Mobilization - The Saga Continues

After my visit to Fort Hunter Liggett last week I got to pondering over the mobilization process and reflecting on my personal history of deployment.
Photo Source: http://www.usar.army.mil/arweb/History/Pages/NMAR.aspx

My first real active duty tour was in Viet Nam. It was my first assignment after two sets of schools and I received no special training prior to deployment. Our ROTC summer camp adopted a “You’re all going to Viet Nam” theme to stress the importance of tactical training. Frankly all I remember is one of our instructors used a famous picture of Raquel Welch as a training aid for mortar training.

The only other specific Viet Nam oriented training was at Fort Gordon, GA where the Southeastern Signal School ran an “Escape and Evasion” course where the new 2 LTs had three options: first choice was you successfully evaded the 82nd Airborne troops who were out to get you; second choice was you made it half way through the course over wooded and hilly terrain, checked in at the half way point and evaded capture; worst choice was you get captured and are subjected to ‘torture’ designed to help you resist such efforts by the enemy. One of my classmates was captured and had some severe muscle injury as a result.

Fast forward to 1997 when I was getting ready to go to Bosnia. We had several weeks at Fort Bragg where we learned useful things like how to clear a mine field and were then told never to go off the road. We left from Pope and ended up a former Mig Base in Tazar, Hungry we were in tents waiting for the bus ride from hell. Not that it was so long, but after the 25th time Mr. Bean gets rather old.

From a timing perspective I found out I was going sometime between April and May. Our orders and deployment started around 10 July. I arrived in Sarajevo on 31 July 1997 and left for home some time around Valentine’s Day 1998, with accumulated leave I was Released From Active Duty (REFRAD) around 9 March 1998 making for about 8 month’s total.

Today’s Reservist often finds out over a year in advance. They have several ‘gates’ they go through before deployment include some medical/dental checks. Yellow Ribbon (family support) events and some basic skills testing. Next comes a little more than 4 weeks at a Regional Training Center at Fot Hunter Liggett, Fort McCoy (WI) or scenic Fort Dix, NJ. This is followed by a break of about two weeks.

When the mobilization order kicks in the troops head for a Mobilization Unit In-processing Center (MUIC) for another 45 days worth of training. When all is said and done the troops are on the ground for about 9 months. The average dwell (stay at home) time is about 18 months.

This comes down to a 2 and ½ year planning cycle where the Reserve soldier has to balance family, military and civilian career. Civilian career time also includes any schooling – military or academic that the individual must accomplish.

This Herculean burden is one reason why the Reserve and the National Guard are often called “twice the soldier”.

MISO: Is it soup yet?

With lightning and a clap of thunder from the Pentagon, PSYOP is to be stricken from the Defense system just as the name Moses was removed from the legacy of Egypt. The Secretary of Defense has approved the recommendation to change PSYOP to Military Information Support and/to Operations (MISO). The Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, Jr. has directed his staff to develop and orchestrate a plan designed to replace “PSYOP” with MISO in the Army (and presumably DOD) lexicon and branches.
Photo source: http://www.ecosalon.com/simple-miso-soup/

The name change follows the recommendation of the DSLC or Defense Senior Leader’s Conference. This is a conference co-hosted by SecDef (Secretary of Defense) and the CJCS (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Attendees typically include the Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs and elements of the Strategic Planning Council. The meetings are held three times a year (Jan, May and Sep) and are executed by the Director, Joint Staff. For some key bullet points on DSLC see: http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/dmcs/Routine%20Reports%20&%20Meetings/DSLC.htm.
The name change has been an emotional topic and has been bandied about for years. On the one hand, “PSYOP” has a long and distinguished history with traditions and a nascent branch espirit de corps. On the other, demand for PSYOP forces is escalating and the optempo is breathtaking.
Lack of emphasis of influence operations by senior combat CDR and the bifurcation of PSYOP forces between SOF and Reserve chains of command continues to hobble efforts to optimize and standardize PSYOP training and operations. Key challenges are: elevate the status and importance of information support (PSYOP/PAO) to the force; optimize force development, command and control to deal with burgeoning demand, provide for future conflicts where cyber influence – especially on non-state actors is critical.

