NATO Attack on Pakistan: Taliban PSYOP or Fog of War?

There is no question that relations between the US and Pakistan are in the crapper. The latest debacle was a NATO Attack on Pakistani forces on 26 November 2011. The incontrovertible facts are that at least 24 Pakistani soldiers died as a result of the attack. (See “Afghans say commando unit was attacked before airstrike was called on Pakistan - http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghans-say-unit-was-attacked-before-airstrike/2011/11/28/gIQAX6ZY5N_story.html)

Pakistan maintains the attack was deliberate, the US says it was not and the Afghans frankly don’t seem to give a sh*t . Conservative leaning publication, the Washington Times ran an article “US suspects NATO was lured into raid” (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/29/pakistan-calls-nato-raid-act-aggression/)

If it’s not the fog of war, it certainly is the fog of who can get their facts straight and their story out. A rash of other stories are circulating about whether or not the US will apologize, whether the mil to mil relationship between the two countries will continue and of course what does it portend for the region after the US withdraws the bulk of its forces as forecasted.

For the influence profession we can learn some powerful lessons:

1. If it is true that the Taliban were clever enough to orchestrate attacks or targeted fires to provoke an attack – this means that there are some pretty big holes in the ROE and the process of confirming your targets. It also means that once again a supposedly primitive foe has demonstrated some very sophisticated thinking

2. PAO and MISO/PSYOP must be on the same page. PSYOP may have the ability to provide PAO with input, insight, file footage and/or other help. Of course due care must be taken so that PAO’s integrity and credibility is not compromised.

3. PAO needs to counsel GOs and other senior leaders on what to say and perhaps, more importantly what not to say in fluid and uncertain situations.

4. As shown by the photo from the Washington Post, any excuse will be deemed a good one by our enemies to show popular sentiment against NATO and the US.

5. Bad news, unlike wine and chicken soup, does not get better with age. Speed is of the essence with regard to investigations and getting the word out.

6. Notwithstanding the most neutral of investigations people will believe that they want to so contingency counter propaganda and demonstration plans must be implemented.

7. The strategic importance of Pakistan as an ally mandates the diplomatic channels to include President Obama need to be engaged. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister for example is quoted in the Washington Post as being ready to pull Pakistan’s support of the US war on militancy. Ministers are influenced by diplomats, typically not by military personnel.

No matter what the truth is behind the attack, all of us need to consider the lessons to be learned and the ways and means to avoid a similar situation in the future.

Libya: Who is in charge of the attack? An important PSYOP/MISO Issue.

My time in Bosnia during 1997 – 1998 taught me quite a bit about the practical aspects of running an alliance. In some respects an alliance is like a family and not everyone gets an equal vote all the time. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) had the advantage of being a NATO entity. While this wasn’t a perfect construct, at least there were some basic rules over who did what, how the force was organized, funding mechanisms and doctrine.

Photo Source: Wired; URL below

According to President Obama: “First of all, I think it’s very easy to square our military actions and our stated policies. Our military action is in support of an international mandate from the Security Council that specifically focuses on the humanitarian threat posed by Colonel Qaddafi to his people. Not only was he carrying out murders of civilians but he threatened more. He said very specifically, we will show no mercy to people who lived in Benghazi.

And in the face of that, the international community rallied and said we have to stop any potential atrocities inside of Libya, and provided a broad mandate to accomplish that specific task. As part of that international coalition, I authorized the United States military to work with our international partners to fulfill that mandate.” (source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/21/president-obama-answers-questions-libya-testament-men-and-women-uniform; accessed 22 March 2011).

Let’s take a look at a couple of key phrases here: “an international mandate from the Security Council”, “international coalition”; and “work with our international partners”. Does this mean that the Secretary General of the UN is the “Commander” of the Libyan mission? Do all of our international partners get to task our aircraft and prioritize targets?

The NY Times reported that the US is moving swiftly to hand command over to our allies (see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/22libya.html?_r=1; accessed 22 March 2011). Does this mean a French or British flag officer will have opcon (operational control) over US forces in the Med?

Does this ersatz coalition have a formal HQ with a combined, joint Military Information Support task force? Are the influence operational objectives clear? Has the coalition taken the necessary time and effort to craft a coordinated information operations effort to include Computer Network Operations, Public Affairs and EW to maximize the effectiveness of the fighting force and minimize the danger to friendly forces?

Frankly I believe many of these questions remained unanswered as our planes streak over Libyan skies. At first blush it would appear that the President has moved swiftly to answer the political mail, and is now trying to minimize his and our collective exposure.

