Digital Engagement = Cyber Counter PSYOP

A colleague referred me to a 17 November 2011 article in the NY Times headed: “U.S. Military Goes Online to Rebut Extremists’ Messages” (see: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/world/us-military-goes-online-to-rebut-extremists.html?_r=2&ref=global-home). The article talks about a Digital Engagement Team (DET) reportedly established in 2008. The team chief, MAJ David E. Nevers was quoted as describing the teams mission to “counter extremist ideology, promote cultural awareness and explain U.S. interests,”.

The article provides a description of the team and the languages they cover (Arabic, Dari, Persian, Pashto, Urdu and Russian in case you’re interested). The Times compares the open efforts of the DET with the highly classified and generally shielded US military efforts in Computer Network Operations (CNO).

The DET’s engagements are “transparent and attributable” according to MAJ Nevers. The team’s approval cycle can take hours and while, as the Times points out, this isn’t ‘real-time’ it’s a heck of a lot faster than any approval cycle I’ve been a part of.

The article also refers to the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team as a complementary effort headed by Richard LeBaron, a former Ambassador to Kuwait, that organization’s coordinator.

There is no question that the DET is a laudable effort, complimented as both effective and cost-efficient by Brian Fishman, a counterterrorism analyst at the New America Foundation, a nonpartisan research group in Washington in that same article.

There are two reasons I’ve pulled this article for today’s post. First of all we hear so much negative crap about the influence war, it’s nice to see something positive for a change. However, perhaps more intriguing are the questions the DET raises to me:

1. Are they part of the MISO element to CENTCOM or the STRATCOM element, or are they an organizational hybrid?

2. To whom does the DET OIC (Officer in Charge) report to and what senior officers are in his rating chain?

3. Is this simply a ‘one off’ created because of Centcom’s AO?

4. Given that the DET’s actions are really global because their WWW AO is amorphous, how can a single Combatant CDR be given responsibilities for the other AOs?

5. Do they have a set of ROE and formal procedural guidelines?

6. While measures of effectiveness (MOE)are notoriously absent from this kind of endeavor, are we capturing the lessons learned and TTP in a systematic way to be applied elsewhere?

7. Are we aware of similar allied efforts and have we tried to promulgate this type of effort through NATO?

8. Does it make sense to set up a similar PACOM effort to address the Asian AO?

The DET passes the common sense test and appears to be a good idea whose time has come, I’m just wondering if we’re making the most of it.

Speaking of ‘making the most of it’, take some time to enjoy your family friends during the Holiday Season. As we learn, life is short and unpredictable. I’ve already lost a colleague to a fatal stroke this year and another is in a hospital after his stroke. Neither were military and both were part of the information security industry – the lesson is enjoy what you can with gusto.

Happy Holidays

Photo Source: CENTCOM official Website (http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/leadership/)

Libya: Who is in charge of the attack? An important PSYOP/MISO Issue.

My time in Bosnia during 1997 – 1998 taught me quite a bit about the practical aspects of running an alliance. In some respects an alliance is like a family and not everyone gets an equal vote all the time. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) had the advantage of being a NATO entity. While this wasn’t a perfect construct, at least there were some basic rules over who did what, how the force was organized, funding mechanisms and doctrine.

Photo Source: Wired; URL below

According to President Obama: “First of all, I think it’s very easy to square our military actions and our stated policies. Our military action is in support of an international mandate from the Security Council that specifically focuses on the humanitarian threat posed by Colonel Qaddafi to his people. Not only was he carrying out murders of civilians but he threatened more. He said very specifically, we will show no mercy to people who lived in Benghazi.

And in the face of that, the international community rallied and said we have to stop any potential atrocities inside of Libya, and provided a broad mandate to accomplish that specific task. As part of that international coalition, I authorized the United States military to work with our international partners to fulfill that mandate.” (source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/21/president-obama-answers-questions-libya-testament-men-and-women-uniform; accessed 22 March 2011).