Perhaps the name change signals a renaissance of the influence profession and missions.

It is past time for the influence aspect of military operations to assume its rightful role as a leading element in today’s force. This implies strong senior leadership support in terms of resourcing and fast tracking the policy and doctrinal changes that are needed in today’s world.

The name change is a perfect reason for renewed efforts to ‘educate’ Congress on what we do why MISO is an important instrument of government power. As a non-lethal battlefield multiplier MISO can more positively impact world opinion of US efforts than kinetic operations.

As good soldiers we have been given a lawful order and must execute it. We need to put aside any personal feelings we might have about the loss of tradition, and consider how we can leverage the name change and the massive activity that is needed to revise ‘the system’ across personnel, operations, training and logistics required to effect the change.

This is also an opportune time for the re-design of the Information Operations (IO) playing and career fields. In particular the need to integrate PAO and MISO as synergistic tools for the CDR is critical. Renaming and repositioning MISO can be a catalytic process to help foster this process.

All of us in the community need to embrace the change regardless of our personal feelings and use this window of opportunity to strengthen the community – perhaps not so much for ourselves, but for those who will come after us.

PSYOP and the “New” Afghan Strategy

A number of publications such as the New York Times and The Washington Post (October 29, 2009 - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/29/AR2009102900223.html) have reported that President Obama is considering a ‘hybrid’ strategy whereby we protect a number of key population centers and critical infrastructure such as highways.
Photo from Washington Post – AP David Guttenfelder



The President is “a great thought thinker” and is not a man to act in haste. His tenure as a Constitutional Law professor no doubt strengthened what was already a strong analytical streak. He has reportedly gone so far as to order a Province by Province analysis (also in the October 29, 2009 Washington Post - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/28/AR2009102804490.html).

Since this is also the approach I posted about before the media stories, it is necessary to take the analysis down a level and address PSYOP under this strategy. Before doing that we need to add in an October 27, 2009 story from Reuters reporting that the US will pay Taliban to renounce the insurgency (Reuters - http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSN2796610._CH_.2400).

PSYOP will likely be given a number of missions to accomplish under this new strategy.
· Reinforce the perception of stability, security and Afghan national government support within the protected zones.
· Provide tactical PSYOP support to infrastructure protection to minimize civilian interruption with that function.
· Employ tactical PSYOP to convince the Taliban to renounce the insurgency and accept payment for their sound decision.
· Develop a broader PSYOP strategy that will leverage the security of the “protected” zones to other parts of the country with the goal of increasing popular support against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
· Seek out key leaders outside the protected zones and persuade them to join this new tide of Afghani pride and nationalism and renounce the Taliban.
· If one or more areas become an example of success – leverage that example at the strategic, operational and tactical PSYOP levels to induce other areas to do the same.

These will not be easy missions as serious considerations need to be given to:
· Troop protection for PSYOP and CA forces working outside the wire.
· Developing and maintaining highly reliable and timely intelligence on each protected zone, adjoining zones as well as key leaders both friend and foe.
o Social networking in the most primitive sense needs to be employed to interlink families and tribes that form natural alliances and to be able to pit historic and natural enemies against each other to weaken the Taliban efforts.
· Coordinating all the elements of power, hard and soft, in support of reinforcing security at the local level whether or not this reinforces the need for or the success of the Afghan national government.
· Rules of engagement inside protected zones and how to protect the force without antagonizing the local population. This implies increased use of non-lethal means and diplomacy. It also implies a ready supply of security vetted and knowledgeable local interpreters.
· Given that some level of troop increase will be supported, how should additional PSYOP resources be deployed to support those troops and who will be the troop provider.
· Are there changes that must be made to the force structure to insure a ready supply of PSYOP forces in support of the “Big Army”? Can the USAR survive under the current merciless operational tempo?

The White house has dithered on the Afghan strategy and while I respect the need to make a carefully reasoned decision, let’s hope the decision includes these considerations as well as how the President’s popularity is likely to fare afterwards.