As with any operation, plans don’t often survive first contact and there is already fog in the media. The President implied that the US took the lead because “Our ability to take out, for example, Qaddafi’s air defense systems are much more significant than some of our other partners.” (same source as above) and that fine military authority, “Wired” reported on secret PSYOPs and Commando Solo (see http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/secret-libya-psyops/).

If there’s a formidable air defense system, you wouldn’t be seeing Commando Solo flying around. And, by the way, where is the funding for this operation coming from as the defense budget continues to get pruned.

Overall it would appear that we are potentially on the precipice of yet another military mission in a Muslim nation with the potential of fanning the flames of other conflicts and perhaps offering an excuse to jump start fundamentalist efforts in other parts of the globe.

I applaud President Obama for his nimbleness, but let’s hope we don’t get burned jumping over the latest candlestick.

Positioned For Troop Reduction? Who is PSYOPing whom?

The Washington Post of March 7, 2011 quoted Secretary of Defense Gates as indicated that the US was “well-positioned” for some troop reductions in Afghanistan in July. If you are a PSYOP (pardon me MISO) soldier, don’t get your hopes up. Don’t get me wrong, I’m a big supporter of Secretary Gates as seen in some previous posts, but my Brooklyn BS detector went off when I read that.

The Washington Post of March 7, 2011 quoted Secretary of Defense Gates as indicated that the US was “well-positioned” for some troop reductions in Afghanistan in July. If you are a PSYOP (pardon me MISO) soldier, don’t get your hopes up. Don’t get me wrong, I’m a big supporter of Secretary Gates as seen in some previous posts, but my Brooklyn BS detector went off when I read that.

While I have not been to Afghanistan, it strikes me that our information support operations forces be they military or civilian are stretched pretty thin. Furthermore, the tribal/rural nature of Afghanistan does not lend itself to mass marketing of any type.

At least Mr. Gates was straight forward by noting that reductions would be small and that a significant US force would remain behind. In theory, the notion of a military draw down should be a signal to NATO and to the US that the diplomatic information efforts need to ramp up. Civilian infrastructure and medical missions also need to be tightened up with realistic fiscal management and timetables coupled with accountability.

I’m still of the opinion that local economies are the fundamental building blocks in that AO. Villages and their traditional leaders will be there long after America departs.

Hopefully we and our NATO allies have the political will to insure a bottom up level of confidence and security otherwise, the terrorist elements within the country and those scurrying back and forth to Pakistan will once again ascend to power.

Juggling Multinational MISO: Turkey – Iran – Iraq

The P-5+1 talks concerning Iran will resume on 21 January 2011 hosted by Turkey. (See http://www.presstv.ir/detail/159632.html). “P-5+1” means the five permanent members of the UN Security Council + Germany. While Turkey has promised to serve merely as the host and not a participant, their impact on the talks will surely be felt through their direct and indirect acts.Photo Source is link above.

Stratfor reported that “Then there are the Turks. The Turks opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq because they expected it to fail to establish a viable government in Baghdad and thereby to destroy the balance of power between Iraq and Iran. The Turks have also tried to avoid being drawn into the south beyond dealing with threats from Turkish Kurds operating out of Iraq. At the same time, Turkey has been repositioning itself as both a leading power in the Muslim world and the bridge between the Muslim world and the West, particularly the United States.” Read more: The Turkish Role in Negotiations with Iran | STRATFOR

Clearly the US has strong interests and goals with respect to Iran and that Iran is a pivotal player in the troubled region. How does this translate into the MISO/PSYOP world?

The MISO community has a critical need for people that understand a variety of cultures and that can quickly build rapport with other military personnel. Some of these skills can be built from NATO assignments.

For example while I was in Sarajevo the Turks provided security for our quarters. The guards were mostly young conscripts who were eager to obviate their military obligations with a single year of service. Albeit this service was not easy and their lives during the year were hard ones.

Interestingly the more senior (in rank and age) officers went for a daily run when curfew was lifted. This gave us time to spend with the guards prior to our run. They were a fine group of lads and were very interested in learning English. I gave them all my magazines and newspapers including some on esoteric topics like stamp collecting. They were eager to learn and practice their English and they had a great sense of humor.

I had the opportunity to learn more about the culture of the Turkish military when I attended the Allied Command Europe (ACE) PSYOP Officers Course in the UK where I served as the informal escort officer for a Turkish Colonel.