Let’s take a look at a couple of key phrases here: “an international mandate from the Security Council”, “international coalition”; and “work with our international partners”. Does this mean that the Secretary General of the UN is the “Commander” of the Libyan mission? Do all of our international partners get to task our aircraft and prioritize targets?

The NY Times reported that the US is moving swiftly to hand command over to our allies (see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/22libya.html?_r=1; accessed 22 March 2011). Does this mean a French or British flag officer will have opcon (operational control) over US forces in the Med?

Does this ersatz coalition have a formal HQ with a combined, joint Military Information Support task force? Are the influence operational objectives clear? Has the coalition taken the necessary time and effort to craft a coordinated information operations effort to include Computer Network Operations, Public Affairs and EW to maximize the effectiveness of the fighting force and minimize the danger to friendly forces?

Frankly I believe many of these questions remained unanswered as our planes streak over Libyan skies. At first blush it would appear that the President has moved swiftly to answer the political mail, and is now trying to minimize his and our collective exposure.

As with any operation, plans don’t often survive first contact and there is already fog in the media. The President implied that the US took the lead because “Our ability to take out, for example, Qaddafi’s air defense systems are much more significant than some of our other partners.” (same source as above) and that fine military authority, “Wired” reported on secret PSYOPs and Commando Solo (see http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/secret-libya-psyops/).

If there’s a formidable air defense system, you wouldn’t be seeing Commando Solo flying around. And, by the way, where is the funding for this operation coming from as the defense budget continues to get pruned.

Overall it would appear that we are potentially on the precipice of yet another military mission in a Muslim nation with the potential of fanning the flames of other conflicts and perhaps offering an excuse to jump start fundamentalist efforts in other parts of the globe.

I applaud President Obama for his nimbleness, but let’s hope we don’t get burned jumping over the latest candlestick.

Regimental Week 2010: Coming Attractions

When I was a young lad growing up in Brooklyn I used to love going to the movies on Saturday. In retrospect I’m not sure which I liked more the movies or the candy. Next week I’m off to Fort Bragg for PSYOP Regimental Week. You can find the official press release from the US Army Special Operations Command at: http://news.soc.mil/releases/News%20Archive/2010/October/101018-01.html

For me this will be a bittersweet occasion as it will be my last one as the Honorary Colonel of the PSYOP Regiment. Surely the time has come for another senior PSYOP officer to assume this honorary role and I’m delighted that the designee will be an outstanding bridge between PSYOP of the past and military influence operations of the future.

Strangely enough I found out about the ‘replacement’ quite by accident – that fact speaks to the nascent nature of the PSYOP Regiment and the need to attend to military custom.

I’m looking forward to the program which will include updates from the Groups, the Joint Military Information Support Command and our sister services. I’m also looking forward to touring the Media Operations Center and seeing the latest and the greatest and comparing what they have to what I see in the heart of Silicon Valley.
Most of all I’m looking forward to mingling with the troops and learning about what is really happening in the field. While I’m a very hard grader and am rather tough to excite, I am always gratified by the level of our PSYOP soldiers and their ability to perform in an outstanding manner under the most adverse of circumstances.

I’ll be working on my “State of the Regiment” talk over the next few days. Some key messages I’m considering are:
• The PSYOP Brand – what do we really need?
• Today’s PSYOP soldier
• Unity of Command: why don’t we have it and what do we need to do to get it?
• The Future of the Regiment
Field input is encouraged!

The Furlong Affair: PSYOP and Intelligence – What’s the deal?

The New York Times among others has reported on investigations concerning alleged inappropriate activities by senior government official Michael D. Furlong (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/asia/28contractor.html?scp=1&sq=Furlong&st=cse). Furlong, currently a Senior Level executive, is the Strategic Planner and Technology Integration Adviser, Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas (reference: http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=11344) is at the center of a swirling controversy as to whether or not he inappropriately used funds allegedly earmarked for information operations for unauthorized intelligence gathering through contractors. (Photo courtesy US Air Force)

Furlong retired as a LTC after serving in PSYOP slots among others. The controversy seems to imply that there is an unholy alliance between PSYOP (or information operations which appears to be used synonymously in most media pieces) and intelligence.

