility debacle arising from airstrikes in Afghanistan is disturbing on many levels and a very good – bad example.

First of all CDR, especially senior ones, should know that, unlike wine or chicken soup – bad news does not get better with age. CDR should also know that sooner or later the ‘truth’ will come out. Consequently it makes sense to know where your bombs are landing and to be ready to admit when things going awry.

Commercial Public Relations (PR) experts will advise to get out in front of the event and take the moral high ground. Admit what happened, take responsibility, describe how you will help to set things right and then detail the steps you are taking to make sure it won’t happen again.

Of course this has to be in the context of not giving the enemy the feeling that you are abandoning the weapons systems and conveying that you won’t hesitate to bring air power to the fight whenever necessary.

Good News Can Be Good PSYOP When Properly Employed

The Honolulu Star reported on some recent comments by the Brigade CDR of 3rd BCT of the 2th Infantry. (see http://www.starbulletin.com/news/20090322_progress_in_Iraq_pleases_schofield_brigade_leader.html) in its March 22 edition. (Photo: http://www.arcent.army.mil/cflcc_today/2009/february/images/feb03_06/06_03.jpg)


The Bde CDR, COL Walter Piatt, proclaimed good news based on his experience in his current and previous tours in Iraq. The positive news includes increased oil production and exporting from the Baiji oil refinery benefiting the province and the country. Piatt also noted construction efforts on al-Askari, or the Golden Mosque. The Mosque, one of the holiest shrines in Iraq was attacked several times in 2006 (see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/gallery/070613/GAL-07Jun13-77880/index.html) so that rebuilding the Mosque points to much progress according to COL Piatt.

While I am not now, nor have I ever been to Iraq, I wonder how much of this progress is documented by Iraqi media and how much, if any, is covered in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Surely the progress noted here as well as market openings, school building and other hallmarks of positive movement are being observed elsewhere. They could serve as evidence of the country’s growing stabilization and could also offer hope and inspiration for those in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

However, while COL Piatt and the Honolulu Star are credible in Hawaii, different sources would need to be leveraged to make the most of the good news to other audiences beyond the Aloha State. These sources would be those that are relied upon by the various target audiences.
Ideally those sources would be a complementary mix that could include several broadcast and print media. Furthermore, it would be ideal if local peer leaders could espouse the praises of the progress and exhort their local population to follow the examples of the Iraqis.

A less powerful, but workable alternative is to present the progress examples in a neutral light, documenting the success with pictures and quotes from those in the province, or respected international leaders commenting on the specific items of progress.

Perhaps it would also be useful for educational purposes if COL Piatt were interviewed and the interviews forwarded through the Army Office of Congressional Liaison or perhaps through private entities such as the PSYOP Regiment or PSYOP Associations. The success stories would serve to reinforce Congressional understanding of the role of PSYOP subsequent to combat and could help to positively influence funding and organizational decisions. SWC has provided similar educational materials such as their recent video on “Why We Fight” which documents efforts surrounding the GWOT.

In any event, good news, especially good news that could be documented represents good PSYOP when used judiciously through appropriate credible sources.

PSYOP and the Reverse Surge in Iraq

President Obama appears to be carrying through on his promise of ‘ending the war’. He recently announced that the combat mission in Iraq will be over by 2010 (see http://www.military.com/news/article/February-2009/obama-sets-august-2010-for-iraq-withdrawl.html among others). Commanders have announced that a drawdown of forces will start this year, assuming that the level of security in Iraq allows it.

(Photo: Courtesy the Whitehouse: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/02/27/Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/)

The President made a number of key points in his 27 February speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina:

“This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.”

“Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end.”

“After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country.”

(Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/)

There is no specific mention of support of an Iraqi journalistic infrastructure, nor are there comments on the future of military information engagement as this transformation unfolds over the next few years. Clearly there is no indication of how State Department Public Diplomacy would ramp up as military capabilities ramp down.

I believe this is likely to be a critical fault of the overall exit strategy and perhaps a negative indication of President Obama’s ability to synergize all of his tools of statecraft simultaneously.

Unfortunately a ramp down in Iraq has been accompanied by a ramp up in Afghanistan, the demand for PSYOP has gone up, the supply however, has not. This is very likely to mean a temptation to draw down the information engagement resources in Iraq and transfer them to Afghanistan or the theater dejure.

The Administration and DOD must recognize that the information engagement does not end because the combat forces leave, nor does it necessarily change direction because the mission has moved from combat to ‘supporting’.