Many of our MISO personnel have the opportunity of serving on Military Information Support Teams (MIST) in our embassies. I have talked to many of these soldiers at Fort Bragg and I can tell you that they are extraordinary. They are articulate and culturally oriented with many conversant with one or more foreign languages.

Notwithstanding today’s optempo, we need to provide more opportunities for MISO personnel to become culturally familiar. This could include training with other forces, college abroad as well as authorizing modest amounts of funds to pay for memberships in local clubs that foster this kind of knowledge. A good example Is the Japan Society of Northern California (http://www.usajapan.org/).

We also need to place a higher priority on NATO support and integration than we do in order to insure that we learn more about how to work with our allies and that we indeed train as we fight.

PSYOP and the New NATO Strategy

On May 17, 2010 NATO released the report of a panel of experts containing recommendations for a new strategic approach by the organization. (see http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf)

I don’t suspect many of my loyal readers will peruse the document. For those of us who have served in NATO organizations, we recognize that there is a level of diplomacy among senior NATO civilians and commanders that requires a high degree of sensitivity and thus far has never called for much urgency.
In the following paragraphs I will provide a glimpse into the 58 page document.

Here’s the BLUF (Bottom Line UP Front)
PSYOP will be needed to deal with the spectrum of threats facing NATO. The US has the opportunity of being the lead dog by demonstrating our expertise and TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures). US PSYOP doctrine and TTP could be the standard for NATO if the USG is willing to make the commitment in terms of personnel and funding.

US training and doctrine could provide a jump start to the nascent ‘new’ NATO. Failure to engage will leave a vacuum that will either be filled by another nation or worse left unfilled resulting in disastrous consequences in NATO’s future conflicts.

The introduction to the 2010 Strategic Concept contains two key points in my opinion, the first of which is a new perspective on the NATO mission:
“Between now and 2020, it (NATO) will be tested by the emergence of new dangers, the many-sided demands of complex operations, and the challenge of organising itself efficiently in an era where rapid responses are vital, versatility critical, and resources tight. NATO” (Page 5)

The second stated point is that NATO has not done a very good job of building value in the minds of the citizens and politicians of NATO countries and notwithstanding its many accomplishments “could fail to retain the public backing and financial support it must have to perform critical tasks well.”

Strangely enough, at least to me, while there is ample mention of missiles and cyber threats, there is scant mention of the need to influence populations in areas where NATO forces find themselves. The strategy acknowledges that there are several factors “that magnify uncertainty”:

• The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;
• The ambitions of international terrorist groups;
• The persistence of corrosive regional, national, ethnic, and religious rivalries;
• The world’s increased reliance on potentially vulnerable information systems;
• The competition for petroleum and other strategic resources (thereby highlighting the importance of maritime security);
• Demographic changes that could aggravate such global problems as poverty, hunger, illegal immigration, and pandemic disease; and
• The accumulating consequences of environmental degradation, including climate change.

Conclusions cited strikes by international terrorist groups and cyber assaults as key threats and point out that the organization must be able to make decisions rapidly and integrate help from countries and organizations outside NATO to deal with these complex threats. Partnership management was elevated to one of the 4 core NATO tasks highlighted by the 2010 Strategic Concept.

Neither PSYOP nor Information Operations were mentioned specifically. In fact nor was Strategic Communications. With regard to military missions, the document pointed out that military missions complement the core tasks and will include:
• Cooperate with partners and civilian institutions to protect the treaty area against a full range of unconventional security challenges.
• Deploy and sustain expeditionary capabilities for military operations beyond the treaty area when required to prevent an attack on the treaty area or to protect the legal rights and other vital interests of Alliance members.
• Help to shape a more stable and peaceful international security environment by enhancing partner interoperability, providing military and police training, coordinating military assistance, and cooperating with the governments of key countries.

Two other comments were worthy of note: NATO Special Operations should be elevated to a full component command and that “NATO should encourage the further evolution and coordination of national specialisation and niche capabilities”.

Civil Military Operations (CMO) came in for some special attention noting that these are key to complex operations and that civilian capabilities will have to be integrated into a range of operations especially where it is necessary to work with local authorities and combat forces for limited timeframes to provide security and needed public services.

Enemies With No Rules Need Counter PSYOP

The NY Times has been covering the Afghani popular backlash against American airstrikes blamed for the deaths of civilians. (see http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/world/asia/08afghan.html?_r=1&ref=world) Photo from the article.

Protests erupted in the western province of Farah. The protests in turn spurred police response and generated support from some local government officials. The US government admitted that there were airstrikes but balked at responsibility for the civilian deaths.