There are some key points that need to be made here. First of all, PSYOPers are not intelligence collectors. They may be trained observers who can report what they see, but they are not out to collect intelligence. Good PSYOP, like effective marketing and sales, is based on a solid understanding of the target audience, what motivates it, its leadership, what influences it and what are the best ways to appeal to that audience and convince them to behave in the desired manner.

Most of the time PSYOP intelligence needs are not the same as the CDR’s intelligence needs. The CDR’s Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) generally relate to the operations at hand. Most CDR (General McChrystal excepted) are solely interested in that information that will allow them to accomplish their direct mission which is usually kill or capture the enemy. Predilections that are important for influence purposes rarely make it to the CCIR list.

At the core of the Furlong matter is the allegation that he employed a media company, International Media Ventures (http://www.imediav.com/) as an outsource for intelligence operations. The company’s website proclaims that they are in the strategic communications, media and content businesses. A look at the “About” section and you discover that the company leadership is mostly ex-SOCOM types.
What’s the point? If Furlong was outsourcing intelligence, that’s a bad idea, if International Media Ventures was engaged in intelligence operations that’s stupid business because it compromises their ability to provide the kind of products and services expected in support of USG sponsored influence operations.

When the dust settles I am willing to bet that no laws will have been broken, however, the DOD ‘brand’ has suffered just as surely as Toyota is still recovering from their gas pedal issues. Perception is reality especially where PSYOP and influence operations are concerned. Practitioners are under a higher duty of care to insure that USG strategic communications and operational/tactical PSYOP are not tarnished.

24th Air Force Cyber Command – Wither PSYOP?

According to the August 18, 2009 San Antonio News:
“The 24th Air Force, headquarters for a new cyber command, has been activated at Lackland AFB.A ceremony activating the command was held today at the base, which was chosen over five other U.S. sites. The command will oversee efforts to prevent cyber attacks on military bases and systems……Local leaders predict moving the headquarters from Barksdale AFB, La. and adding 400 new positions will provide an economic impact of $30 million annually in salaries.” (http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/53612852.html)

The DOD indicated that Brig. Gen. Charles K. Shugg, vice commander, Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional), Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, will be the new vice commander, 24th Air Force, Air Force Space Command, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas (http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12898). You can find his bio at: http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=8905; photo courtesy of DOD

So what does this all mean? Size, or as in this case, rank matters, so let’s address that for a moment. If the Vice CDR is a one star, stands to reason the CDR will be a MG or two star. So that makes the 24th CDR comparable to a Division CDR. Experience has shown that your rank rather than your competence is your ticket to admission to the CDR’s inner circle. Consequently if PSYOP is to have a seat at the 24th’s Cyber table its representative would have to be at least an 05 or LTC because 04s (Majors) would just get lost in the shuffle.

The mission of the Cyber Command is to: “provide combatant commanders with trained and ready cyber forces to plan and conduct cyberspace operations, and to extend, maintain and defend the Air Force portion of the global information grid.” (source is the general’s bio cited above).

Assuming this is the Air Force component and cyberspace operations means offensive as well as defensive this all begs the question of how PSYOP and the other elements of IO fit in the picture. I’ll hazard a guess that if there is PSYOP representation at the 24th it might come from Air Force PSYOP resources with any Army PSYOP resources being junior in grade and responsibility.

Furthermore – strikes me there may be some very significant strategic challenges and command issues as the ‘big’ Cyber Command fleshes out at Fort Meade. There is no evidence that the President and DOD have established a a total cyber strategy: offense, defense and influence or that there is a top down chain of cyber command that reaches down from the White House and incorporates the influence side (DOD and DOS at a minimum) into the picture.

So, while standing up cyber resources is the right thing to do and this is surely the time, unless the White House stands up to the task of formulating an overarching information/cyber strategy the new cyber units are like aircraft without rudders.