Something Different: IO and Terrorists

Today's posting is something a bit different. Following is a concept paper I drafted for a colleague. Essentially I took the IO capabilities of DoD and then provided analysis on Terrorist employment of those same capabilities.

Comments and input are welcome of course.

Photo Source: http://samsonblinded.org/blog/osama-too-good-to-be-true-part-1.htm

Terrorist Use of Information Operations (IO)

COL (R) Lawrence D. Dietz; General Counsel & Managing Director Cyber Security,
TAL Global Corporation

I Introduction
The US Department of Defense employs Information Operations to influence the course of battle and act as a combat multiplier. Terrorists are also very successfully employing IO and technology to their advantage. This short paper will give you an overview to assist you in future research.

II Department of Defense IO Capabilities

Reference: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dmspo/Publications/Information%20Operations%20Primer%20AY11%20Web%20Version.pdf; Accessed 15 Mar 11

A. Core Capabilities

1. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) now Military Information Support Operations (MISO) – operations designed to influence the behavior of the target in line with CDR’s Concept of the Operation (CONOP)

2. Military Deception (MILDEC) – actions taken to shield true capability from the enemy (e.g Patton’s fake Army in the UK as a decoy for the Normandy invasion.

3. Operations Security (OPSEC) – all measures taken to shield information from adversaries and enemies

4. Electronic Warfare (EW) – dominance of the electronic spectrum, actions can include jamming to deny the enemy is communication, actions taken to identify enemy electronic emitters to facilitate identification of their units, other order of battle information, targeting for interception or jamming.

5. Computer Network Operations (CNO)
a. Computer Network Attack (CNA) – denying the enemy the use of their IT networks.
b. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) – using the enemy’s network for friendly advantage, e.g. intelligence collection, communications medium, storage of hostile software code, etc.
c. Computer Network Defense (CND) – defending one’s own network

B. IO Supporting Capabilities

1. Counterintelligence
2. Combat Camera (Air Force Unit that provides still and video camera support)
3. Physical Attack
4. Physical Security
5. Information Assurance – protecting electronic information

C. IO Related Capabilities

1. Public Affairs = Public Relations; a conduit to the media and creator of print, and broadcast media.
2. Civil Military Operations – military forces employing civilian skills to improve the life and infrastructure of a local population.
3. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy – Department of Defense support to the Department of State’s Public Diplomacy Operations

II Terrorist Use of IO Capabilities

A. Core Capabilities

1. Propaganda – Terrorists are making exceptionally good use of the Internet as a means to inform, influence and recruit. They are also being supported by ‘friendly’ media such as Al Jazeera which tends to spin the news in a way that is favorably received by the Arab Street. Terrorist propaganda is especially effective due to the speed with which they capitalize on events that serve their purpose. This rapid response is indicative of a streamlined or de-centralized chain of command and abbreviated approval cycle.

Allied information support operations tend to be much more cumbersome due to the heavy ROE and complex approval schema which can often include both military and civilian command cycles.

2. Military Deception (MILDEC) – In my view terrorist operations tend to be decentralized although they employ deception to shield their true intentions and make very effective use of ‘cover’ identities.

3. Operations Security (OPSEC) – Terrorist cells are generally quite secure due to their decentralized nature. Most terrorist organizations appear to have a very healthy respect for Signals Intelligence and will avoid electronic means of communications such as mobile phones to avoid detection. Trade craft to include steganography (the concealment of messages in pictures) is also employed along with other measures such as compartmentalized chat rooms, common password schemas, etc.

4. Electronic Warfare (EW) – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are often remotely detonated via mobile phones, garage door openers, etc. I am unaware of any large scale terrorist jamming efforts to date.

5. Computer Network Operations (CNO)

a. Computer Network Attack (CNA) – Experts believe that terrorists will employ cyber attacks in conjunction with a kinetic or physical attack. CNA may be employed prior to or subsequent to the kinetic attack depending on the type of operation.

b. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) – Terrorists, and nation states for that matter are routinely probing networks of interest. Terrorists are likely to employ a combination of human agents to infiltrate target organizations to be in a better position to exploit networks directly or to insert malicious code (such as the Stuxnet reported planted to damage the Iranian Nuclear Research program) for later execution.

Exploitation can also include gathering intelligence from the network. Terrorist cells must be self-financing. Harvesting data (personally identifiable information or PII) that allows them to steal identities which in turn allows monetization through theft of funds, goods or services is very effective.

Terrorist cells can also exploit networks by gathering information that may be of use to the movement in some way such as to identify potential funding sources or gather target information.

Terrorists are employing the Internet as a cost effective and for the most part, relatively secure communications channel. Their global operations lend themselves to Internet communications for availability, cost and security reasons.

c. Computer Network Defense (CND) – Unable to comment.