The US information engagement response was an expression of regret and announcement of a joint investigation by Secretary Clinton and a statement by Gen David McKiernan: “We have some other information that leads us to distinctly different conclusions about the cause of the civilian casualties.”
The article continued with accounts of bodies and anonymous US forensics evidence that seemed to indicate the attacks were the results of grenades, not bombs. And from the Pentagon the world media heard: “We cannot confirm the report that the Taliban executed these people,” said Capt. John Kirby, the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. “We don’t know if it’s true, and we also don’t know how many civilians were killed as a result of this operation.”
· Let me be clear that I am not, nor have I ever been in this theater so I really have no idea what ground truth is. However, this much I do know:
· Popular support will be even more important as more troops pour into Afghanistan.
· NATO forces ought to know where they bombs are falling and ought to be able to estimate the people and property damage to be expected.
· The local population appears to want to believe that the Americans are always the bad guys.
· Declarations of regret are nice but have no local effect.
· Joint investigations will take some time delaying their impact and their credibility will be in doubt unless they have insured local credibility through local leaders.
I have a few recommendations:
· Air strikes are common enough phenomena that the USG must have a proven SOP for dealing with their actual and perceived harm. This SOP needs to stress information engagement tailored to the local area.
· Technology should be employed with the entertainment value of the TV series. I would envision a Lawrence Fishburne or Dennis Haysbert type authoritative figure narrating a simulation that shows how the bodies were created by a Taliban attack. This computer imagery would be employed in the local area and if appropriate made available to regional and international media as well as on YouTube.
· Print versions of the simulation with local language translation should be made available. If there is no written local language then audio (like greeting cards) should be used.

Georgia On My Mind

Blog Entry, 11 Aug 08, Georgia On My Mind
All of us have been watching the unfolding situation in Georgia. For some of us, we are reminded of untold exercises involving the Fulda Gap – or as I used to say “19 Russian Divisions - no waiting”. Russian forces have taken direct and violent action on the battlefield overwhelming their adversary.

They have also employed new weapons – Computer Network Attack (CNA). The UK based Telegraph reported that Russia is also conducting a “Cyber War” (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2539157/Georgia-Russia-conducting-cyber-war.html) where the target is official government websites.

I’d argue that it’s not really “Cyber War”, but a reasoned PSYACT designed more to show dominance rather than to orchestrate harm. Control of a government or individual’s ability to communicate is designed to invoke a feeling of helplessness on the part of the victim and to erode morale and will.

Attacking a government’s websites making them unavailable or redirecting the accessor to another website clearly under the control of the attacker would appear to be a good way to reduce confidence in the government. It would also seem to be a way to make the citizenry feel that their government is powerless.

The defender would have to turn to other means to counter this impression. This best alternative given the demographics would be TV. Government TV broadcasts could fill the void left by any Internet deficit, and employ visuals designed to bolster the confidence of the citizenry and unite them against the attacker.

Broadcasts of action on the front line could also be used as a means to induce other nations to come to the rescue of the victim by putting political pressure on the attacker, or perhaps even offering some military counter balance.

Interestingly enough this type of action was considered in the recently released National Defense Strategy as stated on page 4 of the strategic environment section: “All of these actions suggest a Russia exploring renewed influence, and seeking a greater international role.”

Given all the above, how confident are we that the USG could mount an effective response in this or a similar situation that would harness conventional military power, Computer Network Operations, PSYOP, PA, Department of State and other instruments of national power?

This most recent action should be a real wake up call. An efficient enemy such as the one posed by a totalitarian regime with strong and unchallenged leadership is a formidable foe. Especially since the USG lacks:

A cohesive and well thought out National Information Strategy.
A single designated Senior Government Leader in the Executive Branch to form and implement such a strategy across the USG.
Neither a strategy nor designated responsible individuals within the USG to mobilize or at least work with US civilian resources to assist in an information offensive.

It would seem that now is the time to finally put into place recommendations from the Defense Science Board’s 2007 Task Force on Strategic Communications, ideas from the IO Roadmap of 2003 and other moves designed to prepare the USG to more effectively deal with today’s environment and avoid disaster in tomorrow’s.

It also appears that DoD should increase its emphasis on NATO Doctrine to help insure smoother joint operations with NATO allies and would be NATO members should these be necessary in the future.

Tipping Point PSYOP or Does It Pay To Throw Good Money After Bad?