Strategic Communications: Funding Little Old Grannies Who Wear Veils

It’s very hard to find something positive to say about Strategic Communications these days. Afghanistan and Iraq dominate the headlines and make the world appear to be a very bleak place.However, there are a couple of bright spots for those in Strategic Communications willing to think out of the box and take a longer range view than tomorrow’s headline. The September 3, 2009 Arts Section of the NY Times featured an article entitled: Dubai Superheros: Little Old Grannies Who Wear Veils (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/arts/television/03animated.html?scp=1&sq=Dubai%20Superheros&st=cse) Photo: NY Times

Mohammed Saeed Harib nor Freej, the United Arab Emirate’s (UAE) and therefore very likely the Middle East’s first 3-D animated series may not be as well known as the Simpsons or South Park, but the potential for the Grannie Superheros is worthy of note because it indicates a societal maturation. Societies that have a means to look at themselves and raise issues through ‘characters’ are better able to deal with issues and inequities thwarting the appeal of fundamentalism.

During my service in Bosnia it was clear to me that a free and credible media was a fundamental cornerstone of any nation. Citizens need to be informed and be able to dialog about their societies.

The next level of sophistication is another way for society’s to view themselves and that’s entertainment as a vehicle to address social issues. Freej cannot attack issues head on like The Simpsons or South Park and must of necessity is an indirect approach.

Supporting an entertainment venture like Freej might not seem like Strategic Communication – but it clearly is because as Freej and other forms of entertainment open up issues for discussion and perhaps potential action they can facilitate the positive transformation of a society.

Over time sociological entertainment from the UAE would likely be exported to other areas of the region and perhaps even spawn copy cat programs that would have a local spin, yet still have the positive effect of expanding societal expression.

I should also point out that Mr. Harib attended Northeastern University in Boston which has itself evolved from a commuter based university built on balancing work experience and academic study to one of the top 100 universities in the US, and oh yes, my Alma Mater!

State of the Regiment

I have had a couple of weeks to savor the experience of Regimental Week at Fort Bragg and on reflect on the State of the PSYOP Regiment in general.

To quote Dickens “These are the best of times, these are the worst of times.” The PSYOP Optempo is breathtaking. No matter your assigned POG, you are going to be a part of the war some time soon – and often thereafter. Reservists can expect to re-deploy 18 months after they return and the Optempo on the active side is intense as well. The fact that the 4th POG guidon is deployed down range is evidence of the PSYOP commitment to National Defense.

PSYOP forces have experienced the tragedy of KIA and continue to prove their mettle on the battlefield. The Regiment has taken a giant first step with the first awarding of the Gold MG Robert A. McClure award to COL (R) Al Paddock; COL (R) Jeff Jones, COL (R)Frank King and LTC (R) Joseph Meisner. Each of these outstanding individuals has dedicated a life time to PSYOP and deserving of the award.

While the maturation of the Branch through the award is a positive step forward, there is still much to do.

At the top of my list is the need to reunite AC and RC forces under the same command. The split of command responsibility between USSOCOM and “the Big Army” is a mistake. As one well placed Pentagon official put it during branch week “there must be transparency of capability” to best serve the force. Hopefully DOD is moving ahead in this direction.

Second is the need for community leadership through the CDR of POG troop units, the Regiment and PSYOP Associations. It is my belief that the POG CDR and the JMISC CDR must constitute the critical components of an informal Board of Directors who work in tandem with all the constituents including SWC for the betterment of the branch. SOCOM as the Proponent for PSYOP needs to exert itself through J39 and serve as the catalyst (and perhaps funder) to insure the evolution of the total community.

Third is political action. It all happens on “The Hill” and we in PSYOP must model our ability to “inform” members of Congress about PSYOP to help insure PSYOP receives its appropriate share of the pie.

Fourth is image building. All of us – those in uniform and out must work together to help build a positive image of PSYOP to once and for all remove the stigma of ‘propaganda’ and to clearly articulate the value of what we do everywhere from the battlefield to the Congress to wording of contracts.