B. IO Supporting Capabilities

1. Counterintelligence – No comments

2. Combat Camera – Terrorist organizations make effective use of still and video cameras. They also exploit images captured by other sources such as the media.

3. Physical Attack – Mumbai type attacks are very likely to increase. They require a small footprint, are relatively low in cost and very difficult to defend against. They are very effective at exploiting soft targets which in turns results in dramatic chaos which is then exploited through the media and by the Terrorists’ own sources.

4. Physical Security – No Comment

5. Information Assurance – See Opsec Above

C. IO Related Capabilities

1. Public Affairs = Public Relations; Terrorists are exceptional PR professionals. They understand the value of publicity, especially the emotional appeal of images. They are able to appeal to ‘friendly’ media to a very great extent.
2. Civil Military Operations – Hezbollah and the Taliban have been quite successful at using social welfare as a means to ingratiate themselves with local populations.
3. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy – Governments tend to hide their association with terrorist organizations.

Attacking The Terrorist Mind

The January 10, 2010 NY Times features an article entitled: “The Terrorist Mind: An Update” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/weekinreview/10kershaw.html?scp=1&sq=terrorist%20mind&st=cse)

The author analyzes works by a number of academicians who have studied the terrorist mind. According to the article, Dr. John Horgan of International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State is credited with leading “much of the research into what is known as disengagement – a terrorist’s departure from the organization”. Dr. Horgan claims that there are a couple of key reasons why terrorists leave the movement. This is not to say they abandon their radical views, but rather they have left the group and renounced violence.

Leading reasons include: the small groups they are in “are rife with jealousies and personal competition; life is boring; pressure of maintaining a double life is too exhausting. Others include “aging out” where the member has grown to the point of wanting more stability and perhaps starting a family. Some may sense that the group’s goals are unattainable and/or they have reached their moral limit. Others are dismayed to find elderly and children engaged in battles.

From a PSYOP perspective we want to stimulate and reinforce these views. The Internet is likely the ideal medium to transmit dramatizations and perhaps ‘testimonials’ form former terrorists (to include Taliban) that underscore the feelings noted above.

The Internet has been cited as a key medium for recruitment for Al Qadea and Others (see NY Times, December 31, 2009, “Focus on Internet Imams As Recruiters for Al Qaeda” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01imam.html?scp=1&sq=Focus%20on%20Internet%20Imams&st=cse)) Consequently it is logical to assume that the same medium would be the way to reach the terrorist member and transmit messages reinforcing the desire to leave the movement.

Chatrooms and other virtual meeting places need to be designed that can attract terrorist recruits and members and that offer messages stimulating disengagement. In my view it makes sense to post messages from various sources on websites known to espouse terrorism. I am a believer of using the Internet like the ocean. Taking down offending websites is like playing Whack A Mole because new ones will pop as quickly as others are taken down.

It seems to me that these kinds of operations need to be joint (more than one service) and ideally combined (more than 1 nation). Furthermore the best work product is likely to come from a combination of military, diplomatic and civilian minds – groups designed to think like the customer with the native linguistic ability to carry the creativity and disengagement messages forward in multiple directions on the Internet and elsewhere.

Can PSYOP Prevent Murderer Bombers?

First of all, anyone who detonates an explosive with the intent of killing others is a murderer and I frankly don’t give a rat’s ass if they end up killing themselves in the process.



The Washington Times featured an article: “Suicide Recruits Dropping in Iraq” (http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/11/suicide-recruits-dropping-in-iraq/) which reported a decrease in foreign recruits.

Irregular Warfare reeks of local action. People know their neighborhood better than any visitor can hope to. Local conditions affect those who live there and those whose families have lived in that area in the past. Even if the report is correct, the issue remains that murderer bombers are lethal and hard to stop. A thinking and breathing IED is a dangerous weapon. It's also my contention that recuritment of murderer bombers takes place locally and must be stopped there rather than anywhere else.

From a PSYOP perspective I suspect that there is a tipping point in the mind of the recruit. The apprentice murderer reaches a point where no amount of convincing will dissuade them from going forward. This point may be reached due to the influence of peers, people they respect, or out of desperation. All the PSYOP in the world is too late.

PSYOP should be directed as early in the cycle as possible. Just as small elephants are easier to train than big ones, PSYOP should be laser focused on diverting individuals from this path is likely to have the most effect especially if the PSYOP messages come across as both credible and powerful. A prerequisite to success in this kind of a campaign would be extremely detailed local knowledge. Details like the family composition of each apartment building, the most popular gathering places, the food most closely associated with a warm family atmosphere, the most influential teachers and religious leaders and a keen sense of what has gone wrong there as well.

Messages should be delivered by complementary means with an emphasis on word of mouth and informal communications. If possible messaging should be present at key locations perhaps using artwork such as murals, graffiti and only if appropriate – posters.

Small investments at the local recruiting source will be big dividends by diverting would be murderer bombers from their course.