I arrived in Sarajevo in July 1997 to serve as the DCO of the NATO Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF). By that time Radovan Karadic was already a wanted man. Rumors had him moving frequently at night in a caravan of cars. During the time I was in Bosnia there were several ‘sightings’ and much speculation about where he was and if he would ever get caught.

“Ever” came this week with a raid in Belgrade. Mr. Karadic was found to be leading a new life with a new physical and mental persona. The fact that he eluded his pursuers for so long is likely to be a testimonial to his personal intellect and discipline and to some level of acquiescence by the Serbian government.

What caused the tipping point? Was it PSYOP? Not in this case. I’ve sometimes split target audiences (TA) into Green, Yellow and Red. Green are people that already support your point view, Red are those who will never come around to your perspective and Yellow are the folks in the middle.

Mr. Karadic and his supporters over the last decade likely fall into the Red Group. A TA that has little regard for the Coalition point of view. Frankly I didn’t think that PSYOP efforts to erode his support would be successful. My feeling was that his supporters whether loyalists from the glory days in Pale or his new neighbors in Belgrade would not be persuaded to withdraw their support and turn him in.

If my hypothesis is correct, then why all of a sudden is there a hot tip that leads to an arrest? As Mr. Clinton might have said, “It’s the economy stupid!” The fact is that today’s Serbian government is interested in EU membership (see http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/europe/23serbia.html?ref=europe) and they needed to corral Mr. Karadic and soon his #1 henchman, General Ratko Mladic as evidence of their worthiness to join the EU.

The moral of the story: nations must use all their instruments synergistically if they are to achieve the goals they set for themselves. In this case the Serbian government decided that the nation’s economic future was more important than continuing to shield one of their ‘heroes’.

Economics is a powerful weapon. Success of micro-financing efforts in Iraq have largely gone unnoticed and unreported, hopefully these successes and more importantly the people who have improved their lives are being aggressively promoted in the theater and internationally.

NATO, Denmark and Afghanistan

This morning I had the opportunity to attend a press conference held by H.E. Soren Gade, the Minister of Defense for Denmark. Minister Gade was here in the US visiting Secretary Gates and appeared as a part of the Newsmaker Series at the National Press Club in Washington, DC.

Prior to his presentation there was a bit of a ruckus as there were several very vocal demonstrators protesting. Sort of gave me a time warp back to the 1960’s in a way.

By way of background, Denmark’s troop contribution to Afghanistan is ranked either #1or #2 on a per capita basis and they have recently increased their manning to 700 or so in Southern Afghanistan. The Minister pointed out some tremendous achievements in terms of education – 4 or 5 million children in school and 10 universities compared to less than a million students and a single university under the Taliban. He also noted that 80% of Afghani’s now have access to medical facilities.

He noted that Europe as forgotten 9/11 and categorized Denmark’s mission to Afghanistan as a security mission to secure Denmark against future terrorist operations. In other words prevent other 9/11 like attacks in Denmark or elsewhere. Key overall aspects of the Danish mission:
1. Train the police and the Army.
2. Improve the agriculture in the country and replace the opium poppy crop.
3. Build roads.
4. Improve the power supply

Gade also noted that it was important to win ‘the hearts and minds’ at home and in Afganistan and to strengthen Strategic Communications which he defined as:
• be better at telling ‘good’ stories;
• show what kind of enemy we are up against;
• and improve news and video coverage by devoting Danish resources as a news medium.

He will introduce a NATO Channel at upcoming Bucharest summit. The channel will have resources in Kabul and Kandahar.

It was encouraging to hear such positive statements from one of our allies; however, it would appear that even the Minister didn’t understand that the Department of State, not DoD is responsible for Public Diplomacy. From his passion about telling ‘good stories’ to the home country audience it would seem that he doesn’t have the rigors of the Smith Mundt Act and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 to deal with.

He did not know which countries were supplying soldiers capable of executing the hearts and minds missions and was focused on the broader goals getting other EU nations to contribute more troops to Afghanistan and being optimistic on the effect of a military run news channel.
When I noted that military sources are generally not very credible with foreign audiences, he was hopeful that the Danish effort would be an exception to the rule. He indicated that there were many new TV stations and newspapers in Afghanistan and felt it was not NATO’s mission to encourage or support Afghani media.

Experience has shown that credibility is a key to message acceptance. Pure military forces are not generally able to and while I applaud the Danish actions with regard to their news channel, I’m afraid that it will not have a very pronounced impact on the AO. Success on the information front can only come from capable and credible local media who have the trust of their audiences.