Information engagement, like sales and marketing is a continuous process. This process must be focused and resourced until the desired behavioral objectives have been achieved.

It is possible that DOD has or is developing a strategy to replace military information engagement with contractor resources, however, this hasn’t been made clear nor has there been a major increase in recruiting of PSYOP personnel leaving the military by contractors. While a contractor resource may be able to do the job, one wonders if private industry is the right party to do so. The President has pushed an agenda of engagement and transparency – transitioning from those who serve because they want to, to those who serve because, while they may be no less dedicated than those in uniform, are not graded by an OER, but at the end of the day – by profits may not be the best course of action at this point in time.

PSYOP in Georgia

Fox news has reported that President Bush has ordered the military to spearhead the humanitarian aid missions to Georgia. (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,402982,00.html).

Given the lack of overt USG action on the world stage up to this point and the suffering of the Georgian population it is incumbent on the USG to accompany aid with some strong PSYOP. Large military aircraft are indeed a PSYACT and the sight of a modern day “Berlin Airlift” is likely to be viewed positively, but there has to be more. The USG must orchestrate a multi-pronged information offensive designed to restore the confidence in the US by the Georgian people and the rest of world.

Not only should the aid packages have prominent display of appropriate messages, but media coverage, in particular TV should be encouraged. Viral marketing employing UTube should be aggressively employed. Consideration should be giving to encouraging and authorizing as individuals taking part in the operation to document their personal humanitarian efforts. Putting a face on those being helped is a positive idea.

Logistical and PA support should be provided to the appropriate NGOs. It might also be a good idea to send in a limited number of Civil Affairs teams to do damage assessment and see how the infrastructure of the region has been impacted.

In short the USG needs to get in front of the traditional and new media ASAP. This particular crisis also underscores the need to have properly vetted and prepared contingency PSYOP forces (perhaps consisting of retired and/or civilian personnel) ready to be employed as surge personnel when needed.

Image Courtesy of the RAF (because it was easier to find an appropriate shot from them based on a Google Image Search)

Military Media Analysts – What’s The Beef?

Today’s Defense News ran a story indicating that the Pentagon has suspended its “Media Analyst” program pending an internal review and no doubt based on the hullabaloo created by the story the New York Times ran on April 20.

For those of you unaware of what’s going in – in brief retired military officers have been given ‘special briefings’ by the Pentagon. During these briefings the Pentagon offered up some of their views (let’s call them messages). Interestingly enough these messages reappeared in the statements offered by the ‘analysts’ to the media.

Let’s take a moment to examine the issues:
1. Military analysts received special treatment.
2. The Military analysts were retired military who offered themselves up as experts.
3. The analysts were often defense contractors.
4. The analysts didn’t disclose whether they were speaking on behalf of themselves or the Pentagon.
5. Is it clear that the analysts were in agreement or believed the Pentagon messages or were they just parroting what they heard because of the briefings they received?

1. Special Treatment

The Public Affairs Office (PAO) provides routine and frequent briefings to the media. Since these analysts were regarded as ‘friendly’ they might have great access than media representatives whose past coverage has been less than positive.

However, there is no rule that all media people have to be treated alike. Having worked in the commercial sector, I can assure you that friendly media get more access than unfriendly media. Cause for concern? Maybe, but not as great as it is being played up to be.

2. Retired Military As Experts

Not every retired person is an expert. Rank and past achievements do not necessarily mean expertise – it’s up to the reader or viewer to assess the Expert’s worth just like the jury judges the facts.

3. Disclosure of Nature of Expert’s Business

The media running the ‘expert’ should have disclosed the expert’s affiliation. If the expert was a consultant, then it is up to the media to determine if the consultant has business ties that might impair their impartial judgment. It is not necessarily up to a consultant to disclose each and every client. After all, it was the media that desired to air or print the story – they need to assess the credibility of their sources, not blame the source for any misperceptions.

4. Disclosure of who is really speaking

Clearly the expert has to state that this is their own opinion or it’s the Pentagon’s view. They could also state their source was a Pentagon briefing and let the viewer/reader decide the level of credibility.

5. Belief or Parrot?

If one holds themselves out to be an expert, it is their ethical duty to express only those views and opinions that they feel are justified. It would be unethical to parrot a message that the expert knew or believed was false.

Bottom Line: The Media Analyst program may have a few warts, but it is not much different from the aggressive Press Relations and Analyst Relations programs carried out by many commercial enterprises. The real difference is that PR and AR actions in the commercial sector don’t translate to TV ratings or print readers.