My personal congratulations to COL Curt Boyd on the completion of his outstanding tenure as CDR of the 4th POG and my best wishes to the incoming CDR, COL Carl Phillips on his assumption of Command next month.

Reserve PSYOP and Homeland Defense

Today’s Washington Post reported that SecDef Gates has asked the military to review their roles, responsibilities and capabilities to cope with Homeland Defense in addition to the current Warfighter missions. (see: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/24/AR2008112402456.html)

PSYOP is likely to be in the forefront of any military mission associated with Homeland Defense because it is the only practical means a military commander would have to inform the population of actions they need to take (e.g. store extra food and water), actions to avoid (e.g. curfew enforcement) and information (where to gather or obtain medical help, etc.)

PSYOP will undoubtedly be integrated into the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) supporting FEMA efforts that will be activated to deal with the situation. The various ESF are:

ESF#1 - Transportation

ESF#2 - Communications

ESF#3 - Public Works and Engineering

ESF#4 - Firefighting

ESF#5 - Emergency Management

ESF#6 - Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services

ESF#7 - Logistics Management and Resource Support

ESF#8 - Public Health and Medical Services

ESF#9 - Search and Rescue

ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

ESF#11 -Agriculture and Natural Resources

ESF#12 Energy

ESF#13 - Public Safety and Security

ESF#14 - Long Term Community Recovery

ESF#15 External Affairs

Homeland Defense missions may be actually fraught with more tension thancombat missions because the activity is taking place in the soldier’s homeland and perhaps even his or her neighborhood and because USAR PSYOP forces in are not trained in Homeland Defense or domestic activities, and have no on-going interaction with DHS or other domestic agencies that would likely be involved with domestic incidents.

As a minimum PSYOP units should consider developing contingency plans and on-call rosters. Homeland defense missions will likely occur without significant warning and require rapid response. Commanders would do well to integrate homeland contingency deployments with their home station training and to exercise teams with short, no-notice exercises. In addition selected personnel should be encouraged to become familiar with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and to complete a pre-determined minimum number of courses. This can be done on-line at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nims_training.shtm. Furthermore, RSTs and other resources should be employed to pay soldiers for their time and encourage participation.

The National Planning Scenarios (see http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm) can form the basis of ODP and NCODP sessions and provide great CPX materials. Creative trainers can transplant and adjust the various NPS to suit their particular needs and geographic areas of emphasis.

September 11 taught us the lesson of being unprepared and the critical need for organizational interoperability, let’s hope we have learned it.

Orders and Travel Pay SNAFUs Persist

When I was a young and humble 2LT (OK, so I was only a young 2LT). Many an NCO would tell me: “Never mess with a soldier’s pay or their mail.” I found that advice to be among the more durable tips I’d been given in ROTC and early on in my career.

Apparently the senior echelons in today’s Army Reserve haven’t gotten the word as chronic problems persist in cutting mob, ADSW AND ADT orders so employers can be notified, soldiers can get paid and travel vouchers languish for weeks. While the Government Travel Card (GTC) may have made life easier for those who didn’t have credit cards or were unable to get them, it hasn’t helped out on the payment end. DFAS processing time remains unacceptable.

To be fair, many civilian employers, like my former employer, Symantec dictated that you used the company credit card or supposedly your expenses wouldn’t be reimbursed. Employees were responsible for paying that AMEX card regardless of when they submitted their expense reports for reimbursement or when the check was ultimately cut by the employer. Failure to pay on time could adversely affect the employee’s credit report. It would appear that the USAR has unfortunately lifted the page from the commercial sector in this case.

Given the pressure on today’s force, the hectic optempo, and the economic pressure on soldiers and their families its time that our GOs and elected officials worked together to quickly address these chronic issues.

I have e-mailed both my Senators and my Congressperson. I’ve also sent e-mails to the leading candidates from both partiers and I suggest you do the same.

I’m not sure if well get a reaction, but it is past time for these problems to be conquered and this is THE election year